DAVID GODWIN V SANDRA BAGGETT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DAVID GODWIN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 6, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
v
No. 211896
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 95-504250-NI
SANDRA BAGGETT and WILLIE BAGGETT,
Defendants,
and
FARM BUREAU GENERAL INSURANCE
COMPANY OF MICHIGAN,
Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Collins and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Farm Bureau General Insurance Company of Michigan (Farm Bureau) appeals as of
right from an order granting in part and denying in part its motion for summary disposition and entering
judgment in its favor in the amount of $15,364.37, plus interest. Plaintiff David Godwin cross-appeals
the same order granting in part and denying in part his motion for summary disposition and entering
judgment in his favor in the amount of $4,635.63 plus interest. Farm Bureau argues that plaintiff, its
insured, should reimburse it in the amount of $20,000 for a claim previously paid. We agree and
reverse.
Plaintiff, a pedestrian, was injured in a car accident involving two drivers, only one of whom was
insured. Farm Bureau, believing the uninsured driver was solely at fault, paid plaintiff $20,000 under the
uninsured motorist provision of its no-fault automobile insurance policy. Before payment was made,
plaintiff obtained possession of a statement by Sandra Baggett, the insured motorist, indicating that the
police report prepared following the accident was erroneous. Plaintiff did not supply this information to
defendant, however. Farm Bureau paid plaintiff benefits pursuant to the uninsured motorist provision of
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its no-fault automobile insurance policy, and plaintiff and Farm Bureau then executed a trust agreement
stating that plaintiff
shall hold for benefit of the Beneficiary [Farm Bureau] all rights, claims and causes of
action which the Trustee has or may have against any person, organization, association,
or corporation, other than the Beneficiary, because of bodily injury, sickness, or disease
which is the subject of the claim made against the Beneficiary.
The trust agreement further provided that
[t]he Trustee agrees to take, through any representative designated by the
Beneficiary, such action as may be necessary or appropriate to recover the damages
suffered by the Trustee from any person, organization, association, or corporation, other
than the Beneficiary, who may be legally liable therefor; such action to be taken in the
name of the Trustee, the Beneficiary to pay all costs and expenses in connection
therewith. It is further agreed that any moneys recovered by the Trustee, as a result of
judgment, settlement, or otherwise, shall be held in trust and paid to the Beneficiary;
provided, however, any sum recovered in excess of the total amount paid by the
Beneficiary to the Trustee, under the terms of the above-mentioned policy, shall be
retained by the Trustee for his/her own use and benefit. [Emphasis added.]
Plaintiff eventually garnered an $86,500 arbitration award from the driver of the insured car.
On appeal, Farm Bureau contends that the trial court erred in failing to order plaintiff to
reimburse it the entire $20,000 sum Farm Bureau erroneously paid to him, and instead, deducting
plaintiff’s costs. Specifically, Farm Bureau maintains that because plaintiff did not bring his action
against Baggett through an attorney designated by Farm Bureau, he is not entitled to recover costs and
expenses under the trust agreement. We agree. An insurance contract should be read as a whole and
meaning given to all terms. Auto-Owners Ins Co v Churchman, 440 Mich 560, 566; 489 NW2d 431
(1992). In attempting to discern the parties’ contractual intent, courts must regard the language in the
policy, the character of the contract, the contract’s purpose, and the surrounding facts and
circumstances at the time of execution. Bosco v Bauermeister, 456 Mich 279, 300; 571 NW2d 509
(1997).
It is the clear intent of the trust agreement that plaintiff was to hold in trust for Farm Bureau any
causes of action plaintiff may have relative to the injuries for which he made his claim against Farm
Bureau, and that Farm Bureau would designate an attorney for plaintiff, allowing Farm Bureau to be in a
position to control the course, and expense, of any litigation. Here, where plaintiff retained counsel of its
choosing, Farm Bureau was not responsible for the costs incurred.
Furthermore, under the terms of the insurance policy, plaintiff was obligated to give Farm
Bureau “written notice containing particulars sufficient to identify the insured and also reasonably
obtainable information with respect to the time, place and circumstances” of his accident. We conclude
that plaintiff violated the terms of the policy by failing to give defendant the statement Baggett made to
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her own insurer. That statement may have alerted defendant to the possibility of recovery against
Baggett as a joint tortfeasor. In any event, knowledge that the police report on which Farm Bureau
relied was materially different from Baggett’s version of events would be relevant to Farm Bureau’s
decision whether to pay benefits to plaintiff when it did. Accordingly, we reverse and find that
defendant is entitled to full reimbursement of the $20,000, plus interest.
Because plaintiff is not entitled to costs and expenses under the trust agreement, we find it
unnecessary to address plaintiff ’s counterclaim that the trial court should have interpreted “costs and
expenses” to include attorney fees. We also find that the collateral source rule, MCL 600.6303; MSA
27A.6303, is not applicable. MCL 600.6303(5); MSA 27A.6303(5) states that
benefits from a collateral source shall not be considered payable or receivable unless the
court makes a determination that there is a previously existing contractual or
statutory obligation on the part of the collateral source to pay the benefits.
[Emphasis added.]
See also Haberkorn v Chrysler Corp, 210 Mich App 354, 376; 533 NW2d 373 (1995). Here,
defendant had no obligation to pay under the uninsured motorist provision where there was an insured
driver who was jointly and severally liable. Moreover, the collateral source rule required plaintiff to first
send written notice by registered mail of the verdict. MCL 600.6303(3); MSA 27A.6303(3); Rogers
v City of Detroit, 457 Mich 125, 156; 579 NW2d 840 (1998), overruled on other grounds 462 Mich
439. Plaintiff makes no showing that it complied with this requirement.
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Jeffrey G. Collins
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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