PEOPLE OF MI V REGINALD POMPEY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
August 18, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 213404
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 97-006863
REGINALD POMPEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: White, P.J., and Doctoroff and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions for second-degree murder, MCL
750.317; MSA 28.549, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm),
MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). Defendant was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment for the
felony-firearm conviction and to thirty-five to fifty-five years’ imprisonment for the second-degree
murder conviction, the sentences to run consecutively. We affirm.
On appeal, defendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s request to
instruct the jury on statutory involuntary manslaughter. We disagree. We review this claim of an
instructional error de novo. People v Hubbard (After Remand), 217 Mich App 459, 487; 552
NW2d 493 (1996).
A trial court, if requested, must instruct the jury on a cognate lesser included offense if the
evidence adduced at trial would support a conviction of the lesser offense. People v Hendricks, 446
Mich 435, 444; 521 NW2d 546 (1994); People v Pouncy, 437 Mich 382, 387; 471 NW2d 346
(1991). Statutory involuntary manslaughter is a cognate lesser included offense of murder. People v
Heflin, 434 Mich 482, 502; 456 NW2d 10 (1990). However, there must be more than a modicum of
evidence to warrant giving the instruction; there must be sufficient evidence to justify a conviction of the
lesser offense. Pouncy, supra at 387.
MCL 750.329; MSA 28.561 defines statutory involuntary manslaughter as:
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Any person who shall wound, maim or injure any other person by the discharge
of any firearm, pointed or aimed, intentionally but without malice, at any such person,
shall, if death ensue from such wounding, maiming or injury, be deemed guilty of the
crime of manslaughter.
“[I]n promulgating the involuntary manslaughter statute, the Legislature intended to punish the
intentional pointing of a firearm which results in death even though the defendant did not act with the
criminal intent sufficient for conviction under common-law involuntary manslaughter.” Heflin, supra at
504. The intent required for a common law involuntary manslaughter conviction is gross negligence or
the intent to injure. People v Datema, 448 Mich 585, 606; 533 NW2d 272 (1995).
Here, the evidence did not support the giving of the statutory manslaughter instruction.
Defendant testified that he retrieved the gun from the trunk of his car with the intent to scare the
decedent with the gun. When the decedent ran behind the gas station, defendant followed, pulled out
the gun, and demanded his money. The decedent refused to return the money, and defendant fired one
shot into the ground. The decedent then returned defendant's money. According to defendant, the
decedent then grabbed the gun from defendant's hand and, when he grabbed the gun back from the
decedent, the gun discharged, striking the decedent in the face. Defendant testified that he became
scared and fired the gun again, but he did not know how many times he fired the gun. Witnesses
testified that they heard a total or four or five gunshots. Defendant then left the scene. He testified that
he did not intend to injure the decedent. According to the uncontroverted testimony of the Wayne
County Chief Medical Examiner, although the decedent suffered a grazing gunshot wound to the side of
her face, she died from a gunshot wound to the top of her head. The medical examiner testified that the
decedent’s head was either bent forward, or the shooter was standing over her head, when she was
shot.
Malice is defined as the intent to kill, the intent to cause great bodily harm, or the intent to do an
act in wanton and wilful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of such behavior is to cause
death or great bodily harm. People v Mayhew, 236 Mich App 112, 125; 600 NW2d 370 (1999).
The evidence indicated that defendant knew the gun was loaded and that, after the first shot discharged
and struck the decedent in the face, defendant intentionally fired the gun at least one more time, striking
the decedent in the head. Even if defendant's testimony that the initial discharge was accidental is
believed, his testimony that he subsequently intentionally fired the gun during an argument with the
decedent, striking her in the head, and then drove off, leaving decedent on the ground with two gunshot
wounds, demonstrated that he did not act without malice. We therefore conclude that the trial court
properly denied defendant's request for a statutory manslaughter instruction.
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court v
iolated the principle of proportionality when it
deviated upward from the sentencing guidelines and sentenced him to a prison term of thirty-five to fifty
five years for the second-degree murder conviction. We disagree. We review sentencing decisions
under the abuse of discretion standard. People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 635-636; 461 NW2d 1
(1990); People v Odendahl, 200 Mich App 539, 540-541; 505 NW2d 16 (1993).
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Sentences that depart from the sentencing guidelines are subject to careful scrutiny on appeal.
People v Coultier (After Remand), 205 Mich App 453, 456; 517 NW2d 827 (1994). The key test
of proportionality is whether the sentence reflects the seriousness of the matter, and not whether it
departs from or adheres to the recommended range. Coultier, supra at 456. Furthermore, departures
are appropriate where the guidelines do not adequately account for factors that legitimately can be
considered at sentencing. Milbourn, supra at 659-660.
Here, the trial court noted at sentencing that the guidelines for this case were between ninety-six
and three hundred months. See MCR 6.425(D)(2); People v Fleming, 428 Mich 408, 428; 410
NW2d 266 (1987). However, after commenting that this was a cruel and vicious crime, the trial court
stated that defendant's lack of remorse, his lack of sympathy for the son he shared with decedent, and
his failure to take responsibility for ending the decedent’s life over a mere sixty dollars warranted a
departure from the sentencing guidelines.
We reject defendant's argument that the trial court considered factors that were already
accounted for in the guidelines as its reasons for the upward departure. Defendant had a child with the
decedent and he completely disregarded that familial relationship when he shot and killed her. See
People v Houston, 448 Mich 312, 323; 532 NW2d 508 (1995) (defendant’s relationship with the
victim is an important factor not included in the guidelines calculations). Furthermore, despite
defendant’s argument that defendant expressed remorse, the trial court was free to assess defendant’s
credibility of his expressed remorse when he said that he was “sorry for taking Rashida’s life” and that
he “didn’t mean to harm her at all.” See Houston, supra. Despite defendant's claims that he did not
mean to injure or kill the decedent, the trial court noted the evidence that he did not seek help for
decedent after the shooting, but “left her to die in the mud.” Finally, defendant’s assertion that the trial
court improperly considered factors not supported by the evidence carries no weight. The sentencing
court may use a broad range of information when weighing the sentencing factors. People v Adams,
430 Mich 679, 686; 425 NW2d 437 (1988). Such information can include hearsay information and
other alleged crimes. Fleming, supra at 418. Accordingly, the trial court properly considered factors
such as the prior personal protection order taken against defendant, and the alleged threats that he made
against the decedent’s family.
We therefore conclude that defendant's sentence does not violate the principle of proportionality
and the trial court did not err in departing from the sentencing guidelines.
Affirmed.
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
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