CRAIG S HERZBERG V MOBILE AERIAL TOWERS INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MATTHEW BRIDGEWATER and ANDREA
BRIDGEWATER,
UNPUBLISHED
September 26, 2000
Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees,
v
No. 215390
Midland Circuit Court
LC No. 95-004288-NP
MOBILE AERIAL TOWERS, INC., BRUCE
BREVITZ, d/b/a BREVITZ EQUIPMENT
COMPANY, and CITY OF MIDLAND,
Defendants,
and
DANA CORPORATION and HYCO, a division of
DANA CORPORATION,
Defendants-Appellees/CrossAppellants.
CRAIG S. HERZBERG,
Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
v
No. 215707
Midland Circuit Court
LC No. 95-004879-NP
MOBILE AERIAL TOWERS, INC., BRUCE
BREVITZ, d/b/a BREVITZ EQUIPMENT
COMPANY, and CITY OF MIDLAND,
Defendants,
and
DANA CORPORATION and HYCO, a division of
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DANA CORPORATION,
Defendants-Appellees/CrossAppellants.
Before: Kelly, P.J., and Whitbeck and Collins, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right, challenging the trial court’s denial of their motion for a new trial. The
jury rendered a verdict in favor of defendants in this products liability action1, and plaintiffs moved for a
new trial on the basis of juror misconduct. Plaintiffs argued that two jurors improperly conducted
experiments to test the evidence presented in the case and that this materially affected plaintiffs’
substantial rights. We affirm.
Plaintiffs Matthew Bridgewater and Craig Herzberg were injured while trimming trees in a
mobile aerial tower, commonly referred to as a “cherry picker.” The men were working in a bucket
attached to a boom and were about forty feet above the ground, when the boom collapsed and the
bucket fell. Defendants Dana Corporation and Hyco were the manufacturers of the hydraulic cylinder in
the boom that collapsed. Plaintiffs argued that a necessary safety device, a “set screw,” was never
installed on the hydraulic cylinder and that this constituted a manufacturing defect. Plaintiffs’ theory was
that a nut worked its way loose from a bolt, which caused a loss of hydraulic pressure. Plaintiffs argued
that a set screw would have held the nut in place securely and prevented the accident. Defendants
maintained that the set screw had been installed, but was likely removed negligently by someone else
during maintenance.
The jury found that defendants were not negligent. After the proceedings were concluded, the
trial court and the attorneys spoke with members of the jury. During those discussions, two jurors
disclosed that they had conducted experiments relating to issues in the case. Plaintiffs moved for a new
trial and submitted affidavits of plaintiffs’ attorneys, which alleged that the jury foreperson and one other
juror both conducted experiments and discussed the results of those experiments with other members of
the jury. On the basis of the affidavits, which the trial court recalled as being consistent with information
that it heard from the jurors, the trial court ordered an evidentiary hearing for further investigation into
the foreperson’s experiment.2
1
Plaintiffs’ two actions were consolidated in the trial court, on stipulation of the parties, for discovery
purposes only. However, the actions ultimately were tried together and have been consolidated on
appeal.
2
The experiment conducted by the other juror related to causation, not negligence, and therefore could
not have affected the jury’s verdict on the issue of negligence.
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At the evidentiary hearing, the foreperson acknowledged that he conducted an experiment
relating to the evidence presented during trial. Plaintiffs’ experts testified that they could discern, from
inspecting the threaded hole in the nut, that a set screw had never been installed. The foreperson, who
had some experience in construction, went to a hardware store after trial that day and inserted bolts into
nuts and then checked the threads of the nut to see whether he could determine that a bolt had been
inserted. He could not. Later that evening, at home, the foreperson tapped a hole into a block of steel
and ran a screw through the hole. He then inspected the hole and could not tell that a screw had been
inserted. The foreperson insisted, however, that the experiment did not affect his opinion of the case
and was merely to satisfy his own curiosity about his ability to tell whether a screw had been inserted
into a threaded hole. He also insisted that he did not inform the other members of the jury about his
experiment until after a verdict had been reached and that the experiment played no part in the jury’s
deliberations.
