SCHOOLCRAFT EGG INC V SCHOOLCRAFT TWP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
SCHOOLCRAFT EGG, INC.,
UNPUBLISHED
August 11, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 216268
Kalamazoo Circuit Court
LC No. 96-000094-CE
SCHOOLCRAFT TOWNSHIP,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Saad, P.J., and Jansen and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court’s judgment of no cause of action from plaintiff’s
claim of violation of substantive due process and the trial court’s prior orders granting summary
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(4) and (10) regarding plaintiff’s claims of violation of equal
protection and regulatory taking without just compensation in this zoning case. We reverse and remand
for further proceedings.
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff is a producer, processor, and marketer of table eggs to wholesalers. It was
incorporated in 1984 and began as a partnership with one chicken house on twenty acres of land in an
agriculturally zoned district. Patrick Hunter is plaintiff’s president and general manager. In the two
years following 1984, plaintiff expanded considerably and added two chicken houses, thus having a
total of 200,000 egg-laying chickens. There is no other egg production facility in Schoolcraft Township.
In 1987, members of defendant’s planning commission were apparently concerned about
plaintiff’s expansion and began debating the passage of an intensive livestock ordinance. Plaintiff wished
to add a pullet house and more chicken houses. On December 21, 1987, defendant passed a building
permit moratorium for intensive livestock operations (ILO) that became effective on December 31,
1987. By December 1988, defendant passed Ordinance 1988-116. This ordinance made an ILO a
special exception use in defendant’s agricultural zones, meaning that those desiring to operate an ILO
had to obtain a permit to do so. The ordinance applies to cattle, horses, goats, sheep, swine, turkeys,
ducks, poultry, and “other livestock.” The ordinance designates each chicken as .02 of an animal unit
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and restricts each ILO to 2,500 animal units; therefore, each ILO is restricted to 125,000 chickens.
The ordinance further provides for minimum acreage and setback requirements. Plaintiff’s operation as
a 200,000 chicken facility pre-dated the ordinance, and was thus a n
onconforming use. However,
plaintiff’s desire to expand to 400,000 chickens with additional chicken houses was precluded by the
ordinance. Further, future owners of the property will be required to comply with the ordinance unless
they obtain a variance.
In 1992, plaintiff sought to add two more chicken houses; however, defendant’s zoning board
of appeals denied plaintiff’s variance in December 1993 and denied plaintiff’s request for a rehearing in
January 1994. On January 11, 1996, plaintiff filed a five-count complaint alleging: (1) that the
ordinance violates provisions of the Township Rural Zoning Act, MCL 125.271 et seq.; MSA
5.2963(1) et seq; (2) that the ordinance violates the Equal Protections Clauses of the federal and state
constitutions because the classification of animal units and corresponding values was arbitrary,
capricious, unreasonable, and unrelated to any legitimate governmental interest; (3) that the ordinance
was an unconstitutional deprivation of the Due Process Clause because it d
eprived plaintiff of its
property without due process of a law that is arbitrary, capricious, and unrelated to any legitimate
governmental interest; and (4) the ordinance constitutes a regulatory taking without just compensation.
Plaintiff claims that because of modern agricultural practices and economies of scale, egg production
facilities cannot remain economically viable with less than 400,000 chickens.
Before trial, the trial court summarily dismissed counts I and II of the complaint, relating to the
ordinance allegedly violating provisions of the Township Rural Zoning Act, and plaintiff does not
challenge the trial court’s dismissal of counts I and II. With regard to count III (violation of equal
protection), the trial court also summarily dismissed this claim ruling that it was precluded by plaintiff’s
failure to exhaust its administrative remedies from the zoning board of appeals before initiating this
judicial action. Plaintiff’s count V, that the ordinance constitutes a regulatory taking without just
compensation, was likewise dismissed before trial and the trial court specifically ruled that plaintiff failed
to show that the property was unmarketable as zoned.
Plaintiff’s count IV, alleging a violation of substantive due process, was not dismissed and the
claim went before the trial court as the fact finder. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that,
based on the testimony of defendant’s officials, defendant’s enactment of the ordinance was not
arbitrary or capricious and that it was the result of a deliberative process “which may leave room for
legitimate differences of opinions but that’s not unconstitutional.” Judgment was consequently entered in
favor of defendant.
