RONALD P HORTON V MARY SWITZER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
RONALD P. HORTON,
UNPUBLISHED
October 10, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
MARY SWITZER, BRENDA BELL, and WILLIAM
SLEIGHT,
No. 216291
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 96-084651-CZ
Defendants,
and
MICHIGAN EMPLOYMENT SECURITY
COMMISSION, DONNA STOERTZ, a/k/a
JEANNE STOERTZ, AND DALE LINDLEY,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Kelly, P.J., and Whitbeck and Collins, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff Ronald Horton appeals as of right from a judgment entered after a jury awarded him
nominal damages in his employment discrimination case. We affirm.
I. Basic Facts And Procedural History
On March 27, 1996, Horton filed a complaint alleging that defendant Mary Switzer sexually
harassed him and that defendants Michigan Employment Securities Commission (MESC), Jeanne
Stoertz, and Dale Lindley retaliated against him for making a complaint regarding Switzer’s harassment.
The trial court dismissed Horton’s claims against defendants Switzer, Brenda Bell, and William Sleight,
but permitted the remaining claims against MESC, Stoertz, and Lindley to proceed to trial in late
October 1998. At trial, the court directed a verdict for the remaining defendants on the issue of
economic damages because Horton failed to present sufficient evidence of his past and present income
and fringe benefits. The jury returned a verdict for Horton, but awarded him only $1 in damages.
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II. Refreshed Recollection As Evidence
A. Standard Of Review
Horton first argues that the trial court erred by refusing to allow him to refresh his recollection
regarding his benefits at MESC with a document he received from the state civil service commission.
We review a trial court’s decision to preclude a witness from refreshing his recollection with a particular
document for an abuse of discretion.1
B. Laying The Proper Foundation
A witness may refresh his or her recollection with a writing if there is a proper foundation.2 To
lay a proper foundation, the proponent must show that (1) the witness’s present memory is inadequate,
(2) the writing could refresh the witness’s present memory, and (3) reference to the writing actually does
refresh the witness’s present memory.3 MRE 612 provides a number of guidelines for allowing an
opposing party access to materials used to refresh a witness’s recollection.
C. Preparing The Document
Here, Horton testified that he believed the benefits he received from his employment with
MESC were worth more than $18,000. Horton also testified that he was aware of the value of his
benefits because he had received a statement of his benefits in 1996. Defendants objected to Horton
using the document to refresh his memory or offering the document into evidence. Horton argued that
the document, although hearsay, should be admitted as a business record. The trial court ruled that the
document was inadmissible because Horton was not the custodian for the issuing agency and could not
testify whether the document was an appropriate business record. Horton’s counsel then questioned
the trial court regarding the document’s use for refreshing memory:
Q. And is it also inadmissible, your Honor, as a refreshment tool?
A. Well, my recollection would be it would have to be something that he had prepared
that would refresh his recollection. Otherwise, he could refresh his recollection from
the Lansing State Journal or the [sic] comic books or any other source. So, yeah, I
don’t think it qualifies for that. If it’s used to refresh it wouldn’t be admissible
anyway, I don’t believe ordinarily.
This interchange suggests that counsel and the trial court confused the standards for admitting a
document as evidence with the standard for using a document to refresh a person’s memory. A
document that is used solely to refresh the memory of the witness need not be admitted into evidence
1
Durbin v K-K-M Corp, 54 Mich App 38, 45; 220 NW2d 110 (1974).
2
Moncrief v Detroit, 398 Mich 181, 190; 247 NW2d 783 (1976).
3
Id.
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because the witness’s refreshed memory constitutes evidence, not the document that helped the witness
remember.4
The issue in this case, therefore, is whether Horton could properly refresh his memory from a
document he did not prepare. We are not aware of any case that prohibits a witness from refreshing his
memory by consulting a document he did not prepare and there are a number of cases in which
witnesses have been allowed to refresh their recollection with writings they did not create. For instance,
in Cameron v Blackman,5 the Supreme Court found no error when a witness used a memorandum
someone else prepared to refresh his memory. The Court merely commented that the witness “swore,
however, that he had a complete recollection of the facts, and it is not, therefore, of any consequence
whether this was or was not, a memorandum which could have been evidence in itself. He evidently
used it for convenience merely.”6 In a more recent case, Simons v Besse,7 this Court upheld a trial
court’s decision to allow a doctor to refresh his memory by reading hospital records, including entries he
did not make.
Although these cases are rather old, they generally reflect the modern conclusion that, “[w]here
memory or recollection is being refreshed, the material used for that purpose is not substantive evidence.
Rather, the material is employed to simply trigger the witness’s recollection of the events. That
recollection is substantive evidence and the material used to refresh is not.”8 Accordingly, we infer, the
standards for materials not entered into evidence but merely used to refresh recollection are quite loose
so long as they are calculated to be effective at reminding the witness of some forgotten information.
