PEOPLE OF MI V ROBERT HOLMES JR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 31, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 214418
Lake Circuit Court
LC No. 98-003375-FC
ROBERT HOLMES, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: White, P.J., and Talbot and R.J. Danhof*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, MCL 750.316; MSA
28.548, burning personal property over $50, MCL 750.74; MSA 28.269, and possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). He was sentenced to natural life
imprisonment for the first-degree murder conviction, and to 2
-1/2 to 4 years’ imprisonment for the
burning personal property conviction, consecutive to two-years’ imprisonment for the felony-firearm
conviction. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing a detective to testify
regarding hearsay statements made by the victim’s daughter. We find no merit to this claim. The record
indicates that the testimony at issue was elicited as part of a separate record, outside the presence of the
jury, and was not admitted into evidence.
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial when the victim’s
father violated the sequestration order. We disagree. Defendant did not move for a mistrial below, and
the record indicates that defense counsel expressly waived the sequestration order with respect to the
victim’s father. People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 215; 612 NW2d 144 (2000). The victim’s father
was the first witness to testify and defense counsel consented to his remaining in the courtroom after he
left the stand. Defense counsel also consented to the prosecution’s decision to recall the witness later in
the trial, and even proceeded to cross-examine the witness at that time. Defendant cannot “assign error
* Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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on appeal to something his own counsel deemed proper at trial.” People v Green, 228 Mich App
684, 691; 580 NW2d 444 (1998).
Defendant’s related claims that the trial court erred in failing to strike the witness’ testimony and
in failing to issue a cautionary instruction also lack merit. After defense counsel cross-examined the
witness after he was recalled, he acknowledged that the prosecutor “didn’t do anything improper” and
was “not asking to strike any testimony,” but wanted a cautionary instruction. Although the court stated
that it would “think” about giving such an instruction, defense counsel did not object on the record to
the instructions given and specifically approved them. Carter, supra at 215 (holding that the intentional
relinquishment of a known right constitutes a waiver that precludes a defendant from raising an issue on
appeal).
We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to admit photographs of the deceased
victim into evidence. People v Flowers, 222 Mich App 732, 736; 565 NW2d 12 (1997). The
photographs were relevant to prove intent and to corroborate the witnesses’ testimony, People v Mills,
450 Mich 61, 71, 76; 537 NW2d 909, modified 450 Mich 1212 (1995), and the fact that the photos
are gruesome or that defendant did not contest the physical circumstances of the killing or the nature of
the fatal wound does not render them inadmissible. Id. at 76; People v Schmitz, 231 Mich App 521,
534; 586 NW2d 766 (1998); People v Ho, 231 Mich App 178, 188; 585 NW2d 357 (1998). After
independent review, we cannot conclude that the probative value of the photographs was substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. MRE 403; Mills, supra at 76.
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in admitting portions of Omar Hawkins’
statement to the police under the statement against interest and general exceptions to the hearsay rule set
forth in MRE 804(b)(3) and (b)(6), respectively. Defendant specifically challenges Hawkins’
statements that (1) Hawkins traded three stones of crack cocaine for the gun allegedly used in the
offense, (2) that several individuals, including defendant, were present when the exchange took place,
and (3) that defendant would borrow the gun from him on occasion.1 Defendant argues that the trial
court erroneously found that the declarant was unavailable to testify at trial, that the probative value of
the statements was substantially outweighed by their prejudicial effect, and that their admission violated
his constitutional right of confrontation. We find that any error in the trial court’s decision to admit the
contested evidence was harmless.
Where, as here, a statement against penal interest is used to inculpate the accused, the
defendant’s constitutional right of confrontation is implicated. See People v Poole, 444 Mich 151,
162-166; 506 NW2d 505 (1993). A preserved constitutional error that “‘occur[s] during the
presentation of the case to the jury, and which may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of
other evidence,’” is subject to harmless error analysis. People v Anderson, 446 Mich 392, 405; 521
NW2d 538 (1994) (citation omitted); see also Carines, supra at 774, citing Anderson, supra; People
1
The trial court admitted statements (1) and (3) under MRE 804(b)(3); however, it is not clear whether
the court admitted statement (2) under MRE 804(b)(3) or MRE 804(b)(6) or whether it used MRE
804(b)(6) as an alternative ground for the admission of each statement.