Plaintiff’s appeal raises three issues. First, it claims that the trial court erred in dismissing the
regulatory taking claim because the Supreme Court’s decision in K & K Construction, Inc v Dep’t of
Natural Resources, 456 Mich 570; 575 NW2d 531 (1998), decided after the trial court granted
summary disposition in favor of defendant, modified the law in plaintiff’s favor. Second, plaintiff argues
that the trial court’s judgment in favor of defendant with regard to the due process claim was in error
because the ordinance is facially invalid because it implements spot zoning and exclusionary zoning and
that, regardless of the presumption of validity, the ordinance’s restrictions on ILOs were arbitrary and
capricious and not rationally related to any legitimate governmental interest. Lastly, plaintiff argues that
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the trial court erred in dismissing the equal protection claim because this claim is a constitutional
challenge to the validity of the ordinance and it was not necessary to exhaust administrative remedies
before challenging the ordinance on this basis.
II. REGULATORY TAKING
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion for summary
disposition with respect to the regulatory taking claim. The trial court granted summary disposition
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) (no genuine issue regarding any material fact and defendant entitled to
judgment as a matter of law). The trial court found it significant that plaintiff was allowed to continue its
operations and that the only preclusion was that plaintiff could not expand its otherwise nonconforming
use. Specifically, the trial court ruled:
There is no showing that plaintiff’s property is unmarketable as zoned. While
plaintiff has provided evidence that as an egg producing facility the property may not be
viable, this is not however the functional equivalent of showing that the property is
unmarketable as zoned. There is a distinct lack of evidence, save mere allegations and
denials, to suggest that the land could not be used for other adaptable purposes within
its zoned classification, or that no market for those purposes exist at all. Simply put,
plaintiff may not prove a confiscation by showing a disparity in value between uses. . . .
Plaintiff has not established that its property cannot be used for other adaptable
purposes as it is currently zoned. Therefore, it can hardly be said that the consequent
restrictions of the amended ordinance preclude plaintiffs[’] land from any use to which it
is reasonably adapted.
The trial court therefore held that the ordinance as applied to plaintiff’s property does not amount to a
regulatory taking without just compensation.
We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(10). Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). A
motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) test the factual support of a plaintiff’s claim. Spiek, supra, p 337.
The court is to consider the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and any other documentary
evidence submitted to determine whether a genuine issue of a material fact exists to warrant a trial. Id.
After the trial court granted summary disposition to defendant on this claim, our Supreme Court
issued its opinion in K & K Construction. Plaintiff moved for reconsideration nearly five months after
the Court decided K & K Construction and eight months after the trial court entered the order granting
summary disposition to defendant. Plaintiff, in its motion for reconsideration, urged the trial court to
reopen this issue on the ground that the decision in K & K Construction modified the law on regulatory
taking in its favor. The trial court denied the motion on the ground of untimeliness, citing the fourteen
day time limit for motions for rehearing or reconsideration under MCR 2.119. Plaintiff now argues that
the trial court improperly denied the motion as being untimely and that it should prevail on the merits of
the claim.
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We agree with plaintiff that the trial court should not have dismissed the motion for
reconsideration on timeliness grounds.
MCR 2.119(F) governs motions for rehearing or
reconsideration and provides in relevant part:
(1) Unless another rule provides a different procedure for reconsideration of a
decision (see, e.g., MCR 2.604[A], 2.612), a motion for rehearing or reconsideration
of the decision on a motion must be served and filed not later than 14 days after entry of
an order disposing of the motion.
Plaintiff correctly argues that it was not bound by the fourteen-day deadline set forth in MCR
2.119(F)(1). Plaintiff relies on MCR 2.604(A), which provides that “an order or other form of decision
adjudicating fewer than all the claims . . . does not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties,
and the order is subject to revision before entry of final judgment adjudicating all the claims and rights
and liabilities of all the parties.” Read in conjunction with the reference in MCR 2.119(F)(1) to MCR
2.604, this provision excuses the fourteen-day deadline for a motion for reconsideration or rehearing of
orders entered before the final judgment. Dean & Longhofer, Michigan Court Rules Practice (4th ed),
§ 2.119.7, p 635. Plaintiff was therefore not bound by the fourteen-day rule of MCR 2.119(F)(1).
