CHERYL CRUTE V MEIJER INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CHERYL CRUTE and CARL CRUTE,
UNPUBLISHED
October 10, 2000
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 214272
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 98-801421-NO
MEIJER INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Saad and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this premises liability case, plaintiffs appeal as of right from the circuit court order granting
summary disposition to defendant pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). We affirm.
On appeal, an order granting or denying summary disposition is reviewed de novo. In reviewing
a motion for summary disposition brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10), a trial court considers affidavits,
admissions, and documentary evidence filed in the action or submitted by the parties in the light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion. A trial court may grant a motion for summary disposition
under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if the evidence shows that there is no genuine issue in respect to any material
fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460
Mich 446, 454-455; 597 NW2d 28 (1999).
Plaintiff Cheryl Crute tripped and fell on an empty display shelf, an “end cap,” located in the
center aisle of defendant’s store. Plaintiffs contend that the display shelf was not an open and obvious
danger or, alternatively, that defendant had a duty to protect Mrs. Crute from the end cap because it
had reason to expect that Mrs. Crute’s attention would be directed elsewhere.
A premises owner must maintain his or her property in a reasonably safe condition and has a
duty to exercise due care to protect invitees1 from conditions that might result in injury. Riddle v
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An invitee “is one who enters a premises to conduct business that concerns the premises owner at the
owner’s express or implied invitation.” Riddle v McLouth Steel Products Corp, 440 Mich 85, 90,
n 4; 485 NW2d 676 (1992). Defendant does not deny that Mrs. Crute was an invitee.
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McLouth Steel Products Corp, 440 Mich 85, 90; 485 NW2d 676 (1992). A possessor of land has
no duty to protect an invitee from dangers that are so obvious and apparent that an invitee can be
expected to discover them herself. Id. at 94. A danger is open and obvious if it is reasonable to expect
an average user with ordinary intelligence to discover the danger upon casual inspection. Eason v
Coggins Memorial Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, 210 Mich App 261, 264; 532 NW2d
882 (1995).
However, even if a danger is open and obvious, the landowner may still owe a duty to protect
an invitee from it if special circumstances exist. As our Supreme Court explained in Bertrand v Alan
Ford, Inc, 449 Mich 606, 611; 537 NW2d 185 (1995):
[T]he rule generated is that if the particular activity or condition creates a risk of harm
only because the invitee does not discover the condition or realize its danger, then the
open and obvious doctrine will cut off liability if the invitee should have discovered the
condition or realized its danger. On the other hand, if the risk of harm remains
unreasonable, despite its obviousness or despite knowledge of it by the invitee, then the
circumstances may be such that the invitor is required to undertake reasonable
precautions. The issue then becomes the standard of care and is for the jury to decide.
[Footnotes omitted.]
“‘Such reason to expect harm to the visitor from known or obvious dangers may arise, for example,
where the possessor has reason to expect that the invitee’s attention may be distracted, so that he will
not discover what is obvious, .. . .’” Id. at 611-612, quoting 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 343A,
comment f, p 220.
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, we conclude that it does not establish
a triable issue concerning defendant’s breach of duty. Defendant did not have a duty to protect Mrs.
Crute from tripping over the end cap because it was an open and obvious danger. Mrs. Crute testified
that she would have noticed the end cap had she been looking at the floor. However, she was not able
to look at the floor directly in front of her because she was carrying a stack of six towels. From the
evidence, it is clear that the end cap created a risk of harm only because Mrs. Crute did not discover
the condition, as her arms were full of merchandise that blocked her view of the floor. Although
plaintiffs contend that, as viewed from directly above, the end cap would appear to be part of the floor
due to its color and placement among the checkerboard-patterned tiles, this argument is not convincing.
First, the evidence shows that Mrs. Crute approached the end cap from the side, a position from which,
if she had been looking, she would have seen the end cap shelf and noticed it was elevated
approximately two or three inches. Second, Mrs. Crute admitted that she would have seen the end cap
had she been paying attention, which, admittedly, she was not. A party may not create an issue of
material fact merely by contradicting her own deposition testimony. See Schultz v Auto-Owners Ins
Co, 212 Mich App 199, 202; 536 NW2d 784 (1995). The trial court did not err in finding that the end
cap was an open and obvious danger.
Finally, plaintiffs contend that defendant still owed a duty to protect Mrs. Crute from the end
cap, although it was open and obvious, because it was foreseeable that Mrs. Crute’s attention would be
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diverted as she looked to the nearby checkout lanes to see which line was shortest. It is generally
accepted that in a “self-service” type store like defendant’s, in which merchandise is displayed on
counters or on shelves so that customers can browse as they perambulate the aisles, a customer can
presume that the owner will keep the passageways provided for her use in a reasonably safe condition,
primarily because the storekeeper intends that its customers will devote a major part of their attention to
the displayed merchandise, rather than to the floor to discover possible obstructions in the aisle.
Jaworski v Great Scott Supermarkets, Inc, 403 Mich 689, 699-700; 272 NW2d 518 (1978).
However, Mrs. Crute was not distracted intentionally by an enticing display of merchandise. Instead,
she was distracted by the checkout lanes and her desire to purchase the towels as quickly as possible.
Plaintiffs do not support their underlying premise, i.e., that defendant intended the checkout lanes to
entice and distract its customers, or that the checkout lanes were intrinsically distracting. Under these
circumstances, defendant did not have reason to expect that a customer in Mrs. Crute’s position would
have been so distracted as to have failed to take precautions for her own safety. Thus, defendant was
not under any obligation to protect Mrs. Crute from tripping over the end cap, which was an open and
obvious danger. The trial court properly granted summary disposition in defendant’s favor.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
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