LJULJA LJUCOVIC V COLLEEN GRACE STEINKIRCHNER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
LJULJA LJUCOVIC, Individually and as Next Friend
of DONNY LJUCOVIC, a minor,
UNPUBLISHED
September 12, 2000
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 211120
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 96-521060 NI
COLLEEN GRACE STEINKIRCHNER, a/k/a
COLLEEN CORBEAU, a/k/a COLLEEN
BREWER,
Defendant,
and
ARBOR DRUGS, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Whitbeck, P.J., and White and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs Ljulja and Donny Ljucovic appeal as of right from a jury verdict in favor of defendant
appellant Arbor Drugs, Inc., finding no cause of action in this dramshop action. We affirm.
On October 26, 1993, Ljulja Ljucovic was driving a vehicle in which her minor son, Donny
Ljucovic, was a passenger when a vehicle driven by Colleen Steinkirchner1 made an untimely left turn
and collided head-on with plaintiff’s vehicle. A few hours before the accident, Steinkirchner consumed
a 750 ml bottle of wine at her apartment. Around 6:00 p.m. that evening, Steinkirchner drove to Arbor
Drugs located at 14 Mile Road and Haggerty Road in the City of Farmington Hills to purchase more
wine. At 6:14 p.m., Steinkirchner purchased a four package of 187 ml bottles of Sutter Home wine
from an Arbor Drugs’ cashier. Steinkirchner presented her identification to the cashier and paid cash
1
We use the term defendant to refer only to Arbor Drugs.
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for the wine, but did not converse with any of the sales people or the cashier. Steinkirchner then left
Arbor Drugs, returned to her vehicle, and consumed approximately two of the four 187 ml bottles of
Sutter Home wine she purchased at Arbor Drugs. Steinkirchner proceeded to drive about ¼ of a mile
south on Haggerty Road toward Village Green Apartments where she lived. As she approached the
entrance to the apartment complex, she stopped briefly and then made a sudden left turn into the
complex. However, instead of completing the left turn, she veered directly into oncoming traffic,
colliding head-on with plaintiff’s vehicle, which was traveling north on Haggerty Road.
Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit alleging automobile negligence against Steinkirchner, and
dramshop liability against Arbor Drugs for selling wine to Steinkirchner when she was visibly
intoxicated.2 A default judgment was entered against Steinkirchner on the issue of liability after she
failed to appear and the jury awarded damages on that claim in the amount of $5,000 to Ljulja Ljucovic
and $90,000 to Donny Ljucovic. Ljulja’s dramshop claim against Arbor Drugs was dismissed on a
motion for directed verdict at trial. Donny’s dramshop action was submitted to the jury; however, the
jury returned a no cause of action verdict in favor of Arbor Drugs, finding that although Donny was
injured by Steinkirchner, Arbor Drugs did not sell wine to Steinkirchner at a time when she was visibly
intoxicated.
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in excluding opinion testimony from lay witness Wanda
DiPonio that plaintiff was intoxicated at the time of the accident. We disagree.
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of
discretion. Dep’t of Transportation v VanElslander, 460 Mich 127, 129; 594 NW2d 841 (1999),
citing Phillips v Deihm, 213 Mich App 389, 401; 541 NW2d 566 (1995); Richardson v Ryder
Truck Rental, Inc, 213 Mich App 447, 454-455; 540 NW2d 696 (1995). “Opinion testimony from a
lay witness is permitted when it is rationally based on the witness’ perception of the incident and when it
is helpful to a clear understanding of” the facts at issue. Co-Jo, Inc v Strand, 226 Mich App 108, 116;
572 NW2d 251 (1997), citing MRE 701; see also McPeak v McPeak (On Remand), 233 Mich App
483, 493; 593 NW2d 180 (1999).
DiPonio testified at her deposition and in an offer of proof made at trial that she observed
Steinkirchner turn into oncoming traffic and collide with plaintiffs’ vehicle and that, based on this
conduct, she believed Steinkirchner was “either nuts or . . . drunk.” DiPonio further testified that she
did not talk to Steinkirchner, did not get close enough to her to smell intoxicants, did not observe
Steinkirchner’s eyes, and only briefly observed Steinkirchner for a few minutes after the accident from
approximately twenty feet away, at which time Steinkirchner appeared to be stumbling as she walked to
the curb. DiPonio explained that, based on these observations, she did not believe Steinkirchner’s
conduct was that “of a sober or sane person.”
2
Arbor Drugs filed a cross-complaint against Colleen Steinkirchner seeking full indemnification for all
damages awarded against it. However, Arbor Drugs dismissed the cross-claim after the no cause of
action verdict was rendered.