It is apparent, therefore, that even though Horton did not prepare the benefit statement, it could
still be used to refresh his memory as long as it did, in fact, refresh his memory.9 Horton’s testimony
that he was, at one time, aware of the value of his benefits because he had reviewed the benefit
statement meets the first two elements of Moncrief. However, the trial court never inquired whether,
after reviewing the statement, Horton would likely remember the amount of those benefits. This was an
abuse of discretion, which apparently resulted from the trial court’s erroneous assumption that the
statement would be submitted as evidence. Rather, to use the statement to refresh Horton’s memory,
only he would see the document, not the jury.10 Then, if he was able to recall the value of his benefits,
4
Durbin, supra at 44.
5
Cameron v Blackman, 39 Mich 108, 109-110 (1878).
6
Id.; see also Robinson v Mulder, 81 Mich 75, 81-82; 45 NW 505 (1890) (refreshing memory from
list someone else prepared was not error because, after reviewing the list, the witness was able to testify
from his memory); People v McNutt, 220 Mich 620, 622-623; 190 NW 750 (1922) (prosecution
witness relied on police document to remember identifying features of the car the defendant allegedly
drove unlawfully).
7
Simons v Besse, 14 Mich App 257, 258; 165 NW2d 334 (1968).
8
People v Favors, 121 Mich App 98, 109; 328 NW2d 585 (1982).
9
Moncrief, supra at 190.
10
See Favors, supra.
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he could testify to that amount without referring to the document at all. Thus, contrary to the trial court’s
implicit conclusion, allowing Horton to refresh his memory would not expose the jury to extraneous
information.
D. The Error’s Effect
Even though the trial court abused its discretion, the error does not require reversal of the jury’s
verdict unless refusal to do so is inconsistent with substantial justice or the error affected Horton’s
substantial rights.11 Here, the jury found for Horton but awarded nominal damages. Clearly, the
damage award was affected, in large part, by the directed verdict for defendants on the economic
damages issue. The question then becomes whether Horton would have had sufficient evidence of
economic damages to avoid the directed verdict if the trial court had allowed Horton to use the
document to refresh his memory.
After reviewing the trial court’s ruling on the directed verdict, we conclude that, even if Horton
had been able to testify in detail regarding the value of his benefits, the trial court would have still
directed the verdict on economic damages for defendants. Horton intended to use the statement to
testify in detail regarding the value of his benefits, not his wages. In its ruling on the directed verdict,
the trial court acknowledged Horton’s testimony on benefits; however, the trial court still found the
evidence insufficient to raise a jury issue regarding damages. Because Horton’s refreshed recollection
of benefits would have no effect on the outcome, the error was harmless.12
III. Admitting The Benefits Statement As Evidence
A. Standard Of Review
Horton argues that the trial court erred by refusing to admit the benefits statement as substantive
evidence. The decision to admit or exclude evidence is within the discretion of the trial court.13 An
abuse of that discretion exists only when an unprejudiced person, considering the facts on which the trial
court acted, would say there is no justification or excuse for the ruling made.14 The ruling will not be
reversed unless a substantial right of the party is affected.15
B. Preservation
Although the record does not clearly reveal why the trial court ruled the benefits statement
inadmissible, it appears that the trial court found that Horton was not competent to establish the proper
11
Ellsworth v Hotel Corp of America, 236 Mich App 185, 188; 600 NW2d 129 (1999), citing
MCR 2.613(A) and MRE 103(a).
12
MCR 2.613(A).
13
Chmielewski v Xermac, 457 Mich 593, 613-614; 580 NW2d 817 (1998).
14
Ellsworth, supra at 188.
15
Id.
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foundation for admitting the document under the business record exception to the hearsay rule, MRE
803(6). Horton now argues that the court erred in refusing to admit the benefits statement because it
qualifies as an admission of a party opponent, which is not hearsay under MRE 801(d)(2). However,
because Horton never argued that the benefits statement was an admission of a party opponent at the
trial, the only issue preserved for appeal is whether the benefits statement qualifies under the business
record exception to the rule against hearsay. 16
C. The Business Record Exception
MRE 803(6) provides:
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts,
transactions, occurrences, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near
the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the
course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of
that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all
as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source
of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of
trustworthiness. The term "business" as used in this paragraph includes business,
institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not
conducted for profit.
This exception to the rule against admitting hearsay is commonly known as the business record
exception. In order for a document to qualify as a business record under MRE 803(6), a plaintiff must
establish that the proposed evidence is one of the documents or other records identified in the rule
prepared in accordance with the conditions that ordinarily make such a document or material
trustworthy.17
We have no reason to doubt Horton’s assertion that the statement was potentially admissible
because a state agency created it in the course of a regularly conducted business activity. However,
Horton did not offer the custodian of the state agency to establish this fact as MRE 803(6) requires.
