PEOPLE OF MI V ELON LOUIS WILLIAMS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
August 25, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 220903
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 99-003348
ELON LOUIS WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Owens, P.J., and Neff and Fitzgerald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
The prosecutor appeals of right from the trial court’s order which purported to acquit
defendant, after a bench trial, of the charge of carrying a dangerous weapon in a motor vehicle, MCL
750.227; MSA 28.424. We reverse.
The Relevant Facts
Defendant was a passenger in a car that was stopped by plainclothes police officers who were
in an unmarked police car that was equipped with flashing lights mounted on the dashboard and rear
parcel shelf of the vehicle. The police claimed that the driver of the vehicle was stopped because he
failed to signal before making a left turn.
According to the police, when one of the officers approached the passenger side of the vehicle,
he observed the glove compartment open and close and saw a handgun being placed inside the glove
compartment. Closer inspection revealed a Smith & Wesson 9 mm semi-automatic handgun in the
glove compartment, and two ammunition clips, one for a 9 mm weapon and one for a .40 caliber
weapon, on the floor of the passenger’s side of the vehicle. When defendant was removed from the car
and patted down, it was determined that he was wearing a bulletproof vest. The driver was also
wearing a bulletproof vest.
Although opining that the traffic stop may have been illegal, the trial court denied defendant’s
motion for a directed verdict of acquittal.
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Defendant and the driver then testified that the driver did not fail to signal his turn, that they were
both unaware of the presence of the handgun in the vehicle (which they had borrowed), and that they
believed that the weapon was discovered by the police in a center console after defendant and the
driver were removed from the vehicle and the police conducted a nonconsensual search.
At the conclusion of the proofs, the trial court stated:
People have proven the facts beyond a reasonable doubt. That’s not the
problem that I’m having. The Defendant is adjudicated not guilty. I don’t have to give
a reason for that, but I will.
There are two statutes in this State, one of which, one of which in pertinent part
reads: A driver of a motor vehicle who is given by hand, voice, emergency light, or
siren, a visual or audible signal by the police or conservation officer acting in a lawful
performance of his or her duty, directing the driver to bring his or her motor vehicle to a
stop, should not willfully fail to obey that direction by increasing the speed of the vehicle,
extinguishing the lights of the vehicle, or otherwise attempting to flee or elude the police
or conservation officer.
This subsection does not apply unless the police or conservation officer giving
the signal is in uniform and the vehicle given by the police or conservation officer is
identified as an official police or Department of Natural Resources vehicle.
The undisputed testimony of the prosecution witnesses was that they were in
plainclothes in what they described as a semimarked vehicle, the semi alluding to lights
in the rear deck and in the windshield. Police lights.
The statute formerly addressed stops made at night, both of them to which I
allude. The history, I believe, of that is because there was a person in California named
Carol Chessman who masqueraded as a police officer, putting, I believe it was a red
balloon over a spotlight, and used that device to stop women, if I remember correctly,
and rape and kill them. There have been instances of persons, civilians, masquerading
as police officers in this city not long ago, pulling people over similarly, for the protection
of the public, and care and caution on the part of the police.
The prosecutor then inquired if the court had found that the prosecution had proven its case
beyond a reasonable doubt and the trial court responded: “Proven he was carrying a pistol to [sic – in
a] motor vehicle without a license.” The court further stated that it had earlier indicated it believed that
there was an illegal stop, and observed that it had a responsibility
to see that the constitutional and statutory rights of both the People and of the accused
are i plemented. Whether somebody brings a motion for evidentiary hearing [or]
m
doesn’t, whether they are aware of the law or not, doesn’t really matter. If the court is
aware, as it should be, the court should rule accordingly.
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The trial court discharged defendant and entered an order of acquittal.
Double Jeopardy
As a preliminary matter, we must determine whether the prosecutor may properly appeal the
trial court’s order. A defendant’s right not to be twice placed in jeopardy is guaranteed by the federal
and state constitutions. US Const, Amend V; Const 1963, art 1, § 15. MCL 770.12; MSA 28.1109
provides that a prosecutor may take an appeal if the Double Jeopardy Clause would not bar further
proceedings. The protection offered by the state constitution’s double jeopardy provision is
coterminous with that of the federal constitution. People v Thompson, 424 Mich 118, 125-130; 379
NW2d 49 (1985). It is axiomatic that the prosecutor cannot appeal from the acquittal of a defendant.