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We do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding opinion testimony from
DiPonio that Steinkirchner was intoxicated at the time of the accident. DiPonio’s opinion was based
solely on her observations of Steinkirchner turning her vehicle into oncoming traffic and staggering when
she exited her vehicle and walked to the curb after the accident. In fact, DiPonio admitted during her
deposition that her conclusion that Steinkirchner was intoxicated based on an improper turn was merely
speculation and that Steinkirchner’s staggering may well have been caused by a factor other than
intoxication (e.g., injured leg, shock from accident). In the absence of specific, objective factors
supporting DiPonio’s opinion that Steinkirchner was intoxicated, we agree with the trial court that her
opinion was not a reliable conclusion based on a rational perception of Steinkirchner, cf. Heyler v
Dixon, 160 Mich App 130, 144-147; 408 NW2d 121 (1987); Lasky v Baker, 126 Mich App 524,
530-531; 337 NW2d 561 (1983), and would not have assisted the jury in understanding her testimony
or resolving the factual issue. DiPonio properly testified to her observations of Steinkirchner
immediately after the accident and the jury was free to draw its own inferences and conclusions from her
testimony. MRE 701; McPeak, supra.
Plaintiffs next argue that the trial court erred in excluding evidence and testimony relating to the
Techniques of Alcohol Management (TAM) used by Arbor Drugs to train its cashiers. We disagree.
The TAM is a training process developed by the Michigan Licensed Beverage Association to
make vendors of alcohol and their employees aware of their duties under the law regarding the sale of
alcohol to visibly intoxicated persons and to provide guidance to sellers on how to determine when a
person is visibly intoxicated. Arbor Drugs used the TAM as part of its internal training of cashiers.
Plaintiffs assert a number of reasons why the TAM should have been admitted at trial, none of which we
find convincing.
Plaintiffs first contend that the dramshop act is silent on the standard of care to be used by
vendors of alcohol, thus, the TAM was admissible to assist the jury in understanding the standard of
care Arbor Drugs and its cashiers should have followed when it sold the wine to Steinkirchner.
The Michigan Liquor Control Act in effect at the time of this action provided in pertinent part:
A retail licensee shall not . . . directly or indirectly, individually or by a clerk,
agent, or servant sell, furnish, or give alcoholic liquor to a person who is visibly
intoxicated. [MCL 436.22(3); MSA 18.993(3).]3
A person is visibly intoxicated when “his or her intoxication would be apparent to an ordinary
observer.” Heyler, supra at 145-146, quoting SJI2d 75.02; see also Miller v Ochampaugh, 191
3
After this action was filed, the Michigan Liquor Control Act was repealed and the Michigan Liquor
Control Code of 1998 was enacted, 1998 PA 58, effective April 14, 1998. The relevant language in
the new statute does not differ from that cited in the text; however, the statute is now cited as MCL
436.1801(2); MSA 18.1175(801).
-3
Mich App 48, 57; 477 NW2d 105 (1991). Thus, contrary to plaintiffs’ contention, the dramshop act
and case law indeed define the requisite standard of care for licensees.
In fact, plaintiffs concede throughout their brief that the dramshop act imposes a duty on
licensees not to sell alcohol to a visibly intoxicated individual, and that an objective standard is used to
determine whether an individual is visibly intoxicated to an ordinary observer. See Miller, supra at 57
58. Thus, the relevant inquiry in a dramshop action is whether the allegedly intoxicated person would
have been visibly intoxicated to an ordinary observer, not whether the particular sales person or
licensee involved in the claim actually found visible intoxication. Id. Under this objective standard,
whether a licensee had certain practices or procedures in place to assess intoxication, and whether a
particular cashier actually followed his employer’s practices or procedures when selling alcohol to an
individual, is irrelevant. The only question the jury must decide is whether, under the circumstances
presented, the allegedly intoxicated individual would have appeared intoxicated to an ordinary observer
at the time of the sale. Id. at 60.
Applying these principles to the facts of this case, we conclude that whether Arbor Drugs used
the TAM to educate its cashiers on the law regarding dramshop liability or to train its cashiers on how to
determine whether an individual is visibly intoxicated, is irrelevant. The law does not impose a duty on
licensees to comply with certain policies or procedures when selling alcohol. See Gallagher v DetroitMacomb Hosp Ass’n, 171 Mich App 761, 764-765; 431 NW2d 90 (1988). The only duty Arbor
Drugs had under the law was not to sell alcoholic beverages to a visibly intoxicated individual. Thus,
whether Arbor Drugs used the TAM and whether its employees complied with the TAM were not
germane to the issue of dramshop liability in this case.
