LUMBERMENS MUTUAL CASUALTY CO V RLI INSUR CO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
LUMBERMENS MUTUAL CASUALTY
COMPANY,
UNPUBLISHED
September 15, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 214487
Van Buren Circuit Court
LC No. 97-004370 CZ
RLI INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Gage, P.J., and Meter and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right a trial court order denying its motion for summary disposition and
granting defendant summary disposition. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Both plaintiff and defendant insured a pickup truck that in February 1996 struck seven year-old
Kristen Weston while she waited for a school bus, causing very serious injuries. Under an automobile
insurance policy, plaintiff provided Packer Foods, Inc. primary coverage with respect to the pickup
involved in the accident, up to a one million dollar coverage limit.1 Plaintiff additionally had provided to
Packer Foods a comprehensive catastrophe policy, which represented an excess policy that provided
additional coverage of two million dollars. Defendant also provided Duane Packer a “personal umbrella
liability policy” with a two million dollar limit above plaintiff’s primary policy.
In early April 1997, after plaintiff and the Westons’ representatives settled the Westons’ claims
against Packer Foods for $1,625,000, plaintiff ascertained that the two million dollar excess policy it
had issued Packer Foods was canceled at some point before the accident occurred, and therefore did
not provide coverage regarding the injured girl’s claim. Plaintiff filed the instant suit in June 1997, after
1
Packer Foods, Inc. apparently was owned by Duane and Bernice Packer, whose daughter Valary
drove the pickup at the time of the accident.
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unsuccessfully seeking defendant’s reimbursement of the $625,000 above the primary automobile policy
limit that plaintiff had paid the Westons.2
Both parties moved for summary disposition.3 The trial court concluded that plaintiff had no
cause of action against defendant, explaining in relevant part as follows:
There was a settlement made in which Defendant was not actively involved and
did not have the opportunity to assert their viewpoint of what this case was worth
because of the mistaken assumption that their coverage was irrelevant at that point and
that there was enough coverage on the part of Plaintiff in their policies, which included
the policy that had been canceled. . . . And under Defendant’s policy and its
provisions, its liability is contingent upon their ability to consent to these things to litigate,
to take over the defense if they have to. . . .
. . . And my conclusion is there is not a viable cause of action stated here by the
Plaintiff . . . because it was the oversight of the Plaintiff that created the situation that
prevented the Defendant from doing what it can never do now, and that is approach this
and settle this in consent or not consent, take over the defense or not take over the
defense of this action, look at the case like it would have been looked at back then.
That’s impossible and I don’t think any of the theories that are set forth in the Plaintiff’s
complaint of contractual subrogation or equitable subrogation or unjust enrichment are
viable in this case.
The trial court concluded that plaintiff prevented defendant’s participation in the settlement conference
by failing to timely advise defendant of the conference and by indicating that defendant’s participation in
the settlement conference was not necessary, and therefore ordered summary disposition for defendant,
which order plaintiff appeals.
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s summary disposition ruling. In reviewing a decision
on a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), we must examine all relevant documentary evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists on
which reasonable minds could differ. Nesbitt v American Community Mutual Ins Co, 236 Mich App
215, 219-220; 600 NW2d 427 (1999).
2
Plaintiff alleged that defendant breached its excess policy (Count I), sought a declaratory judgment
finding defendant responsible for the $625,000 (Count II), argued that defendant was unjustly enriched
by plaintiff’s payment of the $625,000 (Count III), and averred that it “is entitled, under principles of
equitable subrogation, to recover from” defendant (Count IV).