We next address the merits of plaintiff’s claim and consider whether plaintiff presented sufficient
evidence of its claim of a regulatory taking. Both the Fifth Amendment of the federal constitution and art
10, § 2 of the Michigan Constitution prohibit governmental taking of property without just
compensation. A taking may occur where a governmental entity exercises its police power through
regulation restricting the use of property. Electro-Tech, Inc v H F Campbell Co, 433 Mich 57, 68;
445 NW2d 61 (1989). “Zoning laws are a classic example of regulation that may amount to a ‘taking,’
if application ‘goes too far’ in impairing a property owner’s use of [its] land.” Bevan v Brandon Twp,
438 Mich 385, 390; 475 NW2d 37 (1991), citing Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon, 260 US 393,
415; 43 S Ct 158; 67 L Ed 322 (1922).
In K & K Construction, supra, pp 576-577, the Court stated:
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the government may
effectively “take” a person’s property by overburdening that property with regulations.
As stated by Justice Holmes, “[t]he general rule at least is, that while property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”
Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon, 260 US 393, 415; 43 S Ct 158; 67 L Ed 322
(1922). While all taking cases require a case-specific inquiry, courts have found that
land use regulations effectuate a taking in two general situations: (1) where the
regulation does not substantially advance a legitimate state interest, or (2) where the
regulation denies an owner economically viable use of his land. Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass’n v DeBenedictus, 480 US 470, 485; 107 S Ct 1232; 94 L Ed 2d 472
(1987).
The second type of taking, where the regulation denies an owner of
economically viable use of land, is further subdivided into two situations: (a) a
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“categorical” taking, where the owner is deprived of “all economically beneficial or
productive use of land,” Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003,
1015; 112 S Ct 2886; 120 L Ed 2d 798 (1992); or (b) a taking recognized on the
basis of the application of the traditional “balancing test” established in Penn Central
Transportation Co v New York City, 438 US 104; 98 S Ct 2646; 57 L Ed 2d 631
(1978).
In the former situation, the categorical taking, a reviewing court need not apply
a case-specific analysis, and the owner should automatically recover for a taking of his
property, Lucas, supra at 1015. A person may recover for this type of taking in the
case of a physical invasion of his property by the government . . . or where a regulation
forces an owner to “sacrifice all economically beneficial uses [of his land] in the name of
the common good. . . .”Id. at 1019 (emphasis in original). In the latter situation, the
balancing test, a reviewing court must engage in an “ad hoc, factual inquir[y],” centering
on three factors: (1) the character of the government’s action, (2) the economic effect
of the regulation on the property, and (3) the extent by which the regulation has
interfered with distinct, investment-backed expectations. Penn Central, 438 US 124.
We believe that plaintiff has submitted sufficient factual support for its claim of a regulatory
taking, contrary to the trial court’s ruling. The trial court did not address the first situation stated in K &
K Construction, namely, where the regulation does not substantially advance a legitimate state interest.
This is important because the teaching of Nollan v California Coastal Comm, 483 US 825, 837,
841; 107 S Ct 3141; 97 L Ed 2d 677 (1987), is that there must be a substantial advancing of a
legitimate state interest. It is not enough for the governmental unit to simply state its proffered interest,
here, the control of animal pollution; rather, defendant must show that the ordinance substantially
advances its legitimate interest. Thus, a land-use restriction may constitute a taking if is not reasonably
necessary to the effectuation of a substantial governmental purpose. Id., p 834; Penn Central, supra,
p 127.
The question whether the ordinance substantially advances defendant’s legitimate interest in
controlling animal pollution must be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Plaintiff has
presented evidence that the numerical limit placed on chickens does not substantially advance
defendant’s legitimate interest in controlling animal pollution because there is deposition testimony of a
salesperson from the Big Dutchman egg producer that there is no difference in manure odor from a
400,000 hen farm than there is from a 200,000 hen farm provided the manure is kept dry. Further, in
1992, the Department of Agriculture found that plaintiff had resolved the problem with manure run-off.
We finally note that defendant has never set forth any scientific or statistical data regarding the selection
of a 125,000 chicken maximum for a twenty-acre farm and how that number substantially advances its
interest in controlling animal pollution.
