IN RE RAY/JONES MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of APRIL RAY, ANGELINA RAY,
ASHLEY RAY, ADAM RAY, JOVELINA RAY,
Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
August 25, 2000
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 218683
Genesee Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 95-102572
RICHARD C. RAY,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
MARGIE JONES,
Respondent.
In the Matter of APRIL RAY, ANGELINA RAY,
ASHLEY RAY, ADAM RAY, JOVELINA RAY, and
JEREMIAH JONES, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 219092
Genesee Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 95-102572
MARGIE M. JONES,
-1
Respondent-Appellant,
and
RICHARD C. RAY,
Respondent,
and
JUAN DUNCAN,
Respondent.
Before: Wilder, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr., and McDonald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this consolidated appeal, respondent-father Richard Ray and respondent-mother Margie
Jones appeal as of right from a family court order terminating their parental rights to the minor children
pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i)(ii), (g), and (j); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3) (c)(i)(ii), (g), and (j).
Respondent-father Ray and respondent-mother Jones are the parents of April, Angelina, Ashley, Adam,
and Jovelina Ray. Respondent-mother and respondent Duncan are the parents of Jeremiah Jones.1 We
affirm.
This matter began back in June 1995. At the time, respondent-father was incarcerated and
respondent-mother’s whereabouts were unknown. Finding that the allegations in the petition for
temporary custody had been established, the trial court placed the then-born children into foster care. It
is clear from the supplemental orders entered following the numerous review hearings that the terms of
respondent-father’s parent-agency treatment plan included (1) substance abuse counseling, (2) random
drug screens, (3) domestic violence counseling, and (4) obtaining stable housing and employment.
Subsequently, respondent-father was also ordered to “maintain suitable housing, abstain from alcohol
and/or substance abuse, attend [Alcoholics Anonymous] meetings regularly, [and] resume his use of
Antabuse.” Later, respondent-father was specifically ordered by the court to obtain suitable housing as
of September 3, 1998.
1
Respondent Duncan has not appealed the termination of his parental rights. Therefore, respondent
father Ray is identified hereafter as “respondent-father.”
-2
Respondent-mother was ultimately located when she was arrested on October 10, 1995.
Respondent-mother testified that she “was dependent on drugs then, and I was with somebody that—
we were committing crimes together.” Respondent-mother turned herself in to police, was convicted of
receiving and concealing stolen property, and sentenced to three to seven and one-half years’
imprisonment.
At first, respondent-mother was serving her time in prison, but in March 1996 she was
transferred to Community Programs Incorporated Substance Abuse Treatment Center (CPI). In May
1996, respondent-mother truanted CPI. In July 1996, respondent-mother was returned to custody
when she was turned into the police by respondent-father. She was then sent to Scott Correctional
Facility in Plymouth, Michigan, and shortly thereafter to Camp Branch in Coldwater, Michigan. After
respondent-mother became pregnant while at Camp Branch, she was transferred back to Scott
Correctional Facility. On February 17, 1998, respondent-mother was transferred to Project Transition,
a residential program within the Department of Corrections. Shortly thereafter, Jeremiah was born.
After approximately four months, respondent-mother was tethered to an apartment in Detroit.
Respondent-mother testified that after leaving Project Transition, she relapsed into substance abuse. In
early August 1998, respondent-mother removed her tether and fled to Flint, Michigan. She then
entrusted the care of six-month old Jeremiah to a friend. According to respondent-mother, she then
began working as a prostitute in order to obtain crack cocaine.
Looking to the supplemental orders entered following the numerous review hearings, it is clear
that the terms respondent-mother’s parent-agency treatment plan included (1) substance abuse therapy,
(2) abstinence from drug use, (3) obtaining and maintaining stable housing and employment upon release
from prison, and (4) attending parenting classes.
Both respondent-father and respondent-mother argue that the trial court erred in terminating
their parental rights because the statutory grounds for termination were not established by clear and
convincing evidence. We disagree.
Contrary to respondent-father’s assertions, evidence presented at the hearing held on the
supplemental petition established that he had not substantially complied with the parent-agency
treatment plan. Regarding his alcohol abuse, respondent-father admits that he was twice convicted of
OUIL while he was subject to the treatment plan. Further, his admission that he drank a beer on
Christmas 1998, as well as testimony by his case worker that he smelled of alcohol when he showed up
for the November 10, 1998 and January 12, 1999 parenting times, evidence that he violated the court’s
October 2, 1997 order to “abstain from alcohol and/or substance abuse.” Respondent-father’s refusal
to submit to a drug test on November 10, 1998 and January 12, 1999, violates the requirement that he
submit to random drug screens. While testimony concerning his attendance at AA meetings is
somewhat unclear, it is apparent from the evidence that respondent-father has failed to demonstrate that
he was attending AA meetings on a regular basis.
-3
There is also no evidence that respondent-father received counseling for domestic violence. His
poor attendance at parenting times and his failure to reschedule those is also problematic. It does
appear that he had rented a three bedroom residence in early September 1998 and spent time and
effort to fix up the home. However, there is no evidence that he began occupying and maintaining the
home as of September 3, 1998. Finally, while respondent-father asserts that he has been working
regularly as a mechanic, he has not provided documentation to support this contention. Based on this
evidence, we conclude that the statutory grounds for termination have been established by clear and
convincing evidence. In re Miller, 182 Mich App 70, 84; 451 NW2d 576 (1990).
We also conclude that the record includes clear and convincing evidence supporting the
termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights. Id. The record clearly establishes that respondent
mother has a long standing ongoing substance abuse problem. There are no indications that she has the
problem under control, or that she is making significant progress toward achieving that goal. By her
own admission, within weeks after completing her time at Project Transition, respondent-mother had
abandoned Jeremiah, resumed her crack cocaine abuse, and was financing her purchase of the drug
through prostitution. The record also establishes that she twice fled DOC confinement. Further, there is
no indication that she has or is capable of obtaining and maintaining suitable housing and stable legal
employment, or that she has the necessary parenting skills to care for her children.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
-4
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