3
Plaintiff sought summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). Although neither defendant’s
motion nor the trial court’s order cited a subrule warranting defendant’s entitlement to summary
disposition, in light of the parties’ references to and the court’s consideration of documentary evidence
beyond the pleadings, it appears that the court ordered summary disposition pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(10). Nesbitt v American Community Mutual Ins Co, 236 Mich App 215, 219-220, n 2;
600 NW2d 427 (1999).
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The parties do not dispute their insured’s liability in striking Kristen Weston. The parties also
do not now dispute that plaintiff was liable for up to one million dollars of the Westons’ claims, and that
defendant’s excess umbrella policy represents the only policy potentially responsible for any amount of
the Westons’ claims up to an additional two million dollars. Despite that defendant did not contest its
insured’s liability in the Westons’ underlying suit and that the Westons’ claims settled for $625,000
more than the limits of plaintiff’s primary policy, defendant denied responsibility for the $625,000 on the
basis that its policy prohibited “any legal action . . . against us unless you have complied with the policy
provision, []or until your obligation has been set by final judgment or agreement with us.” Defendant
asserted that because it did not agree to the settlement amount, this policy language relieved it from any
obligation to contribute to the settlement.
Deposition testimony of the parties’ employees seems to call into question the reasonableness of
defendant’s failure to participate in the settlement negotiations. Carma Slaymaker, defendant’s claims
specialist who initially handled the Westons’ claims, evaluated the case in March 1996 and set a two
million dollar reserve, meaning “the amount of indemnity that you . . . believe you will require to resolve
the case.” The reserve remained at this amount until after a March 1997 settlement conference. The
testimony of Slaymaker and Brian Casey, defendant’s representative who handled the claim as of June
1996, indicates that from the time the Westons filed their claims until the day before the settlement
conference, Casey and David Dark, an attorney defendant hired to review the Westons’ claims,
believed that defendant’s policy represented the only excess policy potentially liable for the amount of
the Westons’ claims above one million dollars. Casey further explained that he had “no reservations
with respect to the applicability of [defendant’s] policy” to the Westons’ claims.
In April 1996, Slaymaker forwarded to Dark the Weston claim materials defendant had
received, and requested that he evaluate the case’s potential settlement value. John Moyer, one of
plaintiff’s executive claims specialists who handled the Westons’ claims, alleged that defendant was
mailed Weston case correspondence, and Dark acknowledged that in August or September 1996 he
received materials concerning the Westons’ underlying case against the Packers, including a pretrial
scheduling order. Dark also received on March 11, 1997, one week prior to the settlement conference,
a settlement brochure and three videos provided by the Westons and an additional medical report.
Casey testified that he knew from September 1996 that plaintiff intended to attempt a settlement of the
Westons’ underlying lawsuit.
Moyer testified that on the day prior to the settlement conference he spoke with Casey and
informed him that plaintiff would attempt to settle the case for under two million dollars. According to
Moyer, Casey opined that a settlement under two million dollars represented a “terrific result for this
case,” which Moyer alleged that Casey “thought . . . was worth substantially more than $2 million.”
Moyer informed Casey that he believed that a jury might return a verdict on the Westons’ claims
amounting to more than three million dollars. Moyer mistakenly informed Casey that plaintiff’s parent
company Kemper had issued a two million dollar excess policy that covered the Westons’ claims, and
testified that he and Casey discussed “the issue of whose money is it going to be: Kemper’s money or
RLI’s money or both.” The issue of who would be responsible for what amount of the Westons’
recovery above one million dollars remained “an open question” because defendant “was not willing, at
that point in time, to concede anything on the other insurance issue; neither was [Moyer].” Moyer
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alleged that Casey “didn’t want to participate in the settlement negotiations, and indicated he wasn’t
coming,” and Moyer denied telling Casey not to attend the settlement conference.
Plaintiff contends that the trial court erroneously failed to find that defendant waived reliance on
its policy’s “no action” clause by failing to participate in the settlement negotiations. While clauses
prohibiting an insured from voluntarily settling a claim without the insurer’s consent give the insurer the
opportunity to contest liability, to participate in settlement negotiations and to have input as to the value
of the claim, Alyas v Gillard, 180 Mich App 154, 160; 446 NW2d 610 (1989), “[l]ogically, the
insurer may so unreasonably delay its participation in, or approval of, a settlement that the insured will
have no realistic option but to settle without the insurer.” 7 Couch, Insurance, 3d, § 105:18, pp 105
31. See also Alyas, supra (“When an insurer breaches its own policy of insurance by refusing to fulfill
its duty to defend the insured, the insurer is bound by any reasonable settlement entered into in good
faith between the insured and the third party.”).