Consequently, this claim must be remanded for trial because plaintiff has presented evidence
sustaining its claim that defendant set forth “no proof whatsoever that placing a limit of 125,000
chickens on an egg producing facility has any reasonable relationship” to a legitimate governmental
interest. We emphasize that this “essential nexus” between the ordinance requirements and defendant’s
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legitimate interest must be proved by defendant and it is not enough for defendant to simply put forth a
legitimate interest without proving that the ordinance substantially advances that interest. Nollan, supra,
pp 837, 841.
With regard to t e second situation identified in K & K Construction, where the regulation
h
denies an owner economically viable use of the land, we again find that plaintiff presented sufficient
evidence to support this claim to avoid summary disposition. As explained by plaintiff, this case involves
not a categorical taking, but a taking based on the balancing test established in Penn Central. Such a
claim requires the court to engage in an ad hoc, factual inquiry, focusing on three factors: (1) the
character of the government’s action; (2) the economic effect of the regulation on the property; and (3)
the extent by which the regulation has interfered with distinct, investment-backed expectations. K & K
Construction, supra, pp 587-588. “[T]he question whether a regulation denies the owner
economically viable use of his land requires at least a comparison of the value removed with the value
that remains.” Bevan, supra, p 391, citing Keystone, supra, p 497. In determining whether a zoning
regulation effects a taking, the property owner must show that the property is either unsuitable for use as
zoned or unmarketable as zoned. Bevan, supra, p 403. A mere diminution in property value resulting
from the regulation does not amount to a taking. Id., pp 402-403.
Plaintiff presented the deposition testimony of his agricultural expert, Lee Schrader, who
testified that an egg production and marketing operation limited to 125,000 hens is not economically
viable because they are not of a sufficient size to take advantage of the economies to scale.
Additionally, Tim VandeBunte, an egg farmer in Holland, Michigan, testified that plaintiff was “too
small” to remain economically viable. VandeBunte explained that the egg production industry in this
country had “gotten larger and more consolidated” and that plaintiff was too small to stay competitive.
VandeBunte also testified that a company with 200,000 hens without the capacity to expand was not
salable.
Plaintiff’s evidence presents more than a mere diminution in value because of the ordinance
limitation on the number of chickens that it can have on its property. Patrick Hunter, plaintiff’s president
and general manager, testified that most chicken houses have at least 200,000 chickens, and that with a
125,000 chicken maximum, “nobody would build chicken houses in Schoolcraft Township period.”
Hunter stated that he needs more than 125,000 chickens to survive and have a salable product and that
the total debt of the corporation was about $750,000 as of 1997. Interestingly, the appraisal relied
upon by defendant in its motion for summary disposition, from 1994, indicated that the market value
was $516,000.
Here, we find that plaintiff has presented evidence that the property is unmarketable as zoned,
rather than suffering a mere diminution in value because of the ordinance restrictions. See, e.g., Rogers
v Allen Park, 186 Mich App 33, 39; 463 NW2d 431 (1990). The trial court did not apply the proper
test when it concluded that plaintiff had not established that its property could not be used for other
adaptable purposes as currently zoned and that the ordinance precluded plaintiff’s property from any
use to which it is reasonably adapted. Rather, the trial court is to consider the character of defendant’s
action, the economic effect of the ordinance, and the extent of the ordinance’s interference with
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reasonable investment-backed expectations. K & K Construction, supra, pp 587-588; Bevan,
supra, p 402.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of defendant with
regard to plaintiff’s regulatory taking claim and remand for a trial on this claim.
III. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
As stated, the substantive due process claim was tried before the court, with the court ultimately
ruling in favor of defendant. Plaintiff argues that the trial court erroneously began its due process
analysis with the presumption that the ordinance is valid. Plaintiff contends that the ordinance is invalid
because it implements “spot zoning” and “exclusionary zoning.” Plaintiff also argues that, regardless of
the presumption of validity, the evidence established that the ordinance’s restrictions on ILOs were
arbitrary and not rationally related to any legitimate governmental goals.
We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a constitutional challenge to a zoning ordinance.
Scots Ventures, Inc v Hayes Twp, 212 Mich App 530, 532; 537 NW2d 610 (1995). The trial
court’s factual findings, however, are accorded considerable deference, English v Augusta Twp, 204
Mich App 33, 37; 514 NW2d 172 (1994), as factual findings are reviewed under the clearly erroneous
standard, MCR 2.613(C).
