IN RE BRADFORD MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of MEGAN, TRAE, and TAYLER
BRADFORD, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
September 22, 2000
Petitioner -Appellee,
V
No. 224675
Midland Circuit Court
Juvenile Division
LC No. 98-000231-NA
RICHARD BRADFORD,
Respondent -Appellant.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Griffin and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right from the decision of the circuit court to terminate his parental
rights to the three minors, Megan Bradford (DOB 7/20/91), Trae Bradford (DOB 12/16/92), and
Tayler Bradford (DOB 12/26/97). The trial court found two statutory bases for termination established,
MCL 712A.19b(3)(g); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(g) (failure to provide proper care or custody and
no reasonable expectation of ability to do so within a reasonable time), and MCL 712A.19b(3)(j);
MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(j) (reasonable likelihood that children will be harmed if returned to home of
the parent). We affirm.
The trial court's involvement in this case began with the April 14, 1998, filing of a neglect/abuse
petition by the Midland County Family Independence Agency (FIA). The court took jurisdiction over
the children and released them to the custody of their mother, respondent’s then wife, Julie Bradford.
The court ordered respondent out of the home and ordered Julie to comply with the recommendations
of the FIA, which included services and the requirement that respondent be kept away from the
children.
At a June 25, 1999, review hearing, FIA case worker Cheryl Fisher testified that Julie was not
following through with the court ordered services. She also testified that respondent had participated in
only two visitation sessions over the last three months, and that respondent had likewise not followed
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through with the services ordered. Fisher explained that respondent had been incarcerated, because of
various incidents involving Julie, for much of the intervening time. At the conclusion of this hearing the
court entered an order finding that Julie had complied with part of the plan, but that respondent had
complied with none of the plan. The previous orders were maintained, with visitations to be arranged if
respondent chose to request them on his release from jail. One addition to the case service plan was
made, on the basis of newly acquired information that Julie had a boyfriend staying with her, requiring
that no unrelated adults live in her home.
Subsequent events necessitated the July 26, 1999, filing of a supplemental petition charging
further abuse along with disregard of the court's orders. According to Fisher's testimony at a
preliminary hearing on this petition, FIA workers had recently become aware that Julie was living with a
boyfriend, Jason Sian. Fisher testified that respondent, in violation of various court orders, was in
contact with his children and Julie on July 23, 1999, and learned that Sian had repeatedly hit the children
and had recently put a cigarette out on Megan's bare foot. Respondent immediately took Megan to an
emergency room, where she was treated for the burn and an additional injury to the bottom of her foot
was diagnosed. Apparently, Megan cut herself by stepping on a piece of a broken glass that Sian had
thrown in anger. The FIA was made aware of these circumstances following the hospital treatment and
Fisher immediately drafted the supplemental petition. Fisher not only included the allegations of these
various injuries and the children's reports that Sian hit them, but also detailed charges concerning
respondent's unauthorized contact and Julie's violation of the residence restriction. Following the
preliminary hearing, the trial court authorized the petition for filing and entered an order removing the
children from Julie's custody and placing them in appropriate out-of-home placement under FIA
supervision.
On September 22, 1999, Fisher amended the supplemental petition by including additional
allegations and requesting termination of the parental rights of Julie and respondent. An October 5,
1999, adjudication bench trial was then held. At the conclusion of the hearing, finding the allegations in
the amended supplemental petition proved by a preponderance of the evidence, the trial court entered
an adjudication order maintaining the children's out-of-home placement. A dispositional/termination
hearing was scheduled for December 3, 1999.
On December 3, 1999, immediately before the dispositional/termination hearing was to begin,
Julie Bradford released her parental rights to all four of her children. The hearing then commenced with
respect to respondent's parental rights. On December 14, 1999, the trial court issued its findings and an
order terminating respondent's parental rights to Megan, Trae, and Tayler. Respondent now challenges
the trial court’s findings that statutory grounds for termination were proved by a preponderance of the
evidence.
A two-prong test applies to a decision of the circuit court to terminate parental rights. First, the
trial court must find that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination, MCL 712A.19b; MSA
27.3178(598.19b), has been met by clear and convincing evidence. In re Jackson, 199 Mich App 22,
25; 501 NW2d 182 (1993). We review the trial court's decision for clear error. MCR 5.974(I); In re
Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989); In re Sours Minors, 459 Mich 624, 633; 593
NW2d 520 (1999). A finding is clearly erroneous if, although there is evidence to support it, this Court
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is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake had been made. Miller, supra. Once a
statutory ground for termination of parental rights is established, the court must terminate parental rights
unless it finds that termination of parental rights to the child is clearly not in the child's best interest.
MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5); MCR 5.974(E)(2); In re Trejo, ___ Mich ___; ___
NW2d ___ (Docket No. 112528, issued 7/5/00), slip op pp 10-11.
Respondent challenges only the court's findings with regard to the statutory grounds for
termination, no argument is made concerning the issue of the children's best interests. The applicable
statutory subsections, MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (j); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(g) and (j), provide:
(3) The court may terminate a parent's parental rights to a child if the court
finds, by clear and convincing evidence, 1 or more of the following:
***
(g) The parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or custody
for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to
provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the child's age.
***
(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the
child's parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the
parent.
Subsection (3)(g) requires clear and convincing evidence of both a failure and an inability to provide
proper care and custody. In re Hulbert, 186 Mich App 600, 605; 465 NW2d 36 (1990). With
regard to the potential for improvement, the determination of what is "a reasonable time" properly
includes both how long it will take for the parent to improve conditions and how long the child can wait
for the improvement. In re Dahms, 187 Mich App 644, 647-648; 468 NW2d 315 (1991).
We find that clear and convincing evidence supported termination under subsection 3(g). The
evidence demonstrates that while the children lived with respondent and his ex-wife they were
consistently exposed to every undesirable element of an abusive relationship. In addition to tangible
instances of domestic abuse suffered by Julie, evidenced by her hospitalization on one occasion and
respondent's original jail term for a domestic abuse conviction, the testimony also demonstrates a severe
psychological impact on the children. According to both the FIA worker and the foster care worker,
Megan suffered extreme mental distress attributable to her parents' frequent verbal arguments.
Moreover, even at the time of the dispositional hearing, Megan still expressed concern that respondent
would exhibit his temper and had little faith that he would keep any promises to the contrary. Trae,
meanwhile, had himself experienced one instance of physical abuse at the hands of respondent.
Notwithstanding respondent's acceptance of his responsibility for this event, and his seemingly sincere
remorse for its occurrence, the ramifications of the event were clear. In conversations to the social
workers Trae appeared to believe that he was in part at fault, stating that respondent only hit him
because he was listening to his mother instead of respondent. Trae also expressed the belief that it was
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okay for respondent to so discipline him. As the trial court noted in its opinion, that respondent allowed
his children to be exposed to this violent and abuse relationship until agency intervention separated the
parents is, on its own, clear and convincing evidence that the home was unfit and that respondent failed
to provide proper care and custody. See In re Miller, 182 Mich App 70; 451 NW2d 576 (1990).
With regard to whether there existed a reasonable expectation that respondent would be able to
provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time, the weight of the evidence again supports the
trial court's finding. Respondent essentially argues that he was not given a fair chance to demonstrate his
parenting ability with the children in his sole custody. In part this argument is based on his claim that
having secured a divorce from Julie, respondent will no longer have reason to express his temper and
also will not run the risk of spending inordinate amounts of time in jail. While the record does
demonstrate some merit to the argument that Julie was partly responsible for respondent's continuing
legal problems while the children were in her custody, ultimately respondent must be held singularly
accountable for his own conduct.
Both the agency workers and the court made it clear to respondent that any hopes of avoiding
termination rested on his compliance with the various court orders. Through respondent's own actions,
he violated the orders prohibiting contact with Julie and limiting contact with the children to supervised
visitation. This led to respondent's various periods of incarceration during the twenty months the court
maintained jurisdiction, which in turn partly led to respondent's failure to satisfy the requirements that he
complete parenting and anger management classes. Notwithstanding the belated progress respondent
appeared to be making in these classes, each of his counselor's informed the agency workers that he still
had a long way to go before he could effectively parent without significant assistance.
In addition, although over a year and a half had passed since the court initially took jurisdiction
over the children, at the time of the final hearing respondent could only testify that he hoped to have
suitable housing and full-time employment within the week. Further, though respondent testified that he
had family members willing and able to assist him by providing daycare, no definite arrangements
existed. Considering the length of these proceedings, and the time respondent had been afforded to
show improvement in his problem areas, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial
court erred in concluding that satisfactory solutions to respondent's deficiencies in these areas could not
be achieved in a reasonable time. Miller, supra at 337.
Given this conclusion, we need not address the trial court's additional finding that termination
was appropriate under subsection 3(j).
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
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