Fong Foo v United States, 369 US 141, 143; 82 S Ct 671; 7 L Ed 2d 629 (1962); People v
Anderson, 409 Mich 474; 295 NW2d 482 (1980). This principle applies even when the trial court
erroneously directs the acquittal. Fong Foo, supra at 143. As the United States Supreme Court
expressed this principle in United States v Scott, 437 US 82, 96; 98 S Ct 2187; 57 L Ed 2d 65
(1978): “A judgment of acquittal, whether based on a jury verdict of not guilty or on a ruling by the
court that the evidence is insufficient to convict, may not be appealed and terminates the prosecution
when a second trial would be necessitated by a reversal.” However, it is also axiomatic that the mere
mouthing of the word “acquittal” or “not guilty” does not control whether an appeal may be taken. As
the United States Supreme Court explained in United States v Martin Linen Supply Co, 430 US 564,
571; 97 S Ct 1349; 51 L Ed 2d 642 (1977):
[W]e have emphasized that what constitutes an “acquittal” is not to be
controlled by the form of the judge’s action. Rather, we must determine whether the
ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually represents a resolution, correct or not, of
some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged. [Citations omitted.]
See also Scott, supra at 96-97; People v Vincent, 455 Mich 110, 119; 565 NW2d 629 (1997);
People v Mehall, 454 Mich 1, 5; 557 NW2d 110 (1997).
In Anderson, supra at 482, our Supreme Court concluded that the prosecution could not retry
the defendant where the trial court had, rightly or wrongly, accepted the defendant’s mid-trial guilty plea
to a lesser offense of manslaughter, dismissed the murder charge, and discharged the jury; this
constituted “a factual determination upon the prosecutor’s proofs that one or more elements of murder
could not be established.” Similarly, in People v Nix, 453 Mich 619, 626-627; 556 NW2d 866
(1996), the Court concluded that double jeopardy principles precluded the prosecutor from appealing
the trial court’s mid-trial grant of a motion for a directed verdict. On the other hand, in Vincent, supra
at 120, the Court held that the ambiguous statements of the trial judge, when ruling on a motion for a
directed verdict, did not amount to a decision on that motion and that double jeopardy did not bar the
continuation of the trial. In Mehall, supra at 5, the Court explained:
[E]ven an order that is not termed an acquittal may, in fact, rest upon a finding
of insufficient evidence. In such a circumstance, the defendant could not be retried.
Conversely, an action that is labeled an acquittal may, in truth, be premised on a
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different ground than insufficient evidence. In that situation, it would not violate
principles of double jeopardy to retry the defendant.
In short, the label applied by the trial court to its action is not dispositive of whether a
defendant’s double jeopardy protections are violated by a prosecutor’s appeal of a trial court’s order
purporting to acquit the defendant. For example, in Scott, supra, the defendant moved to dismiss two
counts of the indictment against him on the basis of preindictment delay and at the conclusion of the
prosecutor’s proofs, the trial court granted the motion. The United States Supreme Court held that the
prosecutor’s appeal was not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause because “the dismissal of an
indictment for preindictment delay represents a legal judgment that a defendant, although criminally
culpable, may not be punished because of a supposed constitutional violation.” Id. at 98.
Furthermore, on a number of occasions, this Court has held that where a defendant is not
subjected to a second trial as a result of a prosecutor’s appeal, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not
implicated and there is no bar to the prosecutor’s appeal. See, e.g., People v Carlos Jones, 203 Mich
App 74, 78-79; 512 NW2d 26 (1993) (prosecutor may appeal trial court’s post-verdict decision
setting aside bench trial verdict finding the defendant guilty of manslaughter and acquitting defendant by
determining that he acted in self-defense, where the basis of the court’s decision was that court had
been “confused” when it rendered the original verdict); People v McEwan, 214 Mich App 690; 543
NW2d 367 (1995) (prosecutor could appeal trial court’s sua sponte post-verdict determination to grant
a new trial), People v Hutchinson, 224 Mich App 603; 569 NW2d 858 (1997) (prosecutor can
appeal from trial court’s sua sponte post-verdict determination reducing offense from possession of 650
or more grams of cocaine to attempted possession of more than 650 grams of cocaine).
