EUGENE A HARDY V CHRYSLER CORP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
EUGENE A. HARDY,
UNPUBLISHED
September 15, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 222360
WCAC
LC No. 95-000294
CHRYSLER CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr. and McDonald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This case has been remanded by our Supreme Court for consideration as on leave granted.
Defendant appeals the decision of the Worker’s Compensation Appellate Commission (WCAC)
affirming the magistrate’s decision and awarding benefits to plaintiff. We affirm.
Plaintiff injured his knee during the course of his employment for defendant. While recovering
from surgery, he accepted a non-disability retirement package, and did not return to work. Thereafter,
he sought worker’s compensation benefits. The magistrate found plaintiff totally disabled, based on his
inability to perform activities required by his job, and granted him an open award of benefits. The
magistrate rejected defendant’s assertion that plaintiff terminated active employment when he retired and
was therefore precluded by the “retiree presumption” from receiving benefits. MCL 418.373(1); MSA
17.237(373)(1).
The WCAC affirmed the magistrate’s decision and rejected defendant’s contention that an
employee who is recovering from surgery should be considered actively employed for a reasonable time
following the surgery, and thus subject to the retiree presumption. In addition, the WCAC upheld the
magistrate finding that plaintiff was totally disabled, MCL 418.301(4); MSA 17.237(301)(4), and
entitled to an open award of benefits.
The WCAC does not review a magistrate’s decision de novo; nevertheless, it must undertake
both a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the evidence to ensure a full, thorough, and fair review.
MCL 418.861a(13); MSA 17.237(861a)(13); Mudel v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, ___ Mich
___; ___ NW2d ___ (No. 111702, decided July 25, 2000), slip op at 6-8. The WCAC is required to
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determine whether the magistrate’s findings were supported by competent, material, and substantial
evidence on the whole record. MCL 418.861a(3); MSA 17.237(861a)(3); Michales v Morton Salt
Co, 450 Mich 479, 484; 538 NW2d 11 (1995). If the WCAC finds that the magistrate did not rely on
competent evidence, it may then make its own findings. Mudel, supra, slip op at 8. Judicial review is
limited to the findings made by the WCAC, and those findings are conclusive if there is any competent
evidence to support them. Id., slip op at 9-10. If it appears that the WCAC carefully examined the
record, was duly cognizant of the deference to be given to the magistrate’s decision, and did not
misapprehend or grossly misapply the substantial evidence standard, the judicial tendency should be to
affirm the WCAC’s decision. Id., slip op at 12. We review a question of law raised by any final order
of the WCAC on a de novo basis. Oxley v Dep’t of Military Affairs, 460 Mich 536, 540-541; 597
NW2d 89 (1999).
MCL 418.373(1); MSA 17.237(373)(1), the retiree presumption, reads in pertinent part:
An employee who terminates active employment and is receiving nondisability
or retirement benefits under either a private or governmental pension or retirement
program, . . . that was paid by or on behalf of an employer from whom weekly benefits
under this act are sought shall be presumed not to have a loss of earnings or earning
capacity as the result of a compensable injury or disease under either this chapter or
chapter 4. This presumption may be rebutted only by a preponderance of the evidence
that the employee is unable, because of a work related disability, to perform work
suitable to the employee’s qualifications, including training or experience.
Defendant argues that the WCAC erred as a matter of law by concluding that the retiree
presumption did not apply in this case. We disagree and affirm the WCAC’s decision. In Frasier v
Model Coverall Service, Inc, 182 Mich App 741, 744; 453 NW2d 301 (1990), the claimant was off
work due to a work-related disability when he accepted a non-disability retirement. The Frasier
Court, noting that the rules of statutory construction required it to give the phrase “active employment”
in § 373(1) its ordinary meaning, held that because the claimant was off work due to a work-related
injury and was not performing his customary duties at the time he retired, he was not engaged in active
employment at that time. Here, plaintiff was off work due to a work-related disability. He could not
resume his customary duties at the time he chose to retire. The WCAC correctly applied Frasier,
supra, which is controlling, and held that the retiree presumption was inapplicable in this case.
Defendant’s assertion that the WCAC’s decision compels the conclusion that an employee who is off
work for any reason, such as vacation, could retire and escape application of the retiree presumption by
claiming no active employment at the time of retirement is without merit. An employee who is off work
for a reason such as a vacation or a factory shutdown is not off work due to an inability to perform his
customary duties at work. Such a scenario would support the application of § 373(1). See Mason v
Chrysler Corp, 201 Mich App 17; 506 NW2d 240 (1993), modified 444 Mich 875; 511 NW2d 676
(1993).
Affirmed.
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/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
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