PEOPLE OF MI V LAWRENCE DEMETRI BLANTON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 15, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 210004
Wayne Circuit Court
Criminal Division
LC No. 96-504010
LAWRENCE DEMETRI BLANTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Kelly, P.J., and White and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury convictions of armed robbery, MCL 750.529; MSA
28.797, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA
28.424(2). He was sentenced as a third habitual offender, MCL 769.11; MSA 28.1083, to four to
fifteen years’ imprisonment for the armed robbery conviction and a consecutive two-year term for the
felony-firearm conviction. We affirm.
John Barnum testified that, on the night of November 21, 1996, he was working as the manager
of the Terrace Theater. Between 10:00 p.m. and midnight, Barnum had some conversations with
defendant, who had approached Barnum, asking if he was accepting job applications. Defendant
indicated that he was at the theater to see a movie. Barnum went to his office, retrieving an application
from a new stack, and gave it to defendant. Defendant went away, and Barnum went back to his work.
A short while later, Barnum was working in his office. The office was locked, and the door had
a peephole. Barnum heard a knock on the door and, when he looked through the peephole, he saw
defendant. He opened the door, and defendant gave Barnum the completed application. Defendant
used the name “John Smith” on the application. Barnum took the application and told defendant that he
would get back to him.
Barnum went back to work in his office. After a short period of time, he heard a knock on the
office door. It was about midnight. He looked through the peephole and saw defendant again.
Defendant told Barnum that he wished to borrow some money for a telephone call. Barnum opened the
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office door to give defendant some change. When he opened the door, he noticed that defendant had a
gun.
Defendant told Barnum to be calm and indicated he did not want to hurt Barnum. Barnum
complied with defendant’s directions. Apparently the men went into the office and closed the door.
Defendant told Barnum to open the safe, which Barnum did. Next, he told Barnum to turn around, and
Barnum did so, putting his hands behind his back. Defendant handcuffed Barnum. Barnum then heard
the sound of what he believed was defendant putting on latex gloves. Defendant emptied the safe into
an empty garbage can. He took money and Barnum’s driver’s license from Barnum’s wallet.
Defendant made a comment to Barnum that he now knew where Barnum lived and made a threat
against Barnum’s life. Defendant then left the office.
Barnum, who remained handcuffed, was able to maneuver himself to call 911. The police
arrived, and Barnum described the incident. He described the man as a dark-complected black man
who was clean shaven. In fact, defendant has light skin and wears a mustache. Barnum testified that
the safe contained a little over $4,000. The police took the handcuffs and job application form filled out
by the man.
While no identifiable fingerprints were found on the handcuffs, the police were able to identify
two fingerprints on the job application. These fingerprints matched defendant and led the police to him.
The last address they had for defendant was the home of his mother, Sadie Graves. Police surveilled
Graves’ home. They followed defendant from Graves’ home on November 27, 1996 and arrested him.
Defendant was driving a Cadillac. Paperwork from the car indicated that defendant had purchased the
car on November 22, 1996, putting down a cash deposit of over $2,300.
Graves testified for the prosecution. She had ejected defendant from her home in early
November. She told him to leave because, on New Years’ Eve 1995, he had fired a gun. She said
that she worried that defendant might be using drugs, but denied knowing whether he actually did.
Defendant had been giving her some money to save for him so he could purchase a house. She gave
defendant the money, $2,000, when defendant moved out of her home. She denied that defendant had
come to her house earlier during the week of November 27, 1996, with a large sum of money, which he
said he had found. She testified that defendant offered to give her twenty dollars. According to Graves,
defendant’s girlfriend had called, indicating that there was a problem with defendant and that he had
found some money.
According to Graves, defendant was at her house with the rest of her family during the evening
of November 21, 1996. Defendant left there around midnight. She testified that defendant and his
brother, John Rice, had argued about a car that night.
After the police arrested defendant, Livonia Police Detective Sergeant Todd Bredin met with
defendant at the station. Bredin read defendant his rights. Defendant asked Bredin how they caught
him and whether he was going to get life. When Bredin explained that the police obtained defendant’s
fingerprints off the job application, defendant said he thought he had not given the application back to
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the “guy.” Defendant denied owning or using a gun. When Bredin asked defendant why he committed
the offense, defendant told him that he had a heroin problem, which made him do “dumb stuff.”
Bredin gave defendant a form to write out a statement. Defendant wrote only about taking
several applications from Barnum and giving none back. Bredin asked defendant why he did not write
out the other things they had talked about. Defendant told him that what he wrote was true, but he did
not want to write that he had robbed the theater; he did not like to use the word “robbed.” Defendant
told Bredin that, after more careful consideration, he did not wish to write any more until he consulted
with an attorney. Bredin terminated the interview.
