PEOPLE OF MI V CHARLES ERNEST CHANDLER
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 8, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 206890
Shiawassee Circuit Court
LC No. 96-007713 FC
CHARLES ERNEST CHANDLER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Gage, P.J., and White and Markey, JJ.
GAGE, P.J. (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent because I find that the trial court appropriately exercised its inherent
discretion in concluding that defendant should reimburse the court for the costs of his appointed counsel
at the rate of ten dollars per week.
As the majority acknowledges, both the Michigan Supreme Court and this Court previously
have recognized a trial court’s inherent authority and discretion to demand from a criminal defendant
that he provide reimbursement for the expenses of his court-appointed counsel.
The ability of courts to require defendants to repay expenses of court-appointed
counsel has been recognized by the Michigan Supreme Court. In Davis v Oakland
Circuit Judge, 383 Mich 717; 178 NW2d 920 (1970), the Michigan Supreme Court
held that a circuit judge has authority to order a criminal defendant to make restitution to
the county of the costs of the defendant’s appointed counsel from funds belonging to the
defendant but which he failed to disclose at the time counsel was appointed. In doing
so, the Court reasoned:
No authority has been cited, and independent research has uncovered none,
which in any way tends to impair the selectively discretionary power of a trial judge to
apply known assets of an alleged indigent toward defraying—in some part—the public
cost of providing for that indigent the assistance of counsel which [Const 1963, art 1, §
20] and the Bill of Rights uniformly guarantee. [Id. at 720.]
In People v Bohm, 393 Mich 129; 223 NW2d 291 (1974), the defendant
applied to the Michigan Supreme Court for the appointment of counsel to prosecute an
appeal from this Court to the Supreme Court. The Court found that although the
-1
defendant was not impecunious, he was “indigent” insofar as ability to hire a competent
lawyer and thus ordered appointment of counsel. Id. at 130. In doing so, the Court
further ordered that the “trial court in its discretion may enter an appropriate order for
repayment.” Id. at 131. [People v Nowicki, 213 Mich App 383, 387; 539 NW2d
590 (1995).]
As I briefly discuss below, the trial court in the instant case properly exercised this selective discretion in
imposing defendant’s reimbursement obligation.
I find unpersuasive the majority’s suggestion that the instant case might be distinguishable from
Nowicki on the basis that the defendant in Nowicki pleaded guilty, while the instant defendant won
acquittal of the charges against him. Defendant’s acquittal should not itself shield him from any potential
obligation to reimburse the taxpayers of Shiawassee County for the expense of his appointed counsel.
Where defendant in the form of his acquittal verdict obviously derived substantial and valuable
assistance from the trial court’s appointment of counsel at the taxpayers’ expense, I can think of no valid
reason to grant defendant the further windfall of automatic immunity from potential reimbursement
merely because the jury ultimately found defendant not guilty. The court’s appointment of defendant’s
counsel at public expense is tantamount to a loan, and defendant’s acquittal does not represent a valid
basis for its forgiveness. Furthermore, to limit potential reimbursement of the costs of appointed counsel
only to convicted defendants effectively and improperly renders the reimbursement obligation penal in
nature. Nowicki, supra at 386 (explaining that the reimbursement obligation “is completely
independent of [the defendant’s] sentence,” and “does not arise as a consequence of his conviction”).
