LAWANDA COX V UNIVERSITY OF DETROIT HIGH
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
LAWANDA COX,
UNPUBLISHED
September 5, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 214339
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 97-737648-CK
UNIVERSITY OF DETROIT JESUIT HIGH
SCHOOL AND ACADEMY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: White, P.J., and Doctoroff and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from an order granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition
of plaintiff's claim for race discrimination under the Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq.; MSA
3.548(101) et seq. We affirm.
We review the trial court’s grant of summary disposition de novo to determine whether plaintiff
established a genuine issue of material fact with respect to her discrimination claim. MCR
2.116(C)(10); Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337-338; 572 NW2d 201 (1998);
Graham v Ford, 237 Mich App 670, 672-673; 604 NW2d 713 (1999). We have limited our review
of this issue to the evidence that the parties submitted to the trial court with respect to defendant’s
motion for summary disposition. See Poffenbarger v Kaplan, 224 Mich App 1, 4 n 2; 568 NW2d
131 (1997); Amorello v Monsanto Corp, 186 Mich App 324, 330; 463 NW2d 487 (1990).
Defendant hired plaintiff as a librarian under a one-year contract and plaintiff worked for
defendant from August 28, 1994, to June 8, 1995. After defendant did not renew her contract, plaintiff
brought suit alleging that defendant’s decision was racially motivated, that she was the only AfricanAmerican librarian that defendant employed, and that defendant replaced her with a white male who had
qualifications no greater than her own. While plaintiff asserts that she was terminated from her
employment, the record indicates that the adverse employment action on which plaintiff bases her cause
of action actually involved defendant’s failure to renew plaintiff’s employment contract, not a termination
under an existing contract. Although a plaintiff may establish unlawful discrimination in different ways,
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Meagher v Wayne State Univ, 222 Mich App 700, 708; 565 NW2d 401 (1997), plaintiff here
alleged disparate treatment.
Under the burden shifting framework McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green, 411 US 792; 93 S
Ct 1817; 36 L Ed 2d 668 (1973), a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case, that is, enough
evidence to create a rebuttable presumption of discrimination. Wilcoxon v Minnesota Mining & Mfg
Co, 235 Mich App 347, 361 n 7; 597 NW2d 250 (1999); Meagher, supra at 710-711. A plaintiff
may establish a prima facie case by showing:
“(1) she was a member of the protected class; (2) she suffered an adverse
employment action . . . ; (3) she was qualified for the position; but (4) she [suffered the
adverse employment action] under circumstances that give rise to an inference of
unlawful discrimination.” Lytle [v Malady (On Rehearing), 458 Mich 153, 172-173;
579 NW2d 906 (1998)]. Circumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination
when the plaintiff “was treated differently than persons of a different class for the same
or similar conduct.” [Wilcoxon, supra at 361, quoting Reisman v Wayne State Univ
Regents, 188 Mich App 526, 538; 470 NW2d 678 (1991).]
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the second prong of the pretext test requires the
defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action. Hall v McRea
Corp, 238 Mich App 361, 370; 605 NW2d 354 (1999); Meagher, supra at 711. If the defendant
meets this burden, the plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s
legitimate reason was a mere pretext. Meagher, supra at 711. In this context, the test for avoiding
summary disposition was described in Lytle v Malady (On Rehearing), 458 Mich 153; 579 NW2d
906 (1998):
[D]isproof of an employer’s articulated reason for an adverse employment
decision defeats summary disposition only if such disproof also raises a triable issue that
discriminatory animus was a motivating factor underlying the employer’s adverse action.
In other words, plaintiff must not merely raise a triable issue that the employer’s
proffered reason was pretextual, but that it was a pretext for . . . discrimination.
Therefore, we find that, in the context of summary disposition, a plaintiff must prove
discrimination with admissible evidence, either direct or circumstantial, sufficient to
permit a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that discrimination was a motivating factor
for the adverse action taken by the employer toward the plaintiff. [Id. at 175-176
(citation omitted).]
Plaintiff stated a prima facie case when she alleged that she was a member of a protected class,
that she suffered an adverse employment action (defendant’s decision not to renew her contract), that
she was qualified for the librarian position, and that defendant did not renew her contract under
circumstances that gave rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. Lytle (On Rehearing), supra at
172-173. Defendant then met its burden when it articulated that the reason for its decision not to renew
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plaintiff’s contract was plaintiff’s poor work performance. Id. at 173-174. Defendant produced
documentary evidence of numerous complaints against plaintiff from defendant’s faculty, administration,
and students. Defendant also produced evidence that it decided not to renew the contract of another
teacher, a white male, for poor work performance.
After considering each of the ten items that plaintiff relies on, we are of the opinion that plaintiff
failed to oppose defendant’s motion with evidence establishing that defendant’s proffered reason was a
mere pretext for discrimination, and to present evidence “sufficient to permit a reasonable trier of fact to
conclude that discrimination was a motivating factor” in defendant’s decision not to renew her contract.
Id. at 175-176. Although plaintiff presented evidence that the individuals in plaintiff’s position before
and after the one-year contract period were both outside of her protected class, plaintiff presented no
evidence that defendant treated her differently than these individuals (e.g., that she was held to a
different standard of performance). Plaintiff complains generally regarding defendant’s judgment in
deciding not to renew her contract. However, she produced no evidence that the complaints against her
were a mere pretext. Therefore, plaintiff presented insufficient evidence to permit a reasonable trier of
fact to conclude that race discrimination was a motivating factor in defendant’s decision not to renew
her contract. Lytle, supra at 176. Because she failed to do so, summary disposition was proper.
Affirmed. Defendant, as the prevailing party, may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219.
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
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