JAMES HINDELANG V BAY MEDICAL CTR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JAMES HINDELANG,
UNPUBLISHED
August 11, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
v
No. 217487
Bay Circuit Court
LC No. 97-003856-CL
BAY MEDICAL CENTER,
Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Before: Meter, P.J., and Griffin and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion for summary
disposition pursuant to MCR 2116(C)(10) and dismissing his failure to accommodate and retaliatory
discharge claims under the Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act (HCRA) MCL 37.1101 et seq.; MSA
3.550(101) et seq.1 We affirm.
Defendant operates a hospital and related medical facilities in Bay County, Michigan. Plaintiff
was hired in March 1978 as head of the respiratory therapy department and was later named as
department director. At the time plaintiff was hired, he suffered from a slipped epiphysis (top femur
slips out of hip socket), which caused severe arthritis in his right hip. As a further consequence of his
condition, plaintiff’s right leg is shorter than his left leg, and he wears a two inch lift in that shoe. The hip
condition resulted in “very painful ambulation,” tightness and cramping in the hip, and “loss of stability,”
which required him to periodically use a cane. Between April and July 1996, plaintiff took a leave of
absence to have hip replacement surgery, which made his hip more comfortable, reduced the pain, and
improved his gait. Plaintiff testified that by November 1996, he used a cane only in inclement weather
1
After plaintiff filed the instant action, the HCRA was renamed the “persons with disabilities civil rights
act.” The 1998 amendments, substituted the terms “handicap” and “handicapper” with “disability” and
“person with a disability.”
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or when walking long distances
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of a “block” or “half block.” Plaintiff was terminated from employment in January 1997, allegedly due
to inappropriate work hours, lack of availability, and unsatisfactory interpersonal relationships with staff.
Following his termination, plaintiff filed the instant action, alleging in pertinent part that defendant
discriminated against him on the basis of his handicap (i.e., an arthritic hip condition that impaired his
ability to walk); that defendant failed to accommodate him by refusing to allow him to park in non
employee handicapped spaces in front of the building; and that defendant retaliated against him for
asserting a protected legal right to accommodation. The trial court granted defendant’s motion for
summary disposition with respect to all claims. On the handicap discrimination claim, the trial court
found that material questions of fact existed regarding whether plaintiff was “handicapped” within the
meaning of the HRCA; however, the court dismissed the claim on the ground that plaintiff failed to show
that defendant’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for termination were pretextual. 2 With respect to
the accommodation claim, the trial court ruled that defendant’s refusal to permit plaintiff to park in the
lot in front of the building, which was designated for use by patients and visitors, did not violate the
“accommodation mandate.” The trial court also dismissed the retaliation claim, finding that plaintiff
failed to establish a causal nexus between any protected activity and termination and, in any event, did
not show that defendant’s proffered reasons for termination were pretextual.
Plaintiff first argues that a question of fact existed regarding whether defendant failed to
reasonably accommodate his walking disability after his July 1996 request for “the best available
parking for his work environment.” We disagree. This Court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion
for summary disposition de novo. Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d
201 (1998). On a motion brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), the court considers the
documentary evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Smith v Globe Life Ins Co,
460 Mich 446, 454; 597 NW2d 28 (1999). Summary disposition is appropriate where there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at
454-455.
The HCRA guarantees the “opportunity to obtain employment, housing, and other real estate
and full and equal utilization of public accommodations, public services, and educational facilities without
discrimination because of a handicap . . . .” MCL 37.1102(1); MSA 3.550(102)(1). A person is
handicapped under the HCRA if their physical or mental condition substantially limits one or more major
life activity and is unrelated to the person’s ability to perform a particular job or position with or without
accommodation. MCL 37.1103; MSA 3.550(103); Rourk v Oakwood Hospital Corp, 458 Mich
25, 28; 580 NW2d 397 (1998).
In the present case, plaintiff alleged that defendant failed to accommodate him by refusing to
allow him to park in the handicap spaces in the lot in front of the building (i.e., Lot A), which was
designated for visitors and patients. For the purposes of employment relationships, the
2
Plaintiff does not challenge on appeal the trial court’s ruling with respect to his handicap discrimination
claim.