Application of the Law
In this case, the trial court clearly determined that there was sufficient evidence to support
defendant’s conviction of the charged offense. The trial court stated, and re-affirmed in response to the
prosecutor’s query, that sufficient evidence had been presented to find defendant guilty of the charged
offense. The case was dismissed, not because of a lack of evidence, but rather because the trial court
sua sponte concluded that the stop of the vehicle in which defendant was riding was illegal. We hold
that the trial court’s decision in that respect was erroneous. The statute to which the trial court referred,
MCL 750.479a; MSA 28.747(1), concerns whether an individual may be charged with fleeing and
eluding the police when he or she refuses to stop for a police officer who is not in uniform. The statute
does not provide that plainclothes police officers may not make a valid vehicle stop; rather, the statute
only provides that an individual cannot be charged with fleeing and eluding under circumstances where
that individual could not reasonably have known that he or she was being ordered to stop by police
officers. The driver of the vehicle in this case did not refuse to stop for the police, and was not charged
with fleeing and eluding. Therefore, the statute had no application to whether the stop of the vehicle in
which defendant was riding was illegal. Moreover, because defendant was not the driver or owner of
the vehicle, and also denied ownership of the handgun, it is not clear that defendant would have had
standing to raise a constitutional challenge to the legality of the stop. People v Smith, 420 Mich 1, 28;
360 NW2d 841 (1984); People v Lombardo, 216 Mich App 500, 504-505; 549 NW2d 596
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(1996). We therefore conclude that the trial court’s ruling regarding the legality of the vehicle stop was
clearly erroneous. People v Burrell, 417 Mich 439, 448-449; 339 NW2d 403 (1983).
We further note that whether the driver of the vehicle was subjected to an illegal stop is not an
element of the offense of carrying a pistol in a motor vehicle. MCL 750.227; MSA 28.424. Thus, not
only did the trial court find that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction, but the
court’s decision to dismiss the charge of carrying a pistol in a motor vehicle was not based on “a
resolution . . . of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.” Martin Linen, supra at
571. Because the trial judge pronounced that defendant’s factual guilt was satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt, defendant was not deprived of his “valued right to have his trial completed by a
particular tribunal.” Wade v Hunter, 336 US 684, 689; 69 S Ct 834; 93 L Ed 974 (1949).
Furthermore, no additional proceedings directed at the ascertainment of defendant’s guilt or innocence
are necessary and thus defendant will not be subjected to a “second trial” by this decision.
Finally, we agree with the prosecutor that our prior decision in People v Wilcox, 183 Mich
App 616; 456 NW2d 421 (1990), does not compel a different result because that decision is
distinguishable. In Wilcox the trial court interrupted the trial and dismissed the charge because it desired
that this Court should render an advisory opinion regarding a warrantless arrest question. The trial
court’s action in that case had the effect of a mistrial declared without the defendant’s consent and
therefore a retrial was barred by double jeopardy. United States v Jorn, 400 US 470; 91 S Ct 547;
27 L Ed 2d 543 (1971). However, as noted, in the case presently before this Court, the trial was
completed and the trial judge pronounced that the evidence was sufficient to find defendant guilty of the
charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the Wilcox decision has no application to
the current case.
We therefore conclude that the protections afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the
federal and state constitution are not violated by the prosecutor’s appeal of the trial court’s erroneous
ruling regarding the stop of the vehicle in which defendant was riding. The ruling itself is clearly
erroneous because it is not an accurate statement of the law. The trial court’s order purporting to
“acquit” defendant is therefore vacated and this case is remanded for entry of a judgment of conviction
of the charged offense of carrying a dangerous weapon in a motor vehicle, MCL 750.227; MSA
28.424, and for sentencing on that conviction.
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
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