Further, Horton admitted that he was not prepared to testify regarding this foundational requirement.
Without the essential foundation to establish the document’s trustworthiness, it did not qualify as a
hearsay exception under MRE 803(6) and the trial court properly refused to admit the document.
IV. Horton’s Economic Expert
A. Standard Of Review
16
Kubisz v Cadillac Gage Textron, 236 Mich App 629, 637; 601 NW2d 160 (1999).
17
See Lopez v General Motors Corp, 224 Mich App 618, 626; 569 NW2d 861 (1997), citing
People v Safiedine, 163 Mich App 25, 33; 414 NW2d 143 (1987).
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Horton argues that the trial court erred by refusing to allow his economic expert to testify. We
review a trial court’s decision on the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion.18
B. Legal Standards
According to MRE 702, if a trial court “determines that recognized scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact,” in this case the jury, “to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.” Though the expert may base his
opinion on facts learned at or before trial, the trial court may require the “underlying facts or data
essential to an opinion or inference be in evidence.”19
C. The Trial Court’s Decision To Exclude The Expert’s Testimony
Horton offered very little evidence of his economic losses at trial, failing even to state what his
wages were at the time he ended his employment with MESC. Horton’s expert admitted that his
opinions were substantially based on facts that were not in evidence in the case, including Horton’s past
and present wages, tax returns, and the benefits statement, which the trial court had ruled was
inadmissible. Because these facts were not in evidence, the trial court properly exercised its discretion
to prevent the expert from offering opinions based on assumptions that did not accord with the facts
established at trial.20
V. Directed Verdict
A. Standard Of Review
Horton argues that the trial court erred by directing a verdict for defendants on the issue of his
economic damages. We review the trial court’s decision to grant a directed verdict de novo.21
B. Legal Standards
When deciding whether to grant a directed verdict, the trial court must consider all the evidence
presented in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.22 The trial court must also make all reasonable
inferences and resolve all conflicts in the favor of the nonmoving party.23 A directed verdict is
appropriate only when no factual question exists on which reasonable minds may differ.24 A directed
18
Chmielewski, supra at 613-614.
19
MRE 703; Thornhill v Detroit, 142 Mich App 656, 658; 369 NW2d 871 (1985).
20
See Green v Jerome-Duncan Ford, 195 Mich App 493, 499-500; 491 NW2d 243 (1992).
21
Meagher v Wayne State University, 222 Mich App 700, 708; 565 NW2d 401 (1997).
22
Meagher, supra at 708.
23
Thomas v McGinnis, 239 Mich App 636, 643-644; 609 NW2d 222 (2000).
24
Meagher, supra at 708.
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verdict is inappropriate if there is a factual dispute in the record allowing reasonable jurors to reach
different conclusions.25 A directed verdict is generally “viewed with disfavor.”26
C. Horton’s Evidence
During his initial direct examination, Horton failed to produce evidence of his wages or fringe
benefits while employed by MESC, or his current income and benefits. Over defendants’ objection, the
trial court allowed Horton to reopen his testimony to offer proof of his economic losses. During his
reopened testimony, Horton gave general testimony about his current income and his benefits while at
MESC. He did not, however, offer evidence of his wages at MESC or his current benefits. The trial
court concluded that Horton failed to present sufficient evidence of economic damages that would raise
a question of fact for the jury. In particular, the trial court focused on the lack of evidence of Horton’s
income while employed at MESC, the lack of evidence of his current economic circumstances, and the
inability to value the damages given the missing evidence.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Horton, the trial court did not err in deciding
that there was insufficient evidence from which reasonable jurors could determine economic loss.
Although a plaintiff need not present voluminous or detailed evidence of his economic damages, he must
present enough evidence to raise a question of fact in order to survive a directed verdict.27 Without any
evidence of whether Horton was currently receiving benefits or what those benefits were worth, it would
have been impossible for the trier of fact to determine the value of benefits he allegedly lost as a result of
losing his job at MESC. Similarly, without evidence of what Horton’s income was at MESC, it would
have been impossible for the trier of fact to determine if he actually lost income and what the sum of that
loss was after he left MESC. Because Horton’s proofs raised no question of fact, the trial court did not
err in directing the verdict on economic damages for defendants.
Affirmed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Jeffrey G. Collins
25
Hunt v Freeman, 217 Mich App 92, 99; 550 NW2d 817 (1996).
26
Zeeland Farm Services v JBL Enterprises, 219 Mich App 190, 195; 555 NW2d 733 (1996).
27
Meagher, supra at 708.
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