STACY LYNN BEEBE V LLOYD BURKE BEEBE
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
STACY LYNN BEEBE,
UNPUBLISHED
November 3, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 226125
Gladwin Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 99-001153-DM
LLOYD BURKE BEEBE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Wilder, P.J., and Smolenski and Whitbeck, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Lloyd Burke Beebe appeals as of right from a judgment of divorce dissolving his
marriage with plaintiff Stacy Lynn Beebe. The only issues on appeal concern the trial court’s decision to
award sole physical custody of the children to Stacy Beebe. We affirm.
I. Basic Facts And Procedural History
A. Overview
Stacy Beebe and Lloyd Beebe married on June 14, 1986; Stacy Beebe filed a complaint for
divorce on February 16, 1999. The parties have two minor children, the first born March 30, 1989,
and the second born December 17, 1990. The parties were in basic agreement at the beginning of
divorce proceedings that they should share physical custody of the children. At that time, Stacy Beebe
worked as a secretary with the Clare/Gladwin Regional Education Service District while Lloyd Beebe
worked for Robinson Industries. Both parties and the two children continued to reside in the marital
home in Gladwin during most of the divorce proceedings.
Much of the testimony at trial focused on the parties’ respective parenting skills and abilities as
well as different negative aspects of the marriage and family relationship. Stacy Beebe offered testimony
about Lloyd Beebe’s temperament and characterized him as impatient and forceful with the children.
Lloyd Beebe characterized Stacy Beebe as a spendthrift. The testimony established that the parties
encountered serious financial problems on at least two occasions during the marriage and Stacy Beebe
-1
testified on cross-examination that how the couple handled their finances was a major problem in the
marriage.
B. Expert Testimony
At trial, Stacy Beebe called clinical psychologist Dr. Edward Mike as an expert witness. Dr.
Mike testified that he met with Lloyd Beebe on thirteen occasions and he met with both parties for “two
or three” joint sessions. From these meetings Dr. Mike concluded that both parties were good parents
and they both loved their children. In response to questions about Stacy Beebe, Dr. Mike testified that
she was concerned about Lloyd Beebe’s relationship with the children because she felt he was impatient
and abrupt at times. Dr. Mike testified that Lloyd Beebe was extremely upset that the family was
breaking up. However, according to Dr. Mike, when it became apparent that Stacy Beebe was
determined to go through with the divorce, they agreed that there was no reason for her to meet with
him for further counseling.
Dr. Mike indicated that Lloyd Beebe was concerned with the children’s welfare and whether
they would be affected by the divorce. According to Dr. Mike, after three sessions with the children, he
felt that they were comfortable with their father, not afraid of him. Dr. Mike also testified that Lloyd
Beebe spent much more time with the children and that they told him they “never really have anything to
do with mom because she likes to read books, and she likes to watch TV, and she never really has any
time with us.” However, just prior to the date Dr. Mike testified, the children told him that Stacy
Beebe was doing many more different things with them than she had previously done. On cross
examination, Dr. Mike testified that his “professional opinion” was that the parties “should share
custodial care-giving equally.” He also testified that the children were seeing him to help them through
the divorce. On recross-examination, Dr. Mike testified that he would award sole custody of the
children to Lloyd Beebe if he had to make a choice between him and Stacy Beebe. He also testified
that he thought both parties were good parents and that it was in the best interests of the children to
spend as much time as possible with both.
C. Custody Decision
The trial court disregarded Dr. Mike’s expert testimony when it decided to award custody to
Stacy Beebe, saying:
[T]here is case law to indicated [sic] that it’s error for a Court to accept
opinions from experts on child custody when they have not seen the children in the
presence of both children [sic] – of both parents. For what it’s worth. I had that
particular issue jammed down my throat in a prior case, so I – I know that that is in fact,
generally speaking, good law.
In its subsequent written opinion, the trial court considered the twelve best interest factors that apply in
child custody cases, which are articulated in MCL 722.23; MSA 23.312(3).
Under best interest factor (a), “[t]he love, affection and other emotional ties existing between
the parties,” the trial court found the parties had equal emotional ties with the children.
-2
The trial court found that Stacy Beebe had a “distinct advantage” under best interest factor (b),
which concerns “[t]he capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give the child love, affection,
and guidance and to continue the education and raising of the child in his or her religion or creed if any.”
The trial reasoned that Stacy Beebe was active in church activities with the children and teaching
Sunday School. The trial court further found that Lloyd Beebe had little or no involvement i these
n
religious activities.
The trial court found the parties equal under factor (c), which considers “[t]he capacity and
disposition of the parties involved to provide” for the children. The trial court explained that both
parties had consistent and adequate employment. According to the trial court, the parties’ current
financial situation was stable despite earlier problems.
