PEOPLE OF MI V JIMMY LEE PERRY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 3, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 219680
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 98-009807 FH
JIMMY LEE PERRY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Talbot, P.J., and Hood and Gage, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
After a bench trial, defendant was convicted of possession with intent to deliver less than fifty
grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(iv). The trial court sentenced
defendant to 5 to 10 years’ imprisonment. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant was charged with the instant crime after a police drug investigation team raided an
Ypsilanti residence. The police obtained a search warrant for the residence following a controlled drug
purchase there that involved two police officers and a confidential informant.
Defendant first contends that the trial court erred in refusing to either order revelation of the
informant’s identity or hold an in camera hearing regarding the informant’s potential testimony. We
review for an abuse of discretion the trial court’s decision whether to require disclosure of a confidential
informant’s identity. People v Poindexter, 90 Mich App 599, 608; 282 NW2d 411 (1979).
“[W]here the government invokes the [‘informant’s] privilege[’] in the face of a defense request
for disclosure, and where the accused is able to demonstrate a possible need for the informant’s
testimony, the trial judge should require production of the informant and conduct a hearing in chambers”
to determine whether he can provide any testimony helpful to the defense. People v Underwood, 447
Mich 695, 706; 526 NW2d 903 (1994), quoting People v Stander, 73 Mich App 617; 251 NW2d
258 (1976). Where, however, a defendant requests production of an informant “sole[ly] . . . to
challenge the truth of the information supplied to the police and used to obtain the search warrant,” the
court need not order the informant’s production. People v Johnson, 83 Mich App 1, 11; 268 NW2d
259 (1978). In this case, defendant’s allegations with respect to the informant, specifically that “no
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informant existed, and thus, no [controlled drug purchase] took place,” amount only to a challenge of
the truth of the information supplied to the police and used to obtain the search warrant. Id. Defendant
did not overcome the search warrant affidavit’s presumption of validity by substantiating his assertions
concerning the falsity of the affiant officer’s claim that a drug transaction occurred. Poindexter, supra
at 604-605. We therefore conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in denying defendant’s
request for the informant’s production. Poindexter, supra at 608-609, n 7, 610; Johnson, supra.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in finding that probable cause supported the
search warrant absent the informant’s testimony. Probable cause to issue a search warrant exists where
there is a substantial basis for inferring a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular location. People v Kazmierczak, 461 Mich 411, 418; 605 NW2d 667 (2000).
A reviewing court should ask whether a reasonably cautious person could have concluded that there
was a substantial basis for the finding of probable cause. People v Head, 211 Mich App 205, 208
209; 535 NW2d 563 (1995).
While defendant argues that “[t]he affidavit in support of the search warrant was almost
exclusively based on allegations by the alleged confidential informant,” with respect to the controlled
drug purchase the affidavit contains only the informant’s alleged statement that while inside 407
Washtenaw the informant purchased cocaine. The affidavit’s other allegations, and the officers’
testimony at the suppression hearing, established that (1) the police watched the informant approach and
enter 407 Washtenaw, after providing him cash and ensuring that he did not possess any controlled
substances, (2) an officer watched defendant answer the informant’s knock and watched the informant
step inside the door for less than one minute, and (3) the officers observed the informant walk away
from 407 Washtenaw, then found in his possession suspected cocaine and no cash. The trial court
found probable cause supporting the warrant based on the officers’ observations, “[r]egardless of what
the confidential informant may say or not say.” We find that the officers’ observations warranted a
reasonably cautious individual’s conclusion that a substantial basis existed for inferring a fair probability
that 407 Washtenaw contained cocaine and other drug paraphernalia. Kazmierczak, supra; Head,
supra.
Defendant also asserts that insufficient evidence supported a finding that he possessed cocaine.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in an appeal from a bench trial, we must view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether a rational trier of fact could find the
essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Lewis, 178 Mich App
464, 467; 444 NW2d 194 (1989).
The possession element of the charged crime may be established by showing either actual or
constructive possession. People v Griffin, 235 Mich App 27, 34; 597 NW2d 176 (1999).
“[C]onstructive possession exists when the totality of the circumstances indicates a sufficient nexus
between the defendant and the contraband.” Id. at 35, quoting People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 521;
489 NW2d 748 (1992), amended on other grounds 441 Mich 1201 (1992). Possession may be
established by circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from that evidence. Wolfe,
supra at 521, 526. During the October 29-30, 1997 raid of 407 Washtenaw, the police discovered in
the southeast bedroom approximately 75 to 100 rocks of crack cocaine. Three witnesses, who also
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resided at 407 Washtenaw at the time of the raid, testified that in October 1997 defendant and his then
girlfriend resided in the southeast bedroom, and that each witness observed defendant sell cocaine from
or within 407 Washtenaw. We conclude that this evidence supported the trial court’s finding beyond a
reasonable doubt that a sufficient nexus existed between defendant and the crack cocaine. Griffin,
supra.
Defendant lastly avers that the trial court improperly allowed the admission of bad acts
evidence. Defendant’s failure to timely object to the trial court’s admission of this evidence waives our
review of this issue unless the evidence’s admission represents a plain error that affected the outcome of
the case. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). The proffered bad acts
evidence was (i) relevant to establishing defendant’s intent to deliver the crack cocaine, MRE 401, 402,
404(b)(1),1 and (ii) not substantially more prejudicial than probative, in light of other evidence and
inferences tending to establish defendant’s intent to deliver (i.e., the large quantity of crack rocks
discovered), MRE 403. Because we find no error, we will not further consider this issue.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
1
Contrary to defendant’s argument on appeal, the record reflects that the prosecutor did provide notice
of his intent to utilize testimony regarding defendant’s prior bad acts. MRE 404(b)(2).
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