I further disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court failed to act with sufficient
caution in imposing the reimbursement obligation. While the majority attempts to distinguish the basis
for the instant trial court’s reimbursement order from the trial court’s reasoning in Nowicki, both the
instant trial court and the Nowicki trial court determined that the reimbursement obligation “arises from
the defendant’s obligation to defray the public cost of representation.” Id. at 386. At the May 23,
1997 show cause hearing, the trial court observed that “over $10,000 in taxpayer monies have been
expended in your defense,” that defendant received representation that would have cost him at least one
hundred thousand dollars if obtained from retained counsel, and that twenty dollars per week “from a
taxpayer’s standpoint I think it’s probably more than reasonable.” The court again indicated at the June
23, 1997 continued hearing that it did not believe it should write off the approximately ten thousand
dollars in assistance that defendant received “out of this court’s line item, which is funded by the general
fund of Shiawassee County,” and that “I feel that I have a continuing obligation that does not dissipate
with a finding of not guilty to hold this defendant responsible for . . . reimbursement of attorney fees
wherein, from the outset, there was an indication that he could make some contribution” (emphasis
added). The record clearly demonstrates that the trial court determined that defendant’s reimbursement
obligation “arises from the defendant’s obligation to defray the public cost of representation.” Id. at
386.
I also reject the majority’s finding that the trial court failed to carefully consider defendant’s
asserted inability to pay the ordered reimbursement. The record establishes that the trial court held a
continued hearing on three separate dates (5/23/97, 6/23/97 and 9/22/97) at which it entertained
defendant’s challenges to the court’s authority to enter a reimbursement obligation and defendant’s
assertions that he could not afford to pay reimbursement. The court did consider, properly in my view,
-2
defendant’s assertions at some point during the pretrial proceedings that if the court ordered bond
defendant could look for work, apparently to fund his defense. Although the bond hearing transcript
does not contain defendant’s remarks, defendant himself acknowledged at the May 23, 1997 hearing
that he previously represented to the court that he could search for employment if the court ordered
bond.
The trial court’s careful consideration of defendant’s asserted lack of income also is reflected in
the court’s two reductions of the initially ordered reimbursement amount of forty-five dollars per week.
At the May 23, 1997 hearing, the court considered defendant’s asserted total disability and lack of
income, the fact that defendant’s wife paid one hundred dollars per week in rent for she and defendant,
and defendant’s explanation with respect to his job hunting efforts that after his acquittal he
unsuccessfully sought work from two former employers, but had not complete any formal written
employment applications. At the hearing’s conclusion, the trial court reduced the required weekly
payment to at least twenty dollars, which amount defendant explicitly conceded was reasonable. The
court then continued the hearing, observing that if defendant returned for the hearing not having paid any
reimbursement, the court would expect to see documentation concerning defendant’s failed search for
employment. By the time of the continued June 23, 1997 hearing, however, defendant had made no
payments, generally reasserting his inability to pay. Although defendant on that date requested a later
hearing to establish defendant’s inability to pay, defendant at the September 22, 1997 hearing merely
reasserted his total disability and lack of any income, including disability benefits. Despite that defendant
failed to verify or even allege that he made any efforts to obtain some employment after the May 1997
hearing, the trial court ultimately again reduced the required reimbursement amount to at least ten dollars
per week.
I conclude that the record demonstrates that the trial court carefully considered its
reimbursement orders. In light of defendant’s past indications of willingness to seek some source of
income, his failure to satisfy the court that he engaged in any job hunting efforts, and the purpose of
defendant’s obligation to defray the public cost of his representation, I cannot conclude that the trial
court abused is discretion in ordering that defendant provide reimbursement of only ten dollars per
t
week. Davis, supra; Nowicki, supra at 387-388. See also People v Ullah, 216 Mich App 669,
673; 550 NW2d 568 (1996) (“[A]n abuse of discretion . . . exists when an unprejudiced person,
considering the facts on which the trial court acted, would say there was no justification or excuse for
the ruling.”). Defendant’s basic needs are not compromised by the nominal requirement of ten dollars
per week for reimbursement to the citizens of Shiawassee County for the costs of defendant’s
representation. 1
I would affirm the trial court’s reimbursement order.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
1
In the event defendant can establish circumstances that render the ten dollar per week amount an
undue hardship, he may petition the trial court for relief. See People v LaPine, 63 Mich App 554,
558; 234 NW2d 700 (1975) (“[I]f payment is impossible or would constitute an undue hardship, these
conditions should be modified or withdrawn.”).
-3
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.