Factor (d) looks at “[t]he length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment,
and the desirability of maintaining continuity” and the trial court concluded that both parties were equal
under this factor. The trial court noted that the marital home and adjacent acreage had been awarded to
Lloyd Beebe. The trial court also reasoned that Stacy Beebe had the “wherewithal to obtain a suitable
environment for her sons.”
Factor (e) examines “the permanence, as a family unit, of the existing proposed custodial home
or homes.” The trial court found that neither party had an advantage since they had continued to live
together in the marital home during the proceedings. The trial court also found that there was no
established custodial environment.
Factor (f) asks the trial court to judge the parties’ “moral fitness.” The trial court concluded
that both parties possessed outstanding moral attributes and that neither had an advantage regarding this
factor.
Similarly, factor (g) requires the trial court to determine the parties’ “mental and physical
health.” The trial court found that both parties enjoyed “excellent health, both mentally and physically”
and no advantage existed for either.
Under factor (h), which refers to “[t]he home, school, and community record of the child,” the
trial court determined that both parties were “involved in school matters on an equal basis.” Further,
the trial court stated that “both parents seem intent on making sure that the children have an appropriate
education with as little difficulty as possible.”
Under factor (i), “[t]he reasonable preference of the child,” the trial court found that the children
had a preference to spend time with each parent equally. In making this finding, the trial court rejected
Dr. Mike’s testimony, explaining that
Dr. Mike provided opinions as to preferences but they were without sufficient credibility
for the court to consider for the simple reason that he never took the time or the
opportunity to observe plaintiff with her sons. Therefore, the court disregards his
testimony as to the preference of the boys concerning child custody.
-3
Factor (j) encompasses “[t]he willingness and ability of each of the parties to facilitate and
encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent.” The
trial court concluded that the parties were equal under this factor. To reach that conclusion, the trial
court characterized Lloyd Beebe’s negativity toward Stacy Beebe’s parenting skills and her
uncooperative conduct during the whole divorce proceedings as “mud throwing” between the parties.
Domestic violence was n an issue in this case so the trial court did not make any specific
ot
findings under factor (k).
Finally, under factor (l), which permits the trial court to ponder “[a]ny other factor considered
by the court to be relevant to a particular child custody dispute,” the trial court found that Stacy Beebe
had a “distinct advantage.” In particular, the trial court concluded that Lloyd Beebe was “overly
impatient with his eight and ten year old sons” and that he showed a “lack of consistency equal to that
of plaintiff.”
Although the trial court found the question of custody to be “an extremely close call,” the court
ultimately concluded that it would be in the best interests of the children to award physical custody to
Stacy Beebe while granting Lloyd Beebe “quality parenting frequently.”
On appeal, Lloyd Beebe challenges the trial court’s decision to disregard Dr. Mike’s testimony
as well as it specific findings concerning best interest factors (b), (c), (d), (h), (i), (j), and (l).
II. Standard Of Review
We review all the trial court’s findings to determine whether those findings are against the great
weight of the evidence, affirming unless the evidence clearly preponderates in a contrary direction.1
III. Dr. Mike’s Testimony
As the excerpt from the trial court’s decision, above, indicates, the primary factor that the trial
court considered when it rejected Dr. Mike’s testimony was the credibility of his reluctant
recommendation of Lloyd Beebe over Stacy Beebe as the custodial parent. In general, trial courts are
given wide latitude to determine whether a witness is credible based on the personal ability to observe
witnesses as they testify.2 Trial courts handling domestic relations matters are not excepted from this
rule.3
The trial court explained that Dr. Mike lacked sufficient opportunities to observe the children
with their mother in order to conclude that Lloyd Beebe would be the better parent to provide physical
1
MCL 722.28; MSA 25.312(8); Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871, 877-878; 526 NW2d 889
(1994) (Fletcher I).
2
See MCR 2.613(C).
3
See Williams v Williams, 214 Mich App 391, 401-402; 542 NW2d 892 (1995).
-4
custody. Spending time with the children and their father likely gave Dr. Mike a
mple reasons to
conclude that Lloyd Beebe was a good parent. However, the trial court asked Dr. Mike to make a
relative determination: which parent would be better than the other when it came to physical custody.
To make this decision, the trial court logically concluded, Dr. Mike had to have an adequate opportunity
to observe and meet with Stacy Beebe. As a matter of undisputed fact, Dr. Mike met with Stacy
Beebe only a fraction of the number of times he met with Lloyd Beebe. Furthermore, Dr. Mike only
met with the children without the parties’ presence on three occasions. While it may be debatable
whether Dr. Mike could accurately judge the children’s preferences from these three meetings, there
certainly is not enough evidence on the record to contradict the trial court’s conclusion that Dr. Mike
was not sufficiently convincing to dictate a different custody outcome, much less evidence that this was
against the great weight of the evidence.