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HCRA mandates that “a person shall accommodate a handicapper . . . unless the person demonstrates
that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship.” MCL 37.1102(2); MSA 3.550(102)(2);
Rourk, supra at 28. Section 210 allocates the burden of proof with respect to the duty of reasonable
accommodation as follows:
In an action brought pursuant to this article for failure to accommodate, the handicapper
shall bear the burden of proof. I the handicapper proves a prima facie case, the
f
person shall bear the burden of producing evidence that an accommodation would
impose an undue hardship on that person, the handicapper shall bear the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that an accommodation would not impose
an undue hardship on that person. [MCL 37.1210(1); MSA 3.550(210)(1).]
Therefore, if the plaintiff meets the initial burden of proving that the employer violated the
accommodation mandate, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate that it cannot reasonably
accommodate the plaintiff without undue hardship. MCL 37.1210(1); MSA 3.550(210)(1); Rourk,
supra; Hall v Hackley Hospital, 210 Mich App 48, 54-55; 532 NW2d 893 (1995).
The accommodation provisions of the HCRA evidence an attempt to balance the rights of the
handicapper with those of the employer. Rourk, supra at 35. Section 210 specifically recognizes the
following types of accommodation: (1) purchasing equipment and devices, (2) reasonable routine
maintenance or repair of such equipment and devices, (3) hiring readers and interpreters, and (4)
restructuring jobs and altering schedules for minor and infrequent transfers. Id. at 33, citing MCL
37.1210(2)-(5), (7)-(11), (14)-(15); MSA 3.550(210)(2)-(5), (7)-(11), (14)-(15). With respect to
accommodations not expressly listed in the statute, “it is for the courts to determine whether the burden
of the requested accommodation imposes an undue hardship, for implicit in the statute is a standard of
reasonableness.” Rourk, supra at 36; Roller v Dep’t of Civil Service, 228 Mich App 534, 539-540;
597 NW2d 118 (1998). The question of reasonableness is not always driven by cost and may include
other factors. Id. 36 n 6, citing Hall, supra.
Assuming without deciding that plaintiff’s arthritic condition constituted a “handicap” within the
meaning of the HCRA, we conclude that defendant’s duty to accommodate did not require it to permit
plaintiff to park in lots reserved for patients and visitors. Plaintiff submitted no authority for the
proposition that defendant was legally required to create a parking space in a lot reserved exclusively
for non-employees. Nor do we believe that the HCRA requires an employer to reduce customer
parking to accommodate its employees’ walking limitations. See Kornblau v Dade County, 86 F3d
193 (CA 11, 1996) (a disabled person was not entitled, under the ADA, to park in a lot reserved for
county employees, even though it was the closest lot to the county building, where she was not a county
employee, she had access to other lots with disabled parking, and parking in the disputed lot would not
have been available to her even were she not disabled). As the trial court noted, “while defendant was
obligated to reasonably accommodate employee handicaps, and thus might be required to reassign
existing employee parking spaces within employee lots, that obligation of reasonable accommodation
did not impose on it a duty to create new employee parking spaces for handicapped employees by
eliminating patient and visitor parking judged necessary by defendant for the operation of its business.”
Accordingly, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that plaintiff failed to carry his initial burden of
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proving that defendant’s conduct as alleged in the complaint violated the HCRA accommodation
mandate. See Rourk, supra (the plaintiff failed to carry her initial burden of proving that her employer
had a duty to accommodate her by transferring her to a different job); Hall, supra at 55-56 (the plaintiff
failed to carry the initial burden of proving that her employer had a duty to accommodate her by banning
smoking in its psychiatric facility).