Plaintiffs further argue that because the dramshop act allowed retail licensees to present
evidence of its “business practices” and procedures in defense of a civil action, plaintiffs should also
have been permitted to introduce evidence of the TAM to show that Arbor Drugs did not comply with
those practices and procedures.
MCL 436.22h(1); MSA 18.993(8)(1) states in pertinent part:
In defense of a civil action under section 22, a retail licensee may present
evidence that at the time of the selling, giving or furnishing of the alcoholic liquor, the
retail licensee was adhering to responsible business practices. Responsible business
practices are those business policies, procedures, and actions which an ordinarily
prudent person would follow in like circumstances.
This provision of the dramshop act, by its express terms, only allows retail licensees to present
evidence of business practices, policies or procedures in defense of a civil action. It does not afford
plaintiffs the right to introduce similar evidence in order to establish liability. Where statutory language is
clear and unambiguous, judicial construction and interpretation is neither necessary nor appropriate.
Heinz v Chicago Rd Investment Co, 216 Mich App 289, 295; 549 NW2d 47 (1996). According to
the plain language of the statute, the Legislature clearly intended to afford licensees the opportunity to
defend their actions by showing that they adhered to “responsible business practices” according to an
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“ordinarily prudent person” standard. Had the Legislature intended to allow plaintiffs to use the same
evidence to establish liability, it would have expressed its intent by including appropriate language in the
statute. The Legislature did not do so, and we decline to read such language into the statute.
Plaintiffs also contend in two conclusory sentences that an interpretation of the statute affording
only licensees the right to use evidence of business practices in defense of a lawsuit violates the Equal
Protection Clauses of the United States and Michigan Constitutions. Plaintiffs have failed to provide any
factual discussion or legal authority in support of their contention. “A party may not merely announce a
position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for the claim.” In re Webb H
Coe Marital and Residuary Trusts, 233 Mich App 525, 537; 593 NW2d 190 (1999). Thus, we
decline to review this claim. Id.
With respect to plaintiffs’ claim that the trial court improperly excluded deposition testimony
from David Stern concerning the TAM, we note that Stern’s deposition testimony was not transcribed
and made part of the lower court record and is thus unavailable for review on appeal. Appeals to this
Court are heard on the original record. MCR 7.210(A). Without the deposition testimony, we are
unable to fully review this claim. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ appellate challenge to the exclusion of this
evidence is deemed waived. Hawkins v Murphy, 222 Mich App 664, 670; 565 NW2d 674 (1997);
Taylor v Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan, 205 Mich App 644, 654; 517 NW2d 864
(1994).
In a related argument, plaintiffs claim that the trial court erred in excluding testimony from Arbor
Drugs’ store manager, Timothy Block, regarding whether, based on the information contained in the
TAM, Stern and other Arbor Drugs employees would have perceived Steinkirchner as intoxicated at
the time of the sale. We conclude, as we did above, that an objective, reasonable person standard is
used to determine visible intoxication and the reasonable person in this case was the jury. It is irrelevant
whether Block, Stern, or any other Arbor Drugs employee would have subjectively perceived
Steinkirchner as visibly intoxicated at the time of the sale. Miller, supra at 57-58. Accordingly, we
find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling.
Plaintiffs next contend that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of Steinkirchner’s attempt
to escape police custody at the hospital after the accident.
After reviewing the record, we agree with the trial court that evidence pertaining to
Steinkirchner’s attempt to escape police custody, while relevant to the issue of Steinkirchner’s
negligence, was irrelevant to any issue in the dramshop action against Arbor Drugs. Because
Steinkirchner was defaulted on the issue of liability in the automobile negligence claim, we find no basis
for the admission of this evidence. The dispositive issue in the dramshop action against Arbor Drugs
was whether Steinkirchner appeared visibly intoxicated to an ordinary observer at the time she
purchased the wine before the car accident. Steinkirchner’s behavior and her level of intoxication
several hours after she purchased the wine, and after she consumed two additional 187 ml bottles of
wine, was neither relevant nor probative to any material issue at trial.
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Next, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erroneously admitted testimony from Dr. Gallagher
regarding information contained in the Physician’s Desk Reference (PDR) as well as the PDR itself.
During trial, evidence was admitted suggesting that Steinkirchner may have taken the anti
depressant drug Zoloft a few hours before consuming alcoholic beverages. On direct examination, Dr.
Spitz, plaintiffs’ expert witness, testified that Zoloft enhanced the effect of alcohol on the individual. Dr.
Spitz also expressly acknowledged that the PDR was an authoritative book published by drug
companies to assist physicians in understanding how drugs work and the effects they may have on
individuals taking them.