IV. The Best Interest Factors
As noted above, under factor (b), the trial court reasoned that Stacy Beebe had a “distinct
advantage” when it came to helping the children learn and grow in their religion because she was
involved in church activities with the children and taught Sunday school while Lloyd Beebe had little or
no involvement in the children’s religious activities. The record supported this finding. Both Stacy
Beebe and her friend described her religious activities, while Lloyd Beebe testified that he did not go to
church with the children regularly. Rather, he and his mother took the children to church when Stacy
Beebe did not do so.
Lloyd Beebe, in his argument concerning factor (c), contends that he and Stacy Beebe are not
equal when it comes to their capacity to provide for their children because she has a history of managing
money poorly. Lloyd Beebe first cites Barringer v Barringer4 for the proposition that a trial court can
look at a party’s higher earning capacity and analyze this particular factor in making a custody decision.
The trial court supported its conclusion that the parties were equal under this factor by pointing out that
both parties are now employed, earning roughly the same amount of money, and each have relatively
stable finances. This case is thus distinguishable from Barringer, supra, in which only one spouse
worked outside the home and the capacity to earn money was a minor but relevant consideration.
Lloyd Beebe also cites Fletcher v Fletcher,5 known as Fletcher II, in which this Court found
that one party’s poor financial judgment affected the children and favored the other party. While Lloyd
Beebe may be correct about Stacy Beebe’s financial problems in the past, he failed to provide evidence
that this problem is ongoing and poses any current threat, no matter how minimal, to the children’s well
being. The facts in Fletcher II were quite different in that the mother’s financial decision continued to
affect the children during the divorce proceedings and revealed her disposition to provide for her
children’s needs in the future. Given the trial court’s clear explanation for its findings, which was well
grounded in the record, we cannot conclude that the finding that factor (c) equally favored both parties
was against the great weight of the evidence.
4
Barringer v Barringer, 191 Mich App 639; 479 NW2d 3 (1991).
5
Fletcher v Fletcher, 229 Mich App 19, 26; 581 NW2d 11 (1998) (Fletcher II).
-5
Lloyd Beebe contends that the trial court erred when it found that factor (d) favored the parties
equally because the children had lived in the marital home and enjoyed the adjacent property their entire
lives and the trial court had awarded him both the home and that property. Lloyd Beebe claims that
Barringer, supra, supports his argument that this factor should tip in favor of the party who retains the
marital home, at least in some cases, because it indicates stability. However, the analysis in Barringer
focused on the defendant’s willingness, if he were awarded custody, to reside with the children in the
marital home and encourage a free and open relationship between the children and the other parent.6
The Barringer Court did not conclude the trial court must consider who retained the marital home
under this factor. Further, the trial court did not ignore that Lloyd Beebe was retaining the marital home
and adjacent property. Rather, the trial court concluded that retaining these assets did not outweigh
Stacy Beebe’s capacity to provide continuity and stability for the children in another suitable residence.
In particular, the trial court acknowledged that Lloyd Beebe was awarded the home and adjacent
property because the parties had agreed to divide the marital estate in that way. Thus, it makes sense
that the trial court would not use Stacy Beebe’s willingness to facilitate the division of the marital estate
as a factor that weighed against her in awarding custody. We see no error here.
Challenging the trial court’s finding that factor (h), which assesses the children’s home, school,
and community records, Lloyd Beebe argues that this factor did not favor the parties equally, but
favored him because he was the only parent who took action to maintain scholastic standards for both
children. However, the evidence introduced at trial supported the trial court’s conclusion that both
parents were involved with the children’s education. Even if their involvement took different forms, with
Lloyd Beebe attending parent teacher conferences and Stacy Beebe supervising the children’s
homework, there is no evidence that one parent had substantially more positive involvement in this area
of the children’s lives than the other parent.
This case is also distinguishable from Lloyd Beebe’s authority, McCain v McCain.7 In
McCain, the mother favored educating the child at home even though she knew the father opposed
taking the child out of her school, where she was doing well.8 Further, the mother had made an
unexplained decision to prevent the child from reading a book at school, which may have interfered with
her educational progress.9 Contrary to the facts in McCain, there is no evidence here that Stacy Beebe
made decisions about her children’s education that were designed to create conflict with Lloyd Beebe,
involved a dramatic change in the form of schooling, or prevented the children from progressing in their
current school.
Further, the trial court attributed the slight disturbances one of the parties’ children was
experiencing at school to the divorce proceedings themselves. The trial testimony also indicates that
both parties are concerned about educating their children. We have no reason to disagree with the trial
6
See Barringer, supra at 642.