On the basis of the foreperson’s testimony, the trial court denied plaintiffs’ motion for a new
trial. Plaintiffs argued that the foreperson’s testimony was not credible, but the trial court refused to
balance the credibility of the foreperson against that of plaintiffs’ attorneys in a matter regarding the
deliberative process of the jury. The trial court also noted that the foreperson’s testimony was not
inconsistent with what the foreperson had told the court immediately after the trial. The court stated that
its previous belief that the experiment was discussed by the jury was simply an assumption.
We review the trial court’s decision whether to grant a motion for a new trial on the basis of
juror misconduct for an abuse of discretion. Froede v Holland Ladder & Mfg Co, 207 Mich App
127, 130 (Jansen, P.J.), 141 (Holbrook, Jr., J.); 523 NW2d 849 (1994).
MCR 2.611(A)(1)(b) provides that a new trial may be granted for juror misconduct where that
misconduct materially affects the substantial rights of the aggrieved party. Juror misconduct does not
require a new trial in every instance. People v Strand, 213 Mich App 100, 103; 539 NW2d 739
(1995). Rather, the party seeking a new trial must demonstrate prejudice. People v Fetterley, 229
Mich App 511, 545; 583 NW2d 199 (1998); Phinney v Perlmutter, 222 Mich App 513, 539; 564
NW2d 532 (1997). In this case, plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that their substantial rights were
materially affected.3
The foreperson testified that his experiment did not affect his verdict and was not shared with
the jury until after the verdict had been reached. In People v Gayton, 81 Mich App 390, 396; 265
3
Defendants argue that the trial court should not have allowed the foreperson to be questioned on the
basis of plaintiffs’ attorneys’ affidavits. Generally, a jury’s verdict may not be impeached by affidavits of
either jurors or non-jurors. Mandjiak v Meijer’s Super Markets, Inc, 364 Mich 456, 460-461; 110
NW2d 802 (1961); Heintz v Akbar, 161 Mich App 533, 540; 411 NW2d 736 (1987). However, an
exception exists where the alleged misconduct involves an extraneous influence. People v Budzyn, 456
Mich 77, 91; 566 NW2d 229 (1997); Hoffman v Monroe Public Schools, 96 Mich App 256, 261;
292 NW2d 542 (1980). We reject defendants’ argument that the experiment was not an extraneous
influence simply because it was conducted by a member of the jury and not an outside party. A juror
may inject extraneous information into the jury’s deliberations. See Budzyn, supra at 90-92.
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NW2d 344 (1978), the defendant alleged that two jurors took materials into the jury room containing
the definition of words that were central to the issues litigated. However, after conducting a hearing, the
trial court determined that the materials were not considered by the jury during its deliberations. Id. at
397. This Court held that the defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice. Id. at 398. Here, given the
foreperson’s testimony that his experiment was not considered by the jury during its deliberations and
did not affect his verdict, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ motion for a new
trial.
Plaintiffs insist that the foreperson’s testimony is not credible, and they rely heavily on the
affidavits submitted by plaintiffs’ attorneys to support their allegations of misconduct. However, the trial
court appropriately declined to entertain a credibility contest between counsel for the losing parties and
a juror regarding the jury’s deliberations. In Mandjiak v Meijer’s Super Markets, Inc, 364 Mich 456,
460-461; 110 NW2d 802 (1961), our Supreme Court held that a jury verdict may not be impeached
“where the information concerning the juror’s alleged misconduct is contained in an unsupported
affidavit of the losing party or his attorney and the allegations of misconduct, such as they are, are
categorically denied in an answering affidavit of a juror.” See also Shiner v Detroit, 150 Mich App
420, 425-426; 387 NW2d 872 (1986) (where motion for new trial on basis of juror bias was
supported solely on the basis of hearsay affidavits refuted by the juror involved, court abused its
discretion in granting new trial). Here, although the foreperson admitted to conducting the experiment,
he categorically denied plaintiffs’ allegations that he injected that experiment into the jury’s deliberations
or that he allowed the experiment to affect his impartiality. Because the only evidence of prejudice is
contained in hearsay affidavits, which are refuted by the juror in question, a new trial is not warranted.
Defendants argue on cross-appeal that the trial court erred in denying their motion for summary
disposition and motion for a directed verdict. However, given our resolution of this case, it is
unnecessary to reach this issue. Kosmyna v Botsford Community Hospital, 238 Mich App 694,
702; 607 NW2d 134 (1999).
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Jeffrey G. Collins
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