In any event, although defendant refused to permit plaintiff’s attempt to park in Lot A or similar
lots, defendant satisfied its duty to accommodate plaintiff by offering him numerous other options. The
uncontested evidence established that defendant permitted plaintiff to park in handicapped spaces in
employee lots and even created additional handicapped spaces in one lot. Defendant also offered
plaintiff the use of a motorized cart to assist him in traveling from the hospital entrance to his office
which, according to defendant, would have substantially reduced the amount of walking. Plaintiff,
however, rejected the offer and did not request the use of the cart from his car to the building. An
employer has the ultimate discretion in choosing between reasonable accommodations, even if the
accommodation is not the one that the employee desires. See Keever v City of Middletown, 145 F3d
809 (CA 6, 1998) (a desk job offered to the plaintiff was a reasonable accommodation, although it was
not the plaintiff’s preferred accommodation); Hankins v Gap Inc, 84 F3d 797, 800 (CA 6, 1996) (the
defendant provided reasonable and effective accommodation even though the accommodation
proposed by the plaintiff was also reasonable). Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial
court properly granted summary disposition with respect to plaintiff’s accommodation claim.
Plaintiff also argues that issues of material fact existed that precluded summary disposition of his
claim of illegal retaliation under the HCRA. Plaintiff contends that defendant retaliated against him for
complaining to defendant that its failure to accommodate him constituted a violation of the HCRA and
for submitting a written request for an accommodation. We disagree.
MCL 37.1602; MSA 3.550(602), provides in pertinent part:
A person or 2 or more persons shall not do the following:
(a) Retaliate or discriminate against a person because the person has opposed a
violation of this act or because the person has made a charge, filed a complaint,
testified, assisted, or participated in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this
act.
To establish a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation under the HCRA, “a plaintiff must show (1) that
he engaged in a protected activity; (2) that this was known by the defendant; (3) that the defendant took
an employment action adverse to the plaintiff; and (4) that there was a causal connection between the
protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Mitan v Neiman Marcus, 240 Mich App
679, 681; ___ NW2d ___ (2000), citing DeFlaviis v Lord & Taylor, Inc, 223 Mich App 432, 436;
566 NW2d 661 (1997) (holding that the prima facie elements of a retaliation claim brought under the
Civil Rights Act also apply to retaliation claims brought under the HCRA).
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Assuming for the sake of argument that plaintiff presented evidence sufficient to sustain the other
prima facie elements of a retaliation claim, we conclude that plaintiff failed to establish a causal nexus
between the protected activity and his termination. In an attempt to show causation, plaintiff presented
evidence which, at most, establishes that he repeatedly requested the ability to park in Lot A, and that
defendant’s vice president of human resources refused to permit him to park there and reprimanded him
for doing so. This evidence, however, fails to show that defendant terminated plaintiff’s employment
because he engaged in protected activity under the HCRA or that such activity was causally related to
defendant’s termination. Moreover, the record is devoid of evidence establishing that defendant’s vice
president of human resources had any “input” in the termination decision or that plaintiff’s immediate
supervisor, the true decision-maker, harbored retaliatory animus. Particularly where there was a six
month temporal gap between plaintiff’s 1996 written accommodation request and the January 1997
discharge, we find that the evidence plaintiff submitted was insufficient to establish the required causal
connection. See Wixson v Dowagiac Nursing Home, 866 F Supp 1047, 1057 (WD Mich, 1994)
(seven months was too remote to support an inference of retaliation); Reeves v Digital Equipment
Corp, 710 F Supp 675, 677 (ND Oh, 1989) (three months was too remote to support an inference of
retaliation).
Even if we were to conclude that plaintiff established a prima facie case, summary disposition
was nonetheless proper. Defendant submitted admissible evidence establishing that plaintiff was
terminated because his immediate supervisor lost confidence in his ability to manage the respiratory
therapy department in light of his inappropriate work hours and his unsatisfactory interpersonal
relationships with staff. In response, plaintiff failed to present evidence sufficient to create a triable issue
that defendant’s legitimate non-retaliatory reasons were pretextual or that retaliatory animus was a
motivating factor underlying the termination decision. Lytle v Malady (On Rehearing), 458 Mich 153,
172-176; 579 NW2d 906 (1998); Hall v McRea Corp, 238 Mich App 361, 370-371; 605 NW2d
354 (1999). Summary disposition was therefore properly granted.
In light of our disposition, we need not address defendant’s issue on cross-appeal that the trial
court erred in concluding that a question of material fact existed regarding whether plaintiff was
handicapped within the meaning of the HCRA.
Affirmed.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
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