As stated in Bevan, supra, p 391, a taking claim may be based on a denial of substantive due
process where a plaintiff is deprived of property rights by irrational or arbitrary governmental action.
“The basis of a substantive due process claims is that the zoning ordinance either fails to advance or is
an unreasonable means of advancing a legitimate governmental interest.” Rogers supra, p 38; see also
Hecht v Niles Twp, 173 Mich App 453, 461; 434 NW2d 156 (1988); Troy Campus v City of Troy,
132 Mich App 441, 454; 349 NW2d 177 (1984). More specifically, in Kropf v Sterling Heights,
391 Mich 139, 158; 215 NW2d 179 (1974), our Supreme Court stated:
In looking at this “reasonableness” requirement for a zoning ordinance, this
Court will bear in mind that a challenge on due process grounds contains a two-fold
argument; first, that there is no reasonable governmental interest being advanced by the
present zoning classification itself, . . . or secondly, that an ordinance may be
unreasonable because of the purely arbitrary, capricious and unfounded exclusion of
other types of legitimate land use from the area in question.
First, contrary to plaintiff’s argument, the trial court correctly stated that it would presume the
validity of the ordinance. Bevan, supra, p 398; Gackler Land Co, Inc v Yankee Springs Twp, 427
Mich 562, 571; 398 NW2d 393 (1986); Kirk v Tyrone Twp, 398 Mich 429, 439; 247 NW2d 848
(1976); Kropf, supra, p 62. However, an ordinance that totally excludes a use recognized by the
constitution or other laws of the state, carries a strong taint of discrimination and a denial of equal
protection of the law. Id., p 156; Countrywalk Condominiums, Inc v Orchard Lake Village, 221
Mich App 19, 22; 561 NW2d 405 (1997). If the ordinance totally excludes a valid land use, it no
longer carries a presumption of validity. Id., p 24. A zoning ordinance may not totally exclude a lawful
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land use where (1) there is a demonstrated need for the land use in the township or surrounding area,
and (2) the land use is appropriate for the location. English, supra, pp 37-38.
We disagree with plaintiff’s contention that the ordinance constitutes exclusionary zoning
because plaintiff did not demonstrate a need for an egg production and marketing in Schoolcraft
Township or the surrounding area. Further, the ordinance does not totally exclude ILOs; rather, it
restricts their size and location. Plaintiff’s contention that the ordinance makes it difficult for ILOs to
operate profitably, thus excluding ILOs as a practical matter, does not fit the rule set forth in English.
Consequently, the ordinance does not constitute exclusionary zoning.
Plaintiff also argues that the ordinance results in “spot zoning,” thus nullifying the presumption of
validity. In Rogers, supra, p 39, this Court explained that spot zoning involves a small zone of
inconsistent use within a larger zone and that the courts will closely scrutinize any ordinance involving
spot zoning. Plaintiff contends that the ordinance results in spot zoning because its operation was the
only one that became a nonconforming use. This argument, however, does not fit the definition of spot
zoning. The ordinance applies to all agriculturally zoned lands in Schoolcraft Township, not only to
plaintiff’s property. Here, the ordinance did not create a zone of inconsistent use, id., but applies to all
agriculturally zoned land. Therefore, there is no proof of spot zoning in this case.
The crux of plaintiff’s argument is that the ordinance is unreasonable because there is no
evidence to suggest that placing a maximum of 125,000 chickens for an ILO, as opposed to 20,000 or
500,000 chickens, promotes health, safety, or welfare, and that there is no evidence that spreading out
the facilities is reasonably related to defendant’s police power. We agree with plaintiff that the
ordinance is unreasonable because there was no showing by defendant that the numerical limits placed
on the livestock or the acreage limits are a reasonable means of advancing defendant’s legitimate
governmental interest.
We do not take issue with the assertion that controlling animal pollution is a legitimate
governmental interest. However, the evidence at trial does not show that the ordinance constitutes a
reasonable means of advancing that interest. First, there was no evidence that forcing ILOs to spread
out, as opposed to concentrating, would actually reduce or control the amount of animal manure. More
importantly, the numerical livestock limit is unreasonable in that it applies to all ILOs regardless of size.
