MELANIE SUE BROLICK V RICHARD HENRY BROLICK
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MELANIE SUE BROLICK,
UNPUBLISHED
September 15, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
v
No. 217779
Ottawa Circuit Court
LC No. 95-023631-DO
RICHARD HENRY BROLICK,
Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Before: McDonald, P.J., and Neff and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from a judgment of divorce. Defendant cross-appeals as of right.
We affirm.
The first issue is whether the trial court erred in determining that defendant’s forty-five percent
interest in Zelenka Nursery was a separate asset, which appreciated $790,106.00 during the marriage.
The trial court further determined that the $790,106.00 appreciation was “equitably part of the marital
estate.” Plaintiff claims the trial court erred in considering only the appreciation of the stock’s value
during the marriage, and also argues the trial court erred in its valuation of defendant’s interest in the
company. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in awarding plaintiff any portion of his interest in
the company given that it was his separate property and plaintiff did not contribute to its “acquisition,
improvement, or accumulation.” MCL 552.401; MSA 25.136. Defendant claims that any increase in
the value of the company was due to passive appreciation of land owned by the company, and that the
value of the company actually decreased during the marriage when one considers inflation. We disagree
with both parties and affirm the trial court’s decision with respect to this asset.
A determination of whether plaintiff contributed to the property’s acquisition, improvement or
accumulation is a finding of fact. See Reeves v Reeves, 226 Mich App 490, 494-497; 575 NW2d 1
(1997). We review the trial court’s findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. Sparks v
Sparks, 440 Mich 141, 151; 485 NW2d 893 (1992). A finding is clearly erroneous if, after a review
of the entire record, the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been made. Pelton v Pelton, 167 Mich App 22, 25; 421 NW2d 560 (1988).
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The trial court made the following findings of fact regarding plaintiff’s contributions to the
improvements of Zelenka Nursery: (1) that plaintiff undertook tasks to increase the value of the
business, including accompanying defendant on sales trips, entertaining business guests, helping out with
interviews of key people, providing a sounding board for defendant’s ideas, refurnishing a western
headquarters and helping to prepare for a national convention; (2) that plaintiff helped Zelenka Nursery
through her work at Northland Express; (3) that plaintiff helped to raise defendant’s children, but that
this endeavor was hardly a full-time calling for plaintiff; and (4) that plaintiff was a member of the board
at Zelenka Nursery and signed personal guarantees on some of Zelenka Nursery’s notes. The record
supports the trial court’s findings of fact on this issue.
We review the dispositive ruling of the trial court to determine whether it was fair and equitable
in light of those facts. Welling v Welling, 233 Mich App 708, 709; 592 NW2d 822 (1999). We will
grant relief only if we are convinced that we would have reached a different result if we had occupied
the position of the trial court or if we are left with the firm conviction that the division was inequitable.
Id.; Spooner v Spooner, 175 Mich App 169, 172; 437 NW2d 346 (1989).
MCL 552.401; MSA 25.136 grants the trial court discretion to award property “as appears to
the court to be equitable under all circumstances of the case.” The trial court must consider certain
factors when determining an equitable division of property, including “the source of the property; the
parties’ contributions toward its acquisition, as well as to the general marital estate; the duration of the
marriage; the needs and circumstances of the parties; their ages, health, life status, and earning abilities;
the cause of the divorce, as well as past relations and conduct between the parties; and general
principles of equity.” Hanaway v Hanaway, 208 Mich App 278, 292-293; 527 NW2d 792 (1995).
In this case, in view of the record, we conclude that the trial court considered these factors and
achieved the goal of equitable distribution with respect to the division of defendant’s interest in Zelenka
Nursery.
Plaintiff argues that her contributions to defendant were comparable to the plaintiff’s
contributions in Hanaway. We disagree. In Hanaway, the plaintiff actively raised the couple’s children
and kept the couple’s household to help ensure the success of defendant’s career. Id. at 293. Here,
two of defendant’s children lived with the couple during the marriage; however, the children were about
fourteen and twelve years old when plaintiff moved in with defendant, and as the trial court noted,
plaintiff’s role in raising the children was hardly a full-time endeavor. Thus, plaintiff’s parental role was
not the same as the role of the plaintiff in Hanaway. Further, plaintiff admitted that she did not work
outside the home for about seven years, from 1986 to 1993. Collectively, these facts indicate that, as
the trial court concluded, although plaintiff’s contribution to Zelenka Nursery was more substantial than
merely keeping the home fires burning, plaintiff’s contribution to the company was still substantially less
than defendant’s contribution. Thus, the court’s distribution of defendant’s interest in Zelenka Nursery,
which placed only the appreciation of defendant’s interest in the marital estate, was fair and equitable in
light of all the circumstances in the case.
Plaintiff also argues the trial court erred in its calculation of the appreciation of the Zelenka
Nursery stock. Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by relying exclusively on business v
aluation
appraisals of Zelenka Nursery performed by Corporate Valuation Specialists in 1979 and by Merrill
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Lynch in 1995, which were performed to assist the company in valuing its employee stock option plan
[hereinafter “ESOP”]. However, plaintiff’s argument is without merit.
