IN RE HARDY MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of ASHIA B’RENEE HARDY and
D’SHAY EDWARD HARDY, Minors..
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
October 27, 2000
Petitioner -Appellee,
v
No. 224645
Wayne Circuit Court
Juvenile Division
LC No. 93-310019
VANCE EDWARD HARDY,
Respondent -Appellant,
and
EUKEDA RENEE LLOYD,
Respondent.
Before: Gribbs, PJ, and Kelly and Hoekstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-appellant appeals by right from the juvenile court order terminating his parental
rights to the minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (g), (j) and (k); MSA
27A.3178(598.19b)(3)(b)(i), (g), (j) and (k). We affirm.
We find from a review of the record that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that each of
the above-referenced subsections was established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 5.974(I);
In re Vasquez, 199 Mich App 44, 51; 501 NW2d 231 (1993). The record shows that respondent
held D’Shay’s hand near the flame on a stove, causing second degree burns on the palm and thumb.
Afterwards, he struck the child two or three times with a belt. Respondent sought no medical attention
for the burn. Respondent has “whipped” both children on other occasions and has allowed his mother,
with whom he and the children live, to do the same. Previously, respondent had been involved with the
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court system and had taken parenting classes, but this type of discipline continued even after the
parenting classes. Further, respondent stated at trial that he did not remember burning the child. Yet,
having pleaded no contest to a criminal charge of first-degree child abuse with regard to this incident,
respondent was convicted as charged, served sixty days in jail and is on probation for two years. The
medical records indicate that in addition to the burn D’Shay had a healing bruise on his lower back and
a loop mark.
Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the court clearly erred in terminating
respondent’s parental rights or in determining that the termination was in the best interest of the children.
In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; ___ NW2d ___ (2000).
To the extent that respondent argues that the trial court erred in failing to take action to preserve
respondent’s family and reunite respondent with his children, we find his argument without merit.
Provided that certain conditions are met, none of which include taking action to reunite parent and child,
the court properly may enter an order terminating parental rights under subsection 19b(3) at the initial
dispositional hearing. MCL 712A.19b(4); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(4); MCR 5.974(D). Moreover,
once the trial court determines that at least one statutory ground for termination under subsection 19b(3)
is established, termination is mandatory unless the court finds that termination is clearly not in the child’s
best interest. In re Trejo, supra at 364-365.
Affirmed.
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
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