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v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 644-645; 588 NW2d 480 (1998). “This requires the beneficiary of the
error to prove and the court to determine, beyond a reasonable doubt that there is ‘no reasonable
possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.’” Anderson,
supra at 406 (footnote and citation omitted).
In this case, the contested statements were offered for the purpose of linking defendant to the
murder weapon, a .38 caliber snub-nosed revolver. The statements did not specifically put defendant in
possession of the gun on the day or time of the offense and were therefore of minor importance. The
statements were also cumulative to other properly admitted evidence, including defendant’s own
statement to the police in which he admitted that he removed the gun from Thomas’ trailer on the day of
the offense. Kelly, supra at 644-645. Consequently, we conclude that there was no reasonable
possibility that the admission of the contested statements might have contributed to defendant’s
conviction and their admission was therefore harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Defendant lastly contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions.
Defendant abandoned this issue by failing to address the elements of the crimes charged and which of
those elements were not met or by failing to provide citation to authority in support of his claim. Prince
v MacDonald, 237 Mich App 186, 197; 602 NW2d 834 (1999). Nevertheless, in reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution and determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the
crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d
748, amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992). It is well established that circumstantial evidence and
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom may be sufficient to prove the elements of the crime. People v
Crawford, 232 Mich App 608, 616; 591 NW2d 669 (1998); see also People v Bottany, 43 Mich
App 375, 377-378; 204 NW2d 230 (1972) (the identity of the defendant as the person who
committed a crime may be established beyond a reasonable doubt by segments of circumstantial proof
in combination even if each element standing alone might not be sufficient).
First-degree premeditated murder requires proof that that the defendant intentionally killed the
victim and that the act of killing was premeditated and deliberate. People v Abraham, 234 Mich App
640, 656; 599 NW2d 736 (1999). Premeditation and deliberation require sufficient time to allow the
defendant to take a “second look.” Id., quoting People v Schollaert, 194 Mich App 158, 170; 486
NW2d 312 (1992). These elements may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the killing.
People v Anderson, 209 Mich App 527, 537; 531 NW2d 780 (1995). Premeditation may be
established through evidence of “(1) the prior relationship of the parties; (2) the defendant’s actions
before the killing; (3) the circumstances of the killing itself; and (4) the defendant’s conduct after the
homicide.” Id.
The elements of first-degree felony murder are “(1) the killing of a human being, (2) with the
intent to kill, to do great bodily harm, or to create a high risk of death or great bodily harm with the
knowledge that death or great bodily harm was the probable result, (3) while committing, attempting to
commit, or assisting in the commission of any of felonies specifically enumerated in [the statute],”
including larceny of any kind. People v Turner, 213 Mich App 558, 566; 540 NW2d 728 (1995);
MCL 750.316(1)(b); MSA 28.548(1)(b). Malice may be inferred from the facts and circumstances of
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the killing, Carines, supra at 759, and firing a weapon at close range will support an inference of an
intent to kill. People v Ray, 56 Mich App 610, 615; 224 NW2d 735 (1974). Larceny is the taking
and carrying away the property of another with felonious intent and without the owners consent.
People v Gimotty, 216 Mich App 254, 257-258; 549 NW2d 39 (1996).
The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the
commission or attempted commission of any felony other than those four enumerated in the statute.
MCL 750.227b(1); MSA 28.424(2)(1); People v Mitchell, 456 Mich 693, 698; 575 NW2d 283
(1998); People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 505; 597 NW2d 864 (1999).
Viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence established that the night
before the incident, defendant was at a party where he may have overheard two other men discussing a
plan to rob the victim, who had cashed a $312 check hours earlier. Charles Sanders, who testified
pursuant to an agreement with the prosecution, stated that defendant told him that he had seen the victim
with a large amount of cash and was apparently annoyed by the fact that she had money to “splurge” on
things like a car and a house and that he “had to have it.” After the party, defendant went to the
victim’s house where he spent the night with others, and was the last person to be seen with the victim
before her murder the following day. According to Sanders, defendant said that he walked up to the
victim, whispered something in her ear, and shot her in the back of her head. This account was
corroborated in part by medical evidence establishing that the victim was shot at point-blank range in
the back of the head.
