VERNON J ANDREWS V MICHAEL BUCK
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
VERNON J. ANDREWS, GRACE M. ANDREWS,
ANGELA A. RYAN, ANDREA A. LARKIN,
DOUGLAS BRIGHAM, and CATHY J. SCHULTZ,
UNPUBLISHED
September 22, 2000
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
and
CLAUDE SHIELDS, ROBERT DYKSTRA, and
KENNETH B. YOST,
Plaintiffs,
v
No. 216760
Oceana Circuit Court
LC No. 91-004103-CH
MICHAEL BUCK, NANCY BUCK, BARBARA
BURKE, ROSANNA GRAF, G. WILLIM,
VIRGINIA E. WALTHER, DUNA VISTA
RESORTS, INC., and GIL HEBBLEWHITE,
Defendants,
and
PENTWATER TOWNSHIP and BARNETT
SURVEYING,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Smolenski, P.J., and Zahra and Collins, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
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Plaintiffs appeal as of right from an order imposing sanctions for bringing a claim without legal
basis. We reverse.
This case has its origins in the construction of a subdivision that substantially deviated from the
plat, both in the layout and construction of roads and in the siting and construction of homes, and a
resolution by defendant Pentwater Township (Pentwater) to create an assessor’s plat for purposes of
assessment and taxation. Pentwater hired defendant Barnett Surveying (Barnett) to prepare the plat.
Plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking, to enjoin activity related to the creation of the assessor’s plat on a
number of grounds. Plaintiffs alleged that at a public meeting, Barnett stated that he intended to extend
or vacate a portion of a road in a manner inconsistent with the original plat and not evidenced by current
usage. Plaintiffs further alleged that such action would effect a taking of their property, that it would
cloud title to their property, and that Barnett had a duty to prepare the assessor’s plat as closely as
possible to the 1905 plat.
The circuit court entered a temporary restraining order on October 4, 1991, but dissolved the
order approximately three weeks later. The court explained in a letter to the parties that the Subdivision
Control Act of 1967 (the Act), MCL 560.101 et seq.; MSA 26.430(101) et seq., governs procedures
relevant to assessor’s plats and provides for a period to object to the accuracy of the plat once it is
completed and filed, so that plaintiff’s suit was premature. The court further explained that an
assessor’s plat is primarily intended for purposes of assessment and taxation and does not affect legal
title to the various parcels of land proposed to be included in the assessor’s plat.
Following a scheduling conference in June 1993, the circuit court entered an order stating that
plaintiffs had thirty days to file written objections regarding the procedures used by the township in
establishing the assessor’s plat assessment district, and that during the pendency of the matter, the
parties could request further discovery. Plaintiffs filed objections and argued, among other things, that
the assessor’s plat was being undertaken for an improper purpose and that it was a waste of time and
money for it to proceed further. In September 1993, the court denied plaintiffs’ objections and ordered
that the procedures used and the propriety of the assessor’s plat “shall not be raised again as an issue.”
The court also ordered that the plat be completed in two years.
Almost one year later, and nearly three years after the suit was filed, in August 1994, defendants
filed a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). The court granted defendants’
motion and, sua sponte, imposed sanctions against plaintiffs for filing a suit without legal basis. Plaintiffs
appealed the imposition of sanctions on the ground that the sanctions were imposed in violation of their
due process rights, as they had no notice or opportunity to be heard on the issue. This Court agreed
and remanded for a hearing. Andrews v Buck, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of
Appeals, issued May 16, 1997 (Docket No. 188669).
In the meantime, plaintiffs filed another complaint against defendants Pentwater and Barnett,
after the assessor’s plat was filed in 1994. The complaint challenged many of the same aspects of the
plat that plaintiffs had attempted to challenge in the earlier lawsuit. The circuit court approved the plat
without modification or correction. Plaintiffs appealed as of right to this Court, which affirmed in part
and reversed in part. Andrews v Pentwater Twp, 222 Mich App 491, 496; 563 NW2d 713 (1997).
