PEOPLE OF MI V GARWOOD R SMITH
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
August 4, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 210613
Bay Circuit Court
LC No. 97-001182-FH
GARWOOD R. SMITH,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Saad, P.J., and Hoekstra and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of delivery of less than fifty grams of cocaine,
MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(iv). The trial court sentenced defendant as a fourth
habitual offender, MCL 769.12; MSA 28.1084, to 4½ to 20 years’ imprisonment, to be served
consecutively to his two- to four-year sentence in another case. We affirm.
Defendant argues that the trial court violated his due process rights by refusing to suppress the
evidence that the police obtained following defendant’s arrest without a warrant where no exigent
circumstances existed. We disagree. When ruling on a motion to suppress the evidence, this Court
reviews the trial court’s factual findings to determine if they are clearly erroneous and its conclusions of
law de novo. People v Zahn, 234 Mich App 438, 445; 594 NW2d 120(1999).
The United States Constitution and the Michigan Constitution guarantee the right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. US Const, Am IV; Const 1963, art 1, § 11; In re Forfeiture of
$176,598, 443 Mich 261, 264-265; 505 NW2d 201 (1993). The expectation of privacy for a
dwelling extends to hotel rooms. People v Oliver, 417 Mich 366, 377; 338 NW2d 167 (1983). A
search without a warrant is unreasonable unless there is both probable cause and an applicable
exception to the warrant requirement. People v Mayes (After Remand), 202 Mich App 181, 184;
508 NW2d 161 (1993). For probable cause to exist, there must be “a fair probability that contraband
or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” People v Garvin, 235 Mich App 90, 102;
597 NW2d 194 (1999), quoting Illinois v Gates, 462 US 213, 238; 103 S Ct 2317; 76 L Ed 2d 527
(1983).
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The existence of exigent circumstances is one exception to the warrant requirement. People v
Davis, 442 Mich 1, 10; 497 NW2d 910 (1993). Under the exigent circumstances exception, the
police may enter a dwelling without a warrant if the officers have probable cause to believe that a crime
was recently committed on the premises, and probable cause to believe that the premises contain
evidence or perpetrators of the suspected crime. In re Forfeiture, supra at 271. The police must
establish that immediate action is necessary to (1) prevent the immediate destruction of evidence, (2)
protect the police officers or others, or (3) prevent the escape of a suspect. Id. In cases where the
police can show an objectively reasonable risk that destruction or removal of evidence is imminent, and
that immediate action is necessary before they can obtain a warrant, the exigent circumstances exception
applies. People v Blasius, 435 Mich 573, 594; 459 NW2d 906 (1990).
In Blasius, police officers observed an individual, Gieber, go to the defendant’s residence and
return with cocaine. Id. at 594-595. The Court determined that this act, in addition to the fact that the
police had observed traffic of known narcotics dealers at the residence, would lead a reasonable person
to believe that there was criminal activity occurring in the house. Id. at 595. Gieber told the officers
that the cocaine was “going fast” and might be gone by the end of the day. Id. Our Supreme Court
held that, when viewing all the factors in combination, exigent circumstances to enter the house existed.
Id. at 597. Specifically, the Court noted that the imminent removal or destruction of evidence may itself
constitute an exigent circumstance. Id. at 583.
In People v Hadley, 199 Mich App 96, 100-101; 501 NW2d 219 (1993), aff’d sub nom on
other grounds People v Morris, 450 Mich 316; 537 NW2d 842 (1995), another controlled substances
case, this Court determined that where the police entered the defendant’s house with no search warrant,
exigent circumstances justified the entry because it was necessary to prevent the loss or destruction of
contraband.
In People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393; 397-398; 608 NW2d 502 (2000), a shooting victim
identified the defendant as the man who shot him and indicated that the defendant lived in a hotel. A
witness also stated that he saw a white van pull into the parking lot and saw a man who matched the
defendant’s description running away from the van after the victim was hollering that he had been shot.
Id. at 397. The police saw a white van with the doors open, the engine running, and the body of a
woman who had died from a gunshot wound inside. Id. at 398. The police then obtained a key for the
defendant’s hotel room and conducted a search of the room without a warrant. Id. This Court found
that there were sufficient facts to show exigent circumstances justifying the search. Id. at 407. This
Court stated that the police could not wait for a warrant because evidence may have been destroyed
and it was necessary to protect the police and others, to prevent the defendant’s escape, and to
determine if the defendant was wounded. Id. at 410.
