UNITED TECH EMP ASSN V GOVERNOR OF MICHIGAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
UNITED TECHNICAL EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION,
UNPUBLISHED
October 27, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
OFFICE OF STATE EMPLOYER, MICHIGAN
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY HEALTH,
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER &
INDUSTRY SERVICES, MICHIGAN
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY, MICHIGAN BIOLOGIC PRODUCTS
INSTITUTE, MICHIGAN COMMUNITY PUBLIC
HEALTH AGENCY, and MICHIGAN
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES,
No. 213782
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 97-087127-CL
Defendants-Appellants.
Before: Talbot, P.J., and Gribbs and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants appeal by right from the trial court’s order granting summary disposition to plaintiff
under MCR 2.116(C)(9) and (10), denying summary disposition to defendants, vacating an arbitration
award, and remanding plaintiff’s grievances to a different arbitrator for a decision on the merits. We
reverse the trial court’s order and reinstate the arbitration award.
This case arises out of consolidated grievances filed by plaintiff, a collective bargaining unit,
alleging violations of conditions of employment contained in the collective bargaining agreement
(“CBA”) between the parties. The grievances resulted from the governor’s issuance of a number of
executive orders, the purpose of which was to reorganize the structure of the executive branch of
government, thereby transferring employees between various restructured departments. The transfers
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resulted in unilateral changes to seniority rights, overtime protections, layoff and recall rights, and other
conditions contained in the CBA.
By stipulation, the parties submitted the following issue to an arbitrator:
Did the State of Michigan violate various provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement between [plaintiff] and the State of Michigan when it unilaterally assigned
employees covered by . . . [plaintiff’s] collective bargaining agreement to different
departmental employers as a result of [the] Governor’s Executive Order[s]?
The arbitrator concluded that a CBA cannot abrogate the governor’s constitutional authority to make
reassignments pursuant to executive orders. He ruled that because the governor’s reorganization was
lawful and was not arbitrary, the CBA had not been violated and plaintiff’s grievances therefore were
without merit, notwithstanding the changes in employment conditions that resulted from the
reorganization.
Subsequently, plaintiff filed a complaint to vacate the arbitration award and then sought
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(9) and (10), arguing that (1) the arbitrator exceeded his
authority because the CBA expressly indicated that the arbitrator could not nullify or ignore a provision
of the agreement, (2) the governor’s constitutional authority to reorganize the executive branch had been
diluted by his ratification of the CBA, and (3) the governor could not exercise his constitutional authority
so as to impair a valid, existing contract such as the CBA.
In response, defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that
(1) the trial court’s review was limited to whether the arbitrator acted within the scope of his authority as
expressed in the CBA; and (2) the arbitrator did act within the scope of his authority by determining if
the governor’s actions were constitutional, since the CBA was subject to the constitution.
The trial court ruled that although the governor has the authority to reorganize the executive
branch, that authority may not be exercised such that it abrogates collectively bargained contractual
rights in violation of the constitutional prohibition against impairment of the obligations of contracts,
Const 1963, art 1, § 10. The court then declared the arbitrator’s conclusion that the CBA had not
been violated to be an error on the face of the award requiring that it be vacated. Implicit in the trial
court’s ruling was a finding that the executive reorganization had indeed violated the contract clause.
The court granted plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition, denied defendants’ motion for summary
disposition, vacated the arbitration award, and remanded plaintiff’s grievances to a different arbitrator
for a decision on the merits.
Defendants first argue that the trial court employed an incorrect standard of review in assessing
the arbitrator’s decision. Defendants contend that the trial court erroneously used the standard of
review for statutory arbitration, when this case involved common law arbitration. Whether the court
employed a proper standard of review is a question of law. This Court reviews questions of law de
novo. In re Rupert, 205 Mich App 474, 479; 517 NW2d 794 (1994).
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While defendants are correct that this case involved common-law arbitration because the
arbitration took place pursuant to a CBA, see MCL 423.9d; MSA 17.454(10.3), we disagree that the
trial court employed an incorrect standard of review in assessing the arbitrator’s decision. Defendants
contend that the trial court incorrectly relied on the statutory arbitration case of Dohanyos v Detrex
Corp (After Remand), 217 Mich App 171, 175-176; 550 NW2d 608 (1996), in which this Court
held that
[w]here it clearly appears on the face of the award or in the reasons for the decision,
being substantially a part of the award, that the arbitrators through an error of law have
been led to a wrong conclusion and that, but for such error, a substantially different
award must have been made, the award and decision will be set aside.
Defendants believe that because Dohanyos involved statutory arbitration, the standard of review it
employed was inapplicable to the instant case. However, Dohanyos cited Detroit Automobile InterIns Exchange v Gavin, 416 Mich 407, 443; 331 NW2d 418 (1982), as authority for the stated
standard of review, and Detroit Automobile, in turn, cited and adopted the standard of review for
common law arbitration as set forth in Howe v Patrons’ Mutual Fire Ins Co, 216 Mich 560, 570;
185 NW 864 (1921). See Dohanyos, supra at 176, and Detroit Automobile, supra at 443.
Accordingly, because the standard of review set forth in Dohanyos ultimately derived from the common
law arbitration case of Howe, the trial court did not err in applying the Dohanyos standard to the
instant, common law arbitration case.1
Next, defendants argue that the trial court erred in granting plaintiff’s motion for summary
disposition. Defendants contend that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority and that the arbitration
award was correct because the executive reorganization did not violate the constitutional prohibition
against the impairment of contracts. This Court reviews a trial court’s grant of summary disposition de
novo. Altairi v Alhaj, 235 Mich App 626, 628; 599 NW2d 537 (1999).