Thus, the limit of poultry (125,000) applies to all ILOs regardless of whether it is comprised of twenty
acres or one hundred acres. Further, there was no evidence that the numerical limit itself advances
defendant’s interest. As noted by plaintiff, there was no evidence that placing a limit of 125,000 poultry
at any ILO, as opposed to 20,000 or 500,000, advances defendant’s interest. This is because the
designation of .02 of an animal unit to each chicken is completely arbitrary.
In this regard, defendant’s attorney, Craig Rolfe, testified at length about the deliberations
concerning the numerical limits. Rolfe admitted that the committee never consulted any expert when it
selected 125,000 as the maximum number of chickens for each ILO. Rolfe testified that the committee
utilized the federal Clean Water Act, which actually provides for two different multipliers for poultry, .01
and .03, depending on the type of operation. Rolfe admitted that the committee chose the number .02
because it was “an average between the two already fudged numbers that the federal government
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promulgated for poultry facilities for whatever those are worth.” Rolfe also admitted that the committee
considered, but rejected, a .01 multiplier for poultry because this would have allowed ILOs to keep
29,999 chickens without becoming subject to the ordinance. Because the committee felt that 30,000
was too high a threshold, it decided instead on a .02 multiplier for poultry, so that ILOs with 15,000 or
more chickens would be subject to the ordinance.
Defendant’s decision to utilize .02 as the designation for each chicken and its decision to limit
each ILO, regardless of size, to 125,000 is unreasonable because there was no evidence that these
numerical limits actually control animal pollution as opposed to any other numerical limits. In fact, we
note at this point that there was no evidence at trial that plaintiff’s operations were actually a pollution
threat to the environment, other than the testimony of local citizens who testified that they believed that
the poultry manure was polluting the environment, with one neighbor admitting that he had no direct
evidence of wetland pollution. Moreover, the same numerical limit applies to all ILOs regardless of size,
leaving potentially larger ILOs with the same number of livestock as on the smallest permissible ILO
(twenty acres). See, e.g., Charter Twp of Delta v Dinolfo, 419 Mich 253, 351 NW2d 831 (1984)
(the township’s ordinance of limiting to two the number of unrelated persons who can occupy a
residential dwelling together or with a biological family was unreasonable because it was not rationally
related to the stated goals of the ordinance of preservation of traditional family values, maintenance of
property values, and population and density control); Scots Ventures, supra, pp 533-534 (the
township’s ordinance mandating a ten-acre lot size minimum was unreasonable because it did not
advance the goals of preservation of farmland and the area’s rural character where there was evidence
that such a lot size requirement was not sufficient to meet these goals and the township’s comprehensive
zoning plan recognized that a five-acre lot size would preserve the rural character of lands no longer in
agricultural use); Art Van Furniture, Inc v Kentwood, 175 Mich App 343, 352-353; 437 NW2d 380
(1989) (the city’s ordinance that regulated the size of wall signs on buildings to ten percent of the total
area of the wall to which it was attached or a maximum of one hundred square feet was unreasonable
because it produced a situation where the wall signs could either constitute 791 or 100 square feet on
the building depending on the number of tenants in the building, thus inuring to the detriment of sole
tenants as opposed to multiple tenants).
Accordingly, the trial court’s decision in favor of defendant is reversed because there is no
evidence that the ordinance is reasonably related to its stated goals of controlling animal pollution. We
remand to the trial court for it to fashion an appropriate remedy pursuant to Schwartz v Flint, 426
Mich 295, 328-329; 395 NW2d 678 (1986). Thus, the trial court is to consider whether plaintiff
proves by a preponderance of the evidence that its proposed use is reasonable, and, if so, issuing an
injunction preventing defendant from interfering with that use. Further, defendant is “free to rezone
consistent with the limiting conditions of plaintiff’s proposed use, or not so limited, where plaintiff’s use
had not been declared unreasonable.” Id., p 329.