Here, defendant was staying at a motel; consequently, he was only there temporarily and could
have checked out. A motel room itself does not create exigency, but each case must be judged on its
own facts. Oliver, supra at 383-385. The question is whether a reasonable person would have
perceived the need to immediately secure the motel room. Id. at 383; People v Olajos, 397 Mich 629,
634; 246 NW2d 828 (1976). In this situation, the police acted under the exigent circumstances
exception. The facts demonstrated that the evidence may have been gone by the time the police had
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obtained a warrant. Further, the police had probable cause to search the room because a controlled
buy took place there less than an hour earlier. Because the police had probable cause and exigent
circumstances existed, it was reasonable for the police officers to search the motel room, and the trial
court properly refused to suppress the evidence.1
Next, defendant argues that the trial court should have granted his motion for new trial because
of prosecutorial misconduct. Specifically, he claims that the prosecutor violated his due process rights
by allowing witness Gerardo Facundo to testify falsely to not expecting leniency in exchange for his
testimony against defendant. We disagree. In cases of prosecutorial misconduct, the determination
must be made whether the defendant was denied a fair trial. People v Paquette, 214 Mich App 336,
342; 543 NW2d 342 (1995). The clear error standard of review applies to a trial court’s factual
findings in deciding a motion for new trial. People v Lester, 232 Mich App 262, 271; 591 NW2d 267
(1998). The court’s disposition of the motion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id.
Where an accomplice or co-conspirator has been granted immunity or other leniency, it is
incumbent upon the prosecutor and trial judge, if the fact is brought out in trial, to disclose the fact to the
jury upon request of defense counsel. People v Atkins, 397 Mich 163, 173; 243 NW2d 292 (1976).
It has been held to be a denial of due process where the witness testifies that he has not been promised
consideration for testimony where the prosecutor knows the statement to be false. Id. at 173-174. A
prosecutor has a constitutional duty to report to the defendant when a witness for the prosecution lies
under oath and a duty to correct the false evidence. Lester, supra at 276. Nevertheless, the
possibility of future leniency does not have to be disclosed:
[I]t is one thing to require disclosure of facts (immunity or leniency) which the jury
should weigh in assessing a witness’s credibility. It is quite another to require
“disclosure” of future possibilities for the jury’s speculation. Indeed, if a prosecutor
were required to volunteer that, although there was no agreement, he intended to
recommend some sort of consideration for a witness because the witness was testifying
in this and other cases or had corrected his past misdeeds, could this not be viewed as
vouching for a witness’s credibility? The focus of required disclosure is not on factors
which may motivate a prosecutor in dealing subsequently with a witness, but rather on
facts which may motivate the witness in giving certain testimony. [Atkins, supra at
174.]
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In his appellate brief and at oral argument, defendant relied on the case of Payton v New York, 445
US 573; 100 S Ct 1371; 63 L Ed 2d 639 (1980), in arguing that the evidence should have been
suppressed because no exigent circumstances existed. Defendant’s reliance on Payton is misplaced
because the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement was not considered in Payton.
The Payton Court specifically stated that, although it was arguable that the warrantless entry might have
been justified by the exigent circumstances exception, the Court would not consider t e exception
h
because the lower courts had not relied on any such justification. Id. at 582-583.
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Here, although there was evidence that the possibility of future leniency existed, the evidence did
not demonstrate that Facundo testified in exchange for the prosecutor’s promise of leniency.
Accordingly, there was no prosecutorial misconduct, and defendant was not denied a fair trial.
Finally, defendant contends that the trial court violated his due process rights by admitting
evidence that, after his arrest, he told the police he would purchase cocaine and he assaulted Facundo,
the person to whom he sold the cocaine. Defendant claims that the prejudicial effect of the other acts
evidence outweighed its probative value. Again, we disagree. The admissibility of other acts evidence
is within the trial court’s discretion, and the court will be reversed only when there is an abuse of
discretion. People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 383; 582 NW2d 785 (1998). An abuse of discretion
is found only if an unprejudiced person, considering the facts on which the trial court acted, would
conclude there was no justification or excuse for the ruling made. People v McAlister, 203 Mich App
495, 505; 513 NW2d 431 (1994).
There was no abuse of discretion in the present case. The evidence that defendant agreed to
cooperate with the police and buy cocaine from a friend was not introduced to prove his character.
Rather, the evidence was intended to demonstrate that the defendant had access to cocaine. This was
relevant because defendant claimed he did not sell cocaine to Facundo. Furthermore, its probative
value was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Defendant explained that he was forced
into the agreement with the police and had to cooperate or he would be jailed. Thus, the prejudicial
impact of the evidence was minimal. The evidence was properly admitted. Moreover, the evidence
regarding the assault on Facundo was admissible to show consciousness of guilt. In People v Sholl,
453 Mich 730, 740; 556 NW2d 851 (1996), the Court held that evidence demonstrating
consciousness of guilt was admissible, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the
evidence. Evidence of a threat against a witness is generally admissible as conduct that can demonstrate
consciousness of guilt. People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 640; 588 NW2d 480 (1998). Thus, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion.
We affirm.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Jane E. Markey
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