DARYL L SHAUGER V DONNA M SHAUGER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DARYL L. SHAUGER,
UNPUBLISHED
August 29, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 203010
Saginaw Circuit Court
LC No. 94-005139-DO
DONNA M. SHAUGER,
Defendant-Appellee.
AFTER REMAND
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and MacKenzie and McDonald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This case is before this Court for the second time. In Shauger v Shauger, unpublished opinion
per curiam of the Court of Appeals, decided April 20, 1999, we remanded for further findings of fact
and for a corresponding reconsideration of the alimony award. We now reverse.
In addition to each party’s fault in causing the divorce, the factors relevant to an alimony
determination are:
(1) the past relations and conduct of the parties, (2) the length of the marriage, (3) the
abilities of the parties to work, (4) the source and amount of property awarded to the
parties, (5) the parties’ ages, (6) the abilities of the parties to pay alimony, (7) the
present situation of the parties, (8) the needs of the parties, (9) the parties’ health, (10)
the prior standard of living of the parties and whether either is responsible for the
support of others, (11) contributions of the parties to the joint estate, and (12) general
principles of equity. [Thames v Thames, 191 Mich App 299, 308; 477 NW2d 496
(1991).]
A court is to make specific findings with regard to each factor that is relevant in a particular
case. Ianitelli v Ianitelli, 199 Mich App 641, 643; 502 NW2d 691 (1993); see also Daniels v
Daniels, 165 Mich App 726, 732; 418 NW2d 924 (1988), and MCR 2.517. We remanded this case
to the trial court for further findings of fact regarding factors (3), (5), (6), (8), and (10). Plaintiff argues
that the trial court failed to adequately address these factors and the issues of fault and imputed income
on remand. This Court reviews findings of fact regarding the award of alimony for clear error and
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dispositional rulings are to be upheld unless we are left with a firm conviction that the decision was
inequitable. Wiley v Wiley, 214 Mich App 614, 615; 543 NW2d 64 (1995).
We agree with the trial court’s finding that factor (10), the prior standard of living of the parties,
is not relevant in this case due to plaintiff’s concession at trial that $1,460 per month is a fair amount for
defendant to survive on. We further find no error in the trial court’s failure to address the issue of fault
in this case because the record contains no evidence of either party’s fault in causing the divorce.
However, after reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court’s findings regarding factors (3),
(5), (6), and (8) were clearly erroneous.
With regard to factor (3), the abilities of the parties to work, the court concluded that defendant
would not be able to work part-time because of her heart problems and the side effects of the
medication she was taking. It is evident that defendant does have health problems and that her
medication causes her to have a dry mouth and dizzy spells. However, the record indicates that
defendant worked part-time as a dental assistant during the ten years preceding the trial, even though
she had an ongoing heart condition for eight of those years. Nothing in the record suggests that the
heart condition or the side effects from the medication worsened to the point that defendant could not
work at all. Defendant herself admitted at trial that she was able to work part-time. We further note
that a job in defendant’s field of training would not require her to speak at length as she did at trial.
Therefore, we conclude that the trial court clearly erred in holding that defendant was not able to work
part-time and failing to impute some income to defendant.
Regarding factor (5), the parties’ ages, the trial court stated that it believed defendant’s age was
relevant “in that she is in the middle of her life and, with her attendant health problems, will most likely
decline with years due to her chronic heart condition.” This finding was clearly erroneous because there
was nothing in the record to suggest that defendant’s condition would worsen with age. The court’s
finding was mere conjecture.
With regard to factors (6) and (8), the abilities of the parties to pay alimony and the needs of the
parties, the trial court stated that plaintiff earned $71,400 in 1995, that overtime was still available to
plaintiff, and that he planned on working six days a week. The court also mentioned that plaintiff
conceded that $1,460 per month was a fair amount for defendant to survive on and that $250 a week
was a reasonable amount of alimony. The court also believed that plaintiff “inflated” the estimate of his
needs at $3,242 per month. The court finally noted that within six months of the trial plaintiff would no
longer need to pay for his daughter’s schooling and concluded that the alimony award of $300 per
week was reasonable and that plaintiff had the ability to pay that amount. Once again, we find that the
trial court clearly erred in its findings and conclusions. Although plaintiff agreed that $1,460 per month
was a fair amount for defendant to survive on and that $250 per week was a reasonable amount of
alimony, plaintiff did not agree that the court’s award of $300 per week was reasonable. Furthermore,
although plaintiff’s monthly needs appear to be much higher than defendant’s, we note that plaintiff
included defendant’s support in his needs and also included items that he pays for both himself and
defendant. Finally, the court’s award failed to take plaintiff’s salary decrease into consideration and
would require plaintiff to work a substantial amount of overtime, which is no longer guaranteed to be
available to plaintiff, to keep from going further into debt.
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Therefore, we conclude that the trial court’s findings were clearly erroneous and after reviewing
the entire record we are left with a firm conviction that the alimony award of $300 per week was
excessive and inequitable. We order that the alimony award be reduced to $250 per week for the
remaining period of the ten years ordered by the trial court.
Reversed. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Barbara B. MacKenzie
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
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