The evidence further established that a police officer’s lost gun, a .38 caliber snub-nosed
revolver was used to commit the murder, and Sanders stated that defendant confessed to killing the
victim with a “.38 snub caliber.” Sanders also testified that defendant told him that he had dropped the
gun off at the home of someone called “Nudie.” Warren “Nudie” Thomas testified that defendant came
to his home with a gun and wanted to leave it with Thomas but when Thomas refused, defendant placed
the gun in a baggie. Under a Christmas tree outside Thomas’ trailer, the police found the gun in a baggie
in a McDonald’s bag wrapped in black cloth. In a statement to police in which he implicated one of the
men who had earlier discussed robbing the victim, defendant admitted that he had been given the gun
wrapped in a McDonald’s bag and black shirt, and that he had hid it outside the trailer.
There was also evidence that defendant was seen in possession of the victim’s car and that he
told one witness that he had approximately $300 in cash. Defendant had a wallet or purse similar to the
victim’s in which there was a card that may have had the name Carisa (the name of one of the victim’s
daughters) on it. Another witness told police that defendant offered her ATM and credit cards.
Sanders also testified that defendant said he tried to pay someone fifty dollars to “get out of town or
whatever,” and one witness testified that she declined defendant’s fifty-dollar offer to drive him to
another city. This evidence, if believed, was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant killed the victim with premeditation and deliberation and/or
during the course of an intended larceny, and that he was in the possession of a firearm at the time he
committed the murder. While we agree that Sanders may not have been the most reputable of
witnesses, his credibility and the weight accorded his testimony (which was corroborated with other
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evidence) were issues for the jury to determine and will not be resolved anew by this Court. Avant,
supra at 506; People v McFall, 224 Mich App 403, 412; 569 NW2d 828 (1997).
Defendant was also convicted of burning personal property over $50, which requires proof that
(1) the defendant set fire to certain property, (2) the property burned was personal property, (3) when
the defendant burned the property, he intended to set a fire knowing it would cause injury or damage to
another person or property, and (4) the property burned had a fair market value of more than $50.
MCL 750.74; MSA 28.269; CJI2d 31.4. Because proof of a fire alone gives rise to a presumption
“that the fire was the result of accident or of some providential cause,” the prosecutor must show that
the fire was intentionally or wilfully set. People v Lee, 231 Mich 607, 612; 204 NW 742 (1925).
Viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence showed that the victim’s car
was completely destroyed by fire on the day she was murdered. On that day, a witness saw defendant
arrive at his home in a car driven by a young woman, and return approximately three hours later in the
same car in which he appeared to be the sole occupant. Testimony from a police officer and tracking
dog handler established that there were two sets of footprints that led from the car up to the steps of
Thomas’ trailer. One set of footprints continued across the porch, down the steps, and ten or fifteen
feet away where they stopped at the discarded Christmas tree and then led back to the trailer. Plaster
casts of footprints found around the victim’s car, Thomas’ trailer, and other areas revealed two different
footwear patterns, one of which came from Timberland boots. Sanders testified that defendant told him
that “he had on some Timberland boots, and he exchanged them into some Adidas forms . . . [l]ike right
after, I guess, the murder had occurred . . . .” During one statement to the police, the officer noted that
defendant was wearing Adidas and that defendant stated that he had been wearing gray boots earlier
that day. Although defendant told police that he had left the boots in his bedroom, they were nowhere
to be found when the police searched the house.
In addition, the arson investigator testified that the fire was not caused by any defect in the
electrical system but was “humanly set.” The unusual burn patterns were indicative of use of an
accelerant and a trained arson dog alerted to those areas of the car and to samples collected from those
areas. Although scientific tests did not show traces of accelerant in those samples, the arson dog
handler testified that his dog, who had been certified one hundred percent accurate every year since
1992, could detect traces of accelerant that the chemists’ instruments could not. The police also found
a blue rag by the car and, in his attempt to incriminate another man, defendant told police that he was
present when it was set on fire and revealed that he knew a blue towel was present. In a later
statement, defendant told police that he and an accomplice “took the car to dispose of it.” The victim’s
father testified that he bought the car for approximately $12,500 one month before the crime, that it was
intact when he last saw it, and was in working condition the day the victim was killed. This
circumstantial evidence, if believed, was sufficient to enable a rational jury to infer that the elements of
burning personal property over $50, including defendant’s identity as the perpetrator of the crime, were
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Affirmed.
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/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Robert J. Danhof
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