IV. EQUAL PROTECTION
Plaintiff lastly argues that the trial court erred in dismissing its equal protection claim under the
“finality rule.” The trial court dismissed counts I, II, and III of plaintiff’s complaint, pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(4) (lack of subject matter jurisdiction), ruling that these counts did not raise separate causes
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of action. Rather, the trial court ruled that plaintiff’s claims that the zoning board of appeals’ decision
did not comply with the constitution and laws of this state could have been raised in an appeal from the
zoning board of appeals’ decision. We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4). Thomas v United Parcel Service, ___ Mich App ___; ___
NW2d ___ (Docket Nos. 209699, 209991, issued May 16, 2000), slip op, p 2.
In Paragon Properties Co v Novi, 452 Mich 568, 577; 550 NW2d 772 (1996), our
Supreme Court, quoting Williams Co Regional Planning Comm v Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,
473 US 172, 186; 105 S Ct 3108; 87 L Ed 2d 126 (1985), stated:
[T]he finality requirement is concerned with whether the initial decisionmaker
has arrived at a definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual, concrete injury.
Importantly, finality is not required for facial challenges to an ordinance because such challenges attack
the very existence or enactment of an ordinance. Paragon Properties, supra, p 577. A facial
challenge is one that alleges that the mere existence and threatened enforcement of an ordinance
materially and adversely affects values and curtail opportunities of all property regulated in the market.
Id., p 576.
On the other hand, a challenge to the validity of a zoning ordinance as applied, whether analyzed
under 42 USC as a denial of equal protection, as a deprivation of due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment, or as a taking under the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, is subject to
the rule of finality. Id. “An ‘as applied’ challenge alleges a present infringement or denial of a specific
right or of a particular injury in process of actual execution.” Id.
In Countrywalk, supra, p 22, this Court, in applying Paragon Properties, held that the
plaintiff was making a facial challenge to the ordinance where the complaint alleged that the ordinance at
issue violated the due process and equal protection clauses in that the ordinance was arbitrary and
capricious, and that it failed to advance any legitimate governmental interest. Consequently, finality was
not required for the court to have jurisdiction over the claims because the plaintiff was making a facial
challenge to the ordinance.
Similarly, plaintiff in the present case is alleging a facial challenge to the ordinance. The
gravamen of count III is that the ordinance creates a classification (an ILO) and a subclassification
(animal units), the creation of which are arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, and bear no reasonable
relation to the advancement of a legitimate governmental interest. The finality rule does not apply to
plaintiff’s facial challenge of the ordinance on equal protection grounds. Further, defendant’s argument
that count III does not seek damages and that the finality rule pertains to a claim for damages is not
correct. The Court in Paragon Properties did not set forth any requirement that a plaintiff must allege
damages for the finality rule to apply. The only distinction drawn in Paragon Properties was whether
the complaint alleged a facial challenge to the ordinance or was an “as applied” challenge. Simply
stated, finality is not required where a plaintiff makes a facial challenge to an ordinance.
Accordingly, the trial court erred in applying the rule of finality to count III of plaintiff’s
complaint because plaintiff is facially attacking the ordinance. Moreover, we disagree with defendant’s
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further contention that the trial court’s error is harmless because the trial court rejected plaintiff’s
substantive due process claim. This Court has recognized that equal protection analysis and substantive
due process analysis substantially overlap. Cryderman v Birmingham, 171 Mich App 15, 25; 429
NW2d 625 (1988). The guarantee of equal protection requires that the classification in the application
of a statute or ordinance be based on a real distinguishing characteristic and bear a reasonable relation
to the object of the legislation. Id., p 26. Because we are reversing the trial court’s decision with
regard to the substantive due process claim, and because the trial court did not consider the merits of
the equal protection claim, we believe it would be inappropriate to dismiss the equal protection claim on
a basis not raised below and not addressed by the trial court. See, e.g., Booth Newspapers, Inc v
Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents, 444 Mich 211, 234; 507 NW2d 422 (1993) (issues raised for the
first time on appeal are ordinarily not subject to review); Candelaria v B C General Contractors, Inc,
236 Mich App 67, 83; 600 NW2d 348 (1999) (appellate review is generally limited to issues decided
by the trial court).
Consequently, the equal protection claim is remanded to the trial court for further consideration.
Defendant is, of course, free to argue below in the same manner on appeal that plaintiff has failed to
prove that the ordinance classifications are arbitrary and cannot serve a legitimate governmental interest.
See Curto v Harper Woods, 954 F2d 1237 (CA 6, 1992).
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Jurisdiction is not
retained.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
-11
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