IN RE NE'SHA ANGEL I Y WRIGHT MINOR
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of NEESHA WRIGHT, a/k/a NE’SHA
ANGEL IYANNA YVONNE WRIGHT, Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
August 11, 2000
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
NAKETAH WRIGHT, a/k/a NAKETAH OWENS,
No. 219319
Genesee Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 97-109147-NA
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Kelly and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right from the family court order terminating her parental rights to the
minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(ii), (g) and (j); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(ii), (g) and (j).
We affirm.
The family court did not clearly err in finding that §§ 19b(3)(g) and (j) were both established by
clear and convincing evidence. MCR 5.974(I); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161
(1989).
We also reject respondent’s argument that the family court clearly erred in terminating her
parental rights under § 19b(3)(c)(ii), based on the “other conditions” language in that subsection.
Respondent argues that the phrase “other conditions” is analogous to the “changed circumstance”
language in MCR 5.974(E) and, therefore, in order to terminate parental rights based on that language,
appellee must prove by clear and convincing evidence the existence of some other statutory basis for
termination set forth in MCL 712A.19b(3); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3). As a result, respondent
contends, termination under § 19b(3)(c)(ii) is statutorily hollow and circular in nature.
We find no ambiguity in the language of § 19b(3)(c)(ii) and conclude that respondent’s
interpretation of the statute is without merit. In construing the terms of a statute, effect must be given to
-1
the Legislature’s intent. When statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the legislative intent must be
honored as clearly indicated in that language. No further construction is required or permitted. Further,
where a statute does not define a term, its plain and ordinary meaning should be used. Western
Michigan University Board of Control v Michigan, 455 Mich 531, 538-539; 565 NW2d 828
(1997).
Termination of parental rights is appropriate under § 19b(3)(c)(ii) where a child has come within
the jurisdiction of the court and, at a termination hearing at least 182 days later, the court finds that other
conditions that would bring the child within the jurisdiction of the court are continuing. In re Sours, 459
Mich 624, 636; 593 NW2d 520 (1999). The initial requirement of this subsection is satisfied. The
family court took jurisdiction of the child after an adjudication hearing. The question is whether there
are other conditions that would bring the child within the jurisdiction of the court that respondent failed
to rectify after notice and a reasonable opportunity to improve.
The child initially came within the jurisdiction of the court because respondent left the home of
her relative placement and took the child, who was a month old, with her and refused to return,
respondent had run away from home on several occasions and the relative would not allow respondent
back in her home due to her behavior, and, although respondent, the relative and a worker signed an
agreement laying out what was expected of respondent if she continued to stay with the relative,
respondent violated the agreement by running away. A termination petition was subsequently filed by
appellee, alleging that respondent had been AWOL and had failed to maintain suitable and stable
housing, participate in and complete parenting classes, maintain consistent contact with the worker, seek
and participate in counseling programs or visit the child on a regular basis. The petition was
subsequently withdrawn and respondent was ordered to follow all recommendations of the worker and
comply and be successful in a residential program. A second termination petition was thereafter filed
alleging that respondent failed to successfully complete a court-ordered parent/agency agreement
specifically prepared to help her regain custody of the child by failing to participate in a substance abuse
program, maintain employment, maintain regular visitation and enroll in or complete a parenting class
and by testing positive for cocaine on two occasions.
The evidence at the permanent custody hearing established that respondent failed to
substantially comply with the parent/agency agreement. Although respondent testified that she was
attending school and working toward obtaining her G.E.D. at the time of the hearing, she admitted that
she had submitted drug screens that were positive for cocaine and that she had not attended any
substance abuse treatment. Respondent was on AWOL status after she left her relative placement, and
then lived with her sister. At the time of the hearing, respondent was living with her mother, whose own
parental rights to her and several siblings had been terminated. Respondent acknowledged that her
mother had difficulty providing for herself. Respondent also admitted that she had attended only half of
a parenting skills program and did not complete the program. Respondent’s visits with the child were
initially sporadic. Although her visits became more consistent later in the proceedings, the workers were
unable to determine whether respondent had bonded with the child. Respondent’s attendance at
counseling and employment were also sporadic.
-2
This evidence was sufficient to support the family court’s determination that § 19b(3)(c)(ii) was
established. Respondent had been put on notice via two separate termination petitions that she had
neglected the child by failing to successfully complete the parent/agency agreement. Respondent had
been ordered at review hearings to comply with the parent/agency agreement. The record indicates that
respondent failed to ameliorate her neglect, despite a reasonable opportunity to do so after she received
notice of the problem and had been afforded hearings regarding it. Therefore, the family court did not
clearly err in terminating respondent’s parental rights under § 19b(3)(c)(ii).
Although respondent correctly argues that the family court abused its discretion in admitting
hearsay testimony concerning her substance abuse, the error was harmless. One of the factors relied on
by the family court in terminating respondent’s parental rights was her substance abuse problem.
Because this circumstance was not related to the court’s initial assumption of jurisdiction, the matter was
required to be proven by legally admissible evidence. In re Gilliam, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d
___ (No. 218044, issued 5/12/00), slip op p 2; In re Snyder, 223 Mich App 85, 88-91; 566 NW2d
18 (1997). Although inadmissible hearsay evidence was presented to establish this new and different
circumstance through the workers’ testimony regarding respondent’s drug screen results, MRE 801,
legally admissible evidence was also presented to establish respondent’s substance abuse. Respondent
admitted that she had submitted drug screens that were positive for cocaine and that she had not
attended any substance abuse treatment. Therefore, admission of the workers’ testimony was harmless
because it was merely cumulative to respondent’s own testimony.
Finally, termination of parental rights was required unless the court found that termination was
clearly not in the child’s best interest. MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5); In re Trejo,
___ Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (No. 112528, issued 7/5/2000), slip op p 27. On this record, we
cannot conclude that the court’s finding was clearly erroneous or that termination was clearly not in the
children’s best interest. Accordingly, the court did not err in terminating respondent’s parental right to
the child. Id.
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
-3
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.