“A trial court has great latitude in determining the value of stock in closely held corporations,
and where a trial court’s valuation of a marital asset is within the range established by the proofs, no
clear error is present.” Jansen v Jansen, 205 Mich App 169, 171; 517 NW2d 275 (1994). Thus,
because the trial court’s valuation was established by the admissible evidence presented by defendant in
the appraisals conducted for the ESOP, no clear error was present. See id.; see also Pelton, supra at
25.
On cross-appeal, defendant also challenges the trial court’s division of defendant’s interest in
Zelenka Nursery. To begin with, defendant argues that any appreciation that occurred with the real
property owned by Zelenka Nursery during the marriage was passive appreciation, that is, appreciation
that occurred without any efforts from the parties. Defendant argues that, under Reeves, this passive
appreciation should not be factored in with the appreciation of defendant’s interest in Zelenka Nursery
in determining what amount should be included in the marital estate.
Defendant’s argument is without merit. Unlike the appreciation that occurred to the property in
Reeves, the appreciation that occurred to the real property owned by Zelenka Nursery was not passive.
Both defendant and plaintiff concentrated their efforts during the marriage into the appreciation of
Zelenka Nursery, of which the real property was an indistinguishable aspect of the business. Thus, the
trial court did not err in failing to distinguish the appreciation that occurred to the company’s real
property from the appreciation that occurred to the value of the company during the marriage.
Defendant’s second argument on cross-appeal is also without merit. Defendant claims that the
trial court erred when it failed to adjust for inflation in determining whether Zelenka Nursery appreciated
during the marriage. The trial court did not commit clear error in calculating the appreciation of
defendant’s interest in Zelenka Nursery stock without factoring inflation into the equation. It is clear that
defendant’s interest in Zelenka Nursery stock was more valuable in 1995 in terms of fair market value
than it was in 1979. See Gregg v Gregg, 133 Mich App 23; 348 NW2d 295 (1984).
The next issue is whether the trial court’s division of the parties’ interest in Spectral Enterprises
was inequitable because the court ordered the parties to maintain an ongoing business relationship in the
company. Again, we review a trial court’s dispositional ruling to determine whether it was fair and
equitable in light of the facts. Welling, supra at 709. On this record, we cannot conclude that the trial
court’s decision was inequitable. The trial court concluded that Spectral provided “an abundant source
of income to support both parties.” Plaintiff’s concerns regarding defendant’s potential to abuse his
position as majority shareholder are purely speculative. In any event, her rights are adequately
protected against any such actions by defendant under MCL 450.1489; MSA 21.200(489).
Finally, plaintiff claims the trial court erred by granting defendant a greater credit for his
premarital property than was established by the evidence. The trial court awarded defendant $324,918
as credit for his premarital property. The court stated that defendant’s trial exhibit AA, a list of
defendant’s premarital assets, established this figure. On appeal, plaintiff asserts that the court’s reliance
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on exhibit AA was in error because some of the figures in this exhibit directly conflict with figures in
defendant’s premarital financial statements, which defendant submitted at trial as exhibit C. The specific
figures on exhibit AA that plaintiff disputes include (1) the premarital value of defendant’s interest in a
housing development for migrant workers called Pine Acres/Pine Creek; (2) the premarital value of
defendant’s home; and (3) the premarital value of defendant’s interest in Bremer Sugar.
The trial court did not clearly err in its findings of fact with respect to the premarital value of
these assets. As stated above, a court’s valuation of an asset is not clear error if it is within the range
established by the proofs. Jansen, supra at 171. In this case, the trial court’s conclusions on the
valuation of these assets were supported by defendant’s exhibit AA. Further, the figures in exhibit AA
were traceable to exhibit C.
In particular, with respect to the value of defendant’s home, exhibit AA lists a value of
$131,453, which is the same value as shown in exhibit C when taking the cost of the home ($210,000)
less the outstanding mortgage ($78,547). Plaintiff argues that the correct value should have been
between $96,453 and $121,453, which was the market value of the home ($175,000 to $200,000)
less the outstanding mortgage ($78,547). However, because the court’s valuation is established by the
proofs, we do not find clear error.
Similarly, with respect to the premarital value of the Bremer Sugar stock, exhibit AA lists the
book value of the stock, which is $16,456. However, defendant argues that the proper value should
have been $12,342, which is listed on exhibit C as the book value less a twenty-five percent discount.
However, again, because the trial court’s valuation of the stock is established by the proofs, we do not
find clear error.
Finally, with respect to the premarital value of Pine Acres/Pine Creek, plaintiff argues that the
trial court erred in valuing defendant’s interest at $52,554, which is the figure listed on exhibit AA,
because exhibit C lists the value of this asset as $1,687. However, as defendant argues, defendant
testified at trial that the premarital interest of this asset was approximately $105,000, of which defendant
owned half, which is approximately $52,500. Thus, the court’s reliance on the value listed in exhibit AA
was not clear error because this figure was established by defendant’s testimony at trial, and we give
special deference to the trial court’s findings when they are based on the credibility of a witness.
Draggoo v Draggoo, 223 Mich App 415, 429; 566 NW2d 642 (1997).
Affirmed.
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
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