7
McCain v McCain, 229 Mich App 123; 580 NW2d 485 (1998).
8
Id. at 127-128.
9
Id. at 128.
-6
court’s conclusion that these problems will abate naturally once the litigation surrounding the divorce
ceases. The trial court did not erroneously conclude that this factor favored both parents equally.
In applying factor (i), the children’s preferences for custody, the trial court chose not to
interview the children. Rather, the trial court considered the testimony of all the other witnesses at trial,
which suggested that the older child enjoys playing sports with Lloyd Beebe but that both children
needed their mother’s “nurturing and guidance.” Bowers v Bowers10 presented a roughly similar
situation in which the trial court failed to interview the parties’ two children, who were ages six and nine.
The Bowers Court found that the trial court’s failure to interview the children was error requiring
reversal because the children were old enough to have a preference and each parent had established a
custodial environment with one of the children due to a lengthy separation before and during the divorce
proceedings.11 The parties to this case, however, did not each take one child for the duration of the
divorce proceedings, leading to the conclusion that each child would have a strong preference regarding
with which parent to live. Rather the parties shared custody in a generally equal manner.
We note that the statutory language for this factor does not refer to interviewing the child to
determine his or her custody preference.12 Case law also holds that failing to interview children is not a
per se error requiring reversal as long as the trial court considers other evidence of the children’s
preferences.13 While we believe that the trial court would have been well-advised to interview the
children in this case to determine their preferences to custody, we cannot say that the trial court’s finding
that the children equally preferred each of their parents was against the great weight of the evidence.
There was extensive testimony at trial in this case concerning the children’s strong relationships with
both of their parents from which the trial court appropriately concluded that “[t]he preferences of these
children as to custody is equal.”
Lloyd Beebe also claims that the trial court erroneously concluded that he and Stacy Beebe
were equally favored, or disfavored as the case may be, under factor (j). This factor considers whether
each party is willing and able to facilitate a relationship between their children and the other parent. To
explain its finding, the trial court referred to Lloyd Beebe’s negative attitude toward Stacy Beebe’s
parenting skills and his “nebulous” testimony concerning her willingness to allow him time with the
children. The court also cited Stacy Beebe’s negative attitude toward Lloyd Beebe’s parenting skills,
which focused on the way he expressed anger. The trial court’s remark that this was “mud throwing”
suggested that the trial court had observed similar conduct between parties in other divorces and
thought that the parties to this case did not exhibit any unusual or concerning tendencies to impede the
children’s relationship with the other parent. Having heard each party’s testimony first-hand, the trial
court was entitled to reject the suggestion that Stacy Beebe was less willing and able to encourage a
beneficial relationship between the children and their father based on the trial court’s appreciation of
10
Bowers v Bowers, 190 Mich App 51, 55-56; 475 NW2d 394 (1991).
11
Id.
12
See MCL 722.3(i); MSA 25.312(3)(i).
13
See Truetle v Truetle, 197 Mich App 690, 694-696; 495 NW2d 836 (1993).
-7
whether either party made credible allegations against the other.14 Quite clearly, having mentioned that
Lloyd Beebe gave only “nebulous” testimony concerning Stacy Beebe’s willingness to facilitate the
children’s relationship with him, credibility did factor into the trial court’s finding. We conclude that the
finding was not against the great weight of the evidence.15
The last finding Lloyd Beebe challenges is the finding under factor (l), the catch-all provision that
permits the trial court to consider other relevant circumstances not accounted for in the other factors.
The trial court found that Stacy Beebe had a “distinct advantage” under factor (l) because she has a
more even temperament when dealing with her children while Lloyd Beebe is prone to raise his voice
and get angry. The trial court was careful to point out that it did not think that Lloyd Beebe was abusive
and it was likely that Stacy Beebe also raised her voice on occasion. However, the trial court
concluded that Lloyd Beebe was “overly impatient with his eight and ten year old sons” and that he
showed a “lack of consistency equal to that of plaintiff.” Lloyd Beebe actually sought counseling for this
problem, providing some objective verification for Stacy Beebe’s allegations. While this may be a very
fine point to make when considering the best interest of the children, it is nonetheless an appropriate
consideration because it is directly related to the manner in which the children would be treated if the
trial court had awarded physical custody to Lloyd Beebe. Given the way the trial court narrowly
tailored its framing of this observation, carefully avoiding generalities about Lloyd Beebe’s potential to
be a good father, we cannot conclude that the finding was against the great weight of the evidence.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
14
See Fletcher I, supra at 890.
15
See Harper v Harper, 199 Mich App 409, 414; 502 NW2d 731 (1993); see also MCR 2.613(C).
-8
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.