Subsequently, Dr. Gallagher, Arbor Drugs’ expert witness, testified on direct examination that
the PDR was an authoritative source and, according to the PDR, Zoloft had not been shown to increase
the mental and motor skill impairment caused by alcohol. Dr. Gallagher then read the language
regarding the effects of Zoloft on alcohol directly from the PDR, which stated “Zoloft has not been
shown in experiments with normal subjects to increase the mental and motor skill impairment caused by
alcohol.” Over plaintiffs’ hearsay objection, the trial court allowed the testimony.
An expert witness may rely on hearsay or other non-record evidence in formulating opinions
and conclusions. Forest City Enterprises, Inc v Leemon Oil Co, 228 Mich App 57, 73; 577 NW2d
150 (1998). Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Dr. Gallagher to read the
language from the PDR on which he relied in formulating his opinion and conclusion into evidence.
Moreover, plaintiffs’ argument that the evidence was improperly offered as substantive evidence
rather than for impeachment, while not raised below and technically abandoned on appeal, see Herald
Co v Ann Arbor Public Schools, 224 Mich App 266, 278; 568 NW2d 411 (1997), is without merit.
The record reveals that Dr. Gallagher’s reference to the statement in the PDR regarding the marginal
effect of Zoloft on alcohol was offered to impeach Dr. Spitz’ testimony to the contrary. See
Dziurlikowski v Morley, 143 Mich App 729, 733; 372 NW2d 648 (1985), aff’d 428 Mich 132; 405
NW2d 863 (1987). Impeachment testimony may be elicited on direct examination of another witness,
not only on cross-examination of the witness being impeached. See Ellison v Wayne Co General
Hosp, 100 Mich App 739, 746; 300 NW2d 392 (1980), modified on other grounds 411 Mich 988
(1981).
Finally, plaintiffs’ argument that the evidence was inadmissible simply because it was prejudicial
to their case is wholly without merit. Evidence that is not unduly prejudicial, see MRE 403, is not
inadmissible simply because it would be harmful to an opponent’s case. See Byrne v Schneider’s Iron
& Metal, Inc, 190 Mich App 176, 181; 475 NW2d 854 (1991). The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting Dr. Gallagher’s testimony.
With respect to the admission of the PDR itself into evidence at trial, plaintiff contends and
defendant concedes that the PDR was improperly admitted as an exhibit. MRE 707; Jones v Bloom,
388 Mich 98, 118; 200 NW2d 196 (1972); Sponenburgh v Wayne Co, 106 Mich App 628, 643
644; 308 NW2d 589 (1981); Bivens v Detroit Osteopathic Hosp, 77 Mich App 478, 488-491; 258
NW2d 527 (1977), rev’d on other grounds 403 Mich 820; 282 NW2d 926 (1978). We agree.
-6
However, any error in the admission of the PDR is deemed harmless and “does not require reversal
unless a substantial right of the party is affected.” MCR 2.613(A); Ellsworth v Hotel Corp of
America, 236 Mich App 185, 188; 600 NW2d 129 (1999). We find that the erroneous admission of
the PDR was harmless and did not affect any substantial right of plaintiffs in light of Dr Spitz’ explicit
acknowledgment that the PDR was an authoritative source, see McCarty v Sisters of Mercy Health
Corp, 176 Mich App 593, 600-601; 440 NW2d 417 (1989), Dr. Gallagher’s testimony on direct
examination regarding the effect of Zoloft on alcohol as stated in the PDR, and the substantial evidence
concerning Steinkirchners’ intoxication at the time of the accident. Accordingly, reversal is not
warranted.
Lastly, plaintiffs claim that the trial court erred in allowing Dr. Gallagher to rely on hearsay
testimony from witnesses who were deposed in preparation for trial but did not testify at trial in
formulating his opinion.
As noted above, there is no rule precluding an expert witness from relying on hearsay or other
non-record evidence, including deposition testimony of non-testifying witnesses, in formulating their
opinions and conclusions. Forest City Enterprises, supra at 73; Tiffany, supra at 267. An opposing
party that disagrees with the facts or data on which the expert relied, or who wants to challenge the
expert’s conclusions based on the information provided, may cross-examine the witness to reveal any
inconsistencies in the evidence or to rebut the expert’s testimony. Lake Oakland Heights Park Ass’n
v Waterford Twp Oakland Co, 6 Mich App 29, 33; 148 NW2d 248 (1967). We find nothing
improper with Dr. Gallagher’s reliance on deposition testimony of non-testifying witnesses to formulate
his opinion. If plaintiffs disagreed with his statements or opinions, they were free to challenge his
testimony and the information on which he relied on cross-examination.
In light of our decision to affirm the no cause of action verdict in favor of defendants, we need
not address plaintiffs’ remaining issue regarding damages.
Affirmed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
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