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In June 1998, after the hearing on remand of the issue of sanctions, the circuit court reaffirmed
the award of sanctions.
Plaintiffs argue on appeal that the circuit court clearly erred in imposing sanctions because the
Act does not explicitly prohibit the filing of lawsuits before a plat is filed, and no case law existed, at the
time plaintiffs filed suit, interpreting the subject provisions of the Act. This Court reviews a trial court’s
decision regarding imposition of sanctions under MCR 2.114 for clear error. Schadewald v Brule,
225 Mich App 26, 41; 570 NW2d 788 (1997). A trial court’s decision is clearly erroneous when,
although there is evidence to support it, this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made. Id.
Our review of the record indicates that the court imposed sanctions pursuant to MCR
2.114(D)(2) and MCR 2.114(E). MCR 2.114(D) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Effect of Signature. The signature of an attorney or party, whether or not the party is
represented by an attorney, constitutes a certification by the signer that
***
(2) to the best of his or her knowledge, information, and belief formed after
reasonable inquiry, the document is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing
law or a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law .
..
MCR 2.114(E) provides that where a court finds that a party has violated MCR 2.114, the court must
impose a sanction on that party.
Although MCL 560.209(3); MSA 26.430(209)(3) clearly provides that anytime within the
thirty-day period after a plat in filed in the appropriate office, “any person or public body having an
interest in any lands affected by the plat may bring a suit to have such plat corrected,” it does not
preclude the bringing of a suit prior to filing of the plat. While defendants point to the letter sent by the
court to the parties in October 1991 as evidence that plaintiffs were on notice that their suit was
premature and that an assessor’s plat would not affect legal title to the property included in the plat, we
note that such notice was informal; the court issued no order with regard to when plaintiffs must file. It
is well-settled that a court speaks only through its written orders. Tiedman v Tiedman, 400 Mich 571,
576-577; 255 NW2d 632 (1977). Further, at the time plaintiffs brought suit, the only authority
addressing the legal effect of an assessor’s plat on title to land was an Attorney General Opinion, OAG,
1981-1982, No 5840, p 17 (January 15, 1981), and that opinion did not address whether an
assessor’s plat can work a taking, whether failure to reconcile boundaries with an assessor’s plat clouds
title, or whether the making of an assessor’s plat in and of itself clouds title.
As plaintiffs point out, this Court in Andrews, supra, ultimately agreed with plaintiffs that, to the
extent the assessor’s plat extended or vacated a portion of a road, it was improper. Id. at 496.
Further, although this Court ultimately found in favor of defendants on the issues whether Pentwater had
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the authority to create a new assessor’s plat in the first place and whether an assessor’s plat acts to alter
legal marketable title to the properties affected, id. at 494, 496, that this Court chose to address these
issues in a published opinion supports plaintiffs’ contention that the law with regard to the effect of an
assessor’s plat on property rights was unsettled and plaintiffs could, in good faith, file their complaint.
See MCR 7.215(B).
Finally, defendants stress that plaintiffs improperly pursued their suit in violation of the court’s
order not to raise the issue of the propriety of the assessor’s plat again. However, the court’s order
imposing sanctions does not indicate that it imposed sanctions because it believed plaintiffs violated its
earlier order. Rather, the court simply stated that it was imposing sanctions for bringing a suit without
legal basis. Furthermore, the circuit court did not issue its earlier order until two years after the suit was
filed, and defendants did not move to dismiss until three years after the suit was filed.
Given that § 209 does not expressly preclude the bringing of a suit prior to the thirty-day period
following the filing of a plat, and in light of the unsettled nature of the law, at the time the suit was filed,
regarding the effect of an assessor’s plat on legal title to the property involved, we are left with a definite
and firm conviction that the trial court erred in imposing sanctions against plaintiffs for bringing a lawsuit
without legal basis. Schadewald, supra at 41.
Reversed.
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Jeffrey G. Collins
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