In light of the existence of some evidence indicating defendant’s knowledge until the day before
the settlement conference of its liability for any amount of the Westons’ claims in excess of one million
dollars, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that defendant reasonably failed to attend the settlement
conference. Even considering that on the day before the settlement conference defendant mistakenly
was informed that Kemper also had an excess policy amounting to two million dollars, Moyer alleged
that an issue existed whether Kemper and defendant would share responsibility for any settlement
amount above one million dollars. While the trial court apparently accepted Casey’s and Dark’s denials
that any coverage issue existed because Moyer and plaintiff’s attorney informed them that plaintiff’s and
Kemper’s policies would cover the full extent of any settlement and that defendant need not attend the
settlement conference, in doing so the court rendered a credibility determination impermissible in the
context of a motion based on MCR 2.116(C)(10). Vanguard Ins Co v Bolt, 204 Mich App 271,
276; 514 NW2d 525 (1994) (“[W]here the truth of a material factual assertion of a moving party
depends upon a deponent’s credibility, there exists a genuine issue for the trier of fact and a motion for
summary disposition should not be granted.”).
Because material issues of fact existed concerning the reasonableness of defendant’s failure to
attend the March 18, 1997 settlement conference, we conclude that the trial court erred in granting
defendant summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) on the basis that the “no action” clause
in defendant’s insurance contract prevented plaintiff’s instant action. In light of our conclusion that the
fact finder must determine whether defendant effectively waived its right to assert the “no action” clause,
we need not address plaintiff’s alternative arguments on appeal. 4 We note, however, that to the extent
4
Plaintiff additionally contends (1) that defendant cannot rely on the “no action” clause without
demonstrating that plaintiff’s settlement in defendant’s absence prejudiced defendant, and (2) that
despite defendant’s nonparticipation in the settlement negotiations, defendant remained liable for the
amount over plaintiff’s primary policy limits because the settlement was reasonable. We note that the
trial court expressly declined to make a finding regarding the settlement’s reasonableness. The
resolution of these issues is not yet required absent a finding whether defendant may invoke its “no
action” clause. Furthermore, because it remains unclear whether defendant is responsible for the
$625,000 pursuant to its contract for insurance, we need not consider plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim.
(continued…)
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the issue becomes relevant on remand, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling that
plaintiff’s computer jury verdict projection evidence was inadmissible.5 Lopez v General Motors
Corp, 224 Mich App 618, 634; 569 NW2d 861 (1997).
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Donald S. Owens
(…continued)
Everett v Nickola, 234 Mich App 632, 637; 599 NW2d 732 (1999) (“[A]n equitable remedy is
neither necessary nor appropriate where a resolution under the law is available.”).
To the extent that defendant contends that plaintiff lacks standing to bring the instant action, we
note that should defendant be found to have an obligation to pay the $625,000 over plaintiff’s one
million dollar policy limit, plaintiff’s payment of the $625,000 in satisfaction of defendant’s rejected
obligation to the insured entitles plaintiff, under the theory of equitable subrogation, to seek
reimbursement of the amount from defendant. Citizens Ins Co of America v Buck, 216 Mich App
217, 226; 548 NW2d 680 (1996).
5
Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, the projection was not admissible under MRE 703 because
plaintiff’s expert did not rely on the projection in reaching his conclusion regarding the reasonableness of
plaintiff’s settlement. Furthermore, plaintiff failed to lay a proper foundation demonstrating the reliability
of its computer program. Duke v American Olean Tile Co, 155 Mich App 555, 560; 400 NW2d
677 (1986).
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