After the prosecution rested, defendant presented his only witness, Rice. Rice testified that he
was with defendant at Graves’ home the night of November 21, 1996. He and defendant argued over
whether Rice could use defendant’s car, a Honda. They left Graves’ home at about the same time,
shortly after midnight.
Following Rice’s testimony, the prosecution asked to recall Bredin to offer testimony to rebut
Graves’ testimony. The prosecution claimed that Graves had given testimony inconsistent with her
statement to Bredin when Bredin interviewed her at her home on November 27, 1996. Over
defendant’s objection, the trial court allowed the testimony,
Bredin testified that, on November 27, 1996, Graves told him that defendant had come to her
house with a large sum of money. Defendant could not explain to her from where the money came. He
offered her some of the money. Bredin testified that Graves never told him that defendant had offered
her twenty dollars. She did tell him that she had ejected defendant from her home because of his drug
use.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing Bredin’s testimony as rebuttal testimony.
This Court reviews the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. People v Gibson,
219 Mich App 530, 532; 557 NW2d 141 (1996). Whether evidence is admissible by a rule of
evidence or statute is a question of law, which we review de novo. People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484,
488; 596 NW2d 607 (1999).
In People v Leo, 188 Mich App 417, 422; 470 NW2d 423 (1991), this Court explained:
Rebuttal testimony may be used to contradict, repel, explain, or disprove
evidence presented by the other party in an attempt to weaken and impeach it. The test
for error regarding rebuttal evidence is whether it is justified by the evidence it is offered
to rebut. A prosecutor cannot elicit a denial during the cross-examination of a defense
witness and use such denial to inject a new issue into the case. Cross-examination
cannot be used to revive a right to introduce evidence that could have been, but was
not, introduced in the prosecutor’s case in chief. [Citations omitted.]
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Bredin’s testimony was not proper rebuttal testimony. It did not respond to evidence presented
by defendant. Rather, the prosecution sought to impeach the testimony of one of its own witnesses.
The prosecution should have recalled Bredin as part of its case in chief.
Although admission of the testimony as rebuttal evidence was erroneous, the error was
harmless. Defendant has the burden of demonstrating that, “‘after an examination of the entire cause, it
shall affirmatively appear’ that it is more probable than not that the error was outcome determinative.”
Lukity, supra at 496.
We find that error in the admission of Bredin’s “rebuttal” testimony was harmless. Barnum
testified as to the circumstances of the robbery. He testified that he got a good look at the robber.
Barnum testified that there was no doubt in his mind that defendant was the man who robbed him, even
though he had earlier described the man as dark-complected and clean shaven. Defendant’s
fingerprints were found on the job application that Barnum previously gave to and was returned by the
man who robbed him. According to Barnum, the robber stole about $4,000, and, the day after the
robbery, defendant made a $2,300 cash deposit for a car.
Graves and Rice offered testimony to contradict some of the inferences that could be drawn
from the untainted evidence. However, considering the untainted evidence, we find that defendant has
failed to establish that it is more probable than not that Bredin’s improper testimony was outcome
determinative. Thus, he has not demonstrated that the error in the admission of Bredin’s testimony
requires reversal.
Next, defendant claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial level. He
argues that trial counsel should have challenged the validity of his arrest and search without a warrant.
We disagree.
To establish that counsel was ineffective, defendant must demonstrate, through the record, that
his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the
representation prejudiced him to the extent that he was denied a fair trial. People v Barclay, 208 Mich
App 670, 672; 528 NW2d 842 (1995), citing People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 309; 521 NW2d
797 (1994). Defendant must demonstrate that, but for the alleged error, the result of the trial would
have been different. People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687; 521 NW2d 557 (1994). There exists a
strong presumption that the assistance provided constituted sound trial strategy, and defendant must
overcome this presumption. Id.
A police officer may arrest a person if the officer has information demonstrating probable cause
to believe that an offense has occurred and the defendant committed it. MCL 764.15; MSA 28.874;
People v Champion, 452 Mich 92, 115; 549 NW2d 849 (1996). “Probable cause to arrest exists
when the facts and circumstances within an officer’s knowledge and of which he has reasonably
trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief
that an offense has been or is being committed.” Id. A search incident to arrest requires no additional
justification. Id.
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Barnum turned over to police a job application that had been handled by the person who
robbed him. Police performed a fingerprint analysis of the application, and the number one candidate
was identified as defendant. Based on this information, the police had probable cause to arrest
defendant. Therefore, the admission of the evidence seized incident to defendant’s arrest was not
erroneous. Because his arrest and the seizure of evidence were not improper, defendant cannot
demonstrate error on the part of trial counsel in failing to challenge these matters. Thus, defendant has
failed to establish that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
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