1
We note that in Port Huron Area School District v Port Huron Education Association, 426 Mich
143, 150; 393 NW2d 811 (1986), a common law arbitration case, the Court stated that “a court may
not review an arbitrator’s factual findings or decision on the merits.” This statement seems to imply that
an error of law on the face of an arbitration award cannot justify vacation of the award. However, this
statement constituted dicta, since the only issue in Port Huron was whether the arbitrator exceeded his
authority in granting the award. Id. at 151. We further note that in EE Tripp Excavating Contractor,
Inc v Jackson County, 60 Mich App 221, 230 NW2d 556 (1975), a panel of this Court held that a
reviewing court has no authority to invalidate an arbitration award on the basis of unlawfulness. This
holding, however, was contrary to Supreme Court authority from Howe, supra at 570, and is therefore
not entitled to deference. Finally, we note that the Dohanyos Court stated at one point that “a general
principle of arbitration precludes courts from upsetting an award for reasons that concern the merits of
the claim.” Dohanyos, supra at 177. This statement, however, contradicted an earlier statement, in the
same opinion, that an outcome-determinative error of law could justify the vacation of an arbitration
award. Dohanyos, supra at 176.
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As stated earlier, the standard of review with regard to an arbitration award is as follows:
Where it clearly appears on the face of the award or in the reasons for the
decision, being substantially a part of the award, that the arbitrators through an error of
law have been led to a wrong conclusion and that, but for such error, a substantially
different award must have been made, the award and decision will be set aside.
[Dohanyos, supra at 176; see also Howe, supra at 570.]
Before reaching the issue of whether the arbitrator made an error of law in assessing the merits of
plaintiff’s grievances, however, we must first address whether the arbitrator exceeded his authority in
making the award. See generally Port Huron Area School District v Port Huron Education
Association, 426 Mich 143, 151-152; 393 NW2d 811 (1986). Plaintiff contends that the following
provisions from the CBA precluded the arbitrator from ignoring provisions of the CBA on the grounds
that they did not mesh with the governor’s executive reorganization:
The arbitrator shall not have jurisdiction or authority to add to, amend, modify,
nullify, or ignore in any way the provisions of this Agreement and shall not make any
award which in effect would grant [plaintiff] or the Employer any rights or privileges
which were not obtained in the negotiation process.
***
To the extent that any provision(s) of this Agreement, or application thereof, is
found to be unlawful or in conflict with the provisions of [the] law, by a court of
competent jurisdiction, or by the Michigan Civil Service Commission, it shall be
modified by negotiations between the parties only to the extent necessary to comply
with such laws.
Plaintiff believes that because (1) the CBA explicitly indicated that the arbitrator could not ignore any
provisions of the agreement, and (2) neither a court of competent jurisdiction nor the Michigan Civil
Service Commission determined that the CBA conflicted with the law, the arbitrator had no authority to
declare portions of the agreement unenforceable. We disagree.
We conclude that the arbitrator did not ignore or modify any provisions of the CBA; instead,
he simply exercised his authority to answer the question posed by the parties, i.e., whether the CBA had
in fact been violated. The arbitrator concluded that because the governor exercised his power to
reorganize the executive branch in a reasonable manner, the CBA could not be deemed violated
because of the changes in job conditions resulting from the executive reorganization. The arbitrator did
not exceed his authority by merely answering the question posed by the parties.
Nor did the arbitrator commit a clear error of law that affected the outcome of the arbitration.
The trial court essentially concluded that the arbitrator erred by failing to find that the executive
reorganization violated the contract clause. The trial court overstepped its bounds of review in reaching
this conclusion, however, since the potential existence of an unconstitutional contract clause violation
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was not at issue before the arbitrator. Indeed, both parties admitted before the arbitrator that the
executive reorganization was constitutional and otherwise lawful; they simply asked the arbitrator to
determine if the reorganization resulted in a violation of the CBA.2 Accordingly, the trial court should
have limited itself to a determination of whether the arbitrator’s finding of no contractual violation was
based on a clear, outcome-determinative error of law. See Dohanyos, supra at 176, and Howe,
supra at 570. The trial court did not limit itself in this way, but we, upon this de novo review, must be
so limited. Accordingly, we will not address whether the executive reorganization violated the contract
clause; we will instead focus solely on whether the arbitrator’s finding of no contractual violation resulted
from a clear error of law.
The arbitrator determined that because the governor exercised his authority to reorganize the
government in a reasonable manner, the CBA could not be deemed violated. He stated the following:
[T]he question is whether the State violated various provisions of the agreement.
It must be understood that the parties have agreed that the transfers resulted in changes
in the rights of assignment, reassignment, transfers, layoffs and overtime equalization
units. However, the realization doesn’t necessarily lead to the conclusion that those
articles were violated. There may have been changes which were mandated by exercise
of the Governor’s constitutional rights, but if the changes were not arbitrary and didn’t
reflect more than what was needed to effectuate the Governor’s constitutional authority,
then arguably there was no violation of the contract. To state it in another fashion, given
the definition of the issue, I cannot in this record conclude that the contract was violated.
We find no clear error of law in this conclusion and therefore are obligated to reverse the trial court’s
ruling and reinstate the decision of the arbitrator. See Dohanyos, supra at 176, and Howe, supra at
570.
Reversed.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
I concur in result only.
/s/Roman S. Gribbs
2
As stated in Michigan Oil Co v Natural Resources Comm, 71 Mich App 667, 691; 249 NW2d
135 (1976), aff’d 406 Mich 1 (1979), whether a contractual violation has occurred and whether there
has been an unconstitutional violation of the contract clause are two separate questions.
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