PEOPLE OF MI V GERALD W ARMSTRONG
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 25, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 212982
Oakland Circuit Court
LC Nos. 98-157628-FC
98-157629-FC
98-157630-FC
GERALD W. ARMSTRONG,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Owens, P.J., and Neff and Fitzgerald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a single jury trial involving the three separate cases joined in this appeal, defendant
was convicted of twelve counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC), MCL 750.520b(1)(a);
MSA 28.788(2)(1)(a) (sexual penetration with a person under thirteen years of age), and two counts of
second-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520(c)(1)(b); MSA 28.788(3)(1)(b) (sexual contact
with a person at least 13 but less than 16 years of age who is a member of the same household).
Defendant was sentenced, as a second habitual offender, MCL 769.10; MSA 28.1082, to thirty to
sixty years in prison for each count of first-degree CSC and to 14 to 22½ years in prison for each count
of second-degree CSC. Defendant appeals as of right, and we affirm.
Defendant first contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his confession because
his statements to the police were involuntary. We disagree. This Court reviews a trial court’s ruling on
the voluntariness of a defendant’s statements while in police custody for clear error. People v Sexton,
458 Mich 43, 68; 580 NW2d 404 (1998). A Walker1 hearing was held before the trial court, during
which testimony was given by defendant and by the two police officers involved in defendant’s
interview, Patrick Morin and Amado Arceo. Defendant contends that he made inculpatory statements
involuntarily, after waiving his rights, due to police intimidation and coercion. A prosecutor may not
introduce a suspect’s statement as evidence at trial if it was involuntarily made through police coercion in
1
People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331; 132 NW2d 87 (1965).
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violation of the suspect’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Culombe v Connecticut, 367
US 568, 601-602; 81 S Ct 1860; 6 L Ed 2d 1037 (1961); People v Wells, 238 Mich App 383, 386;
605 NW2d 374 (1999).
To determine whether a statement is voluntary or the result of police coercion, this Court
examines the entire record and makes an independent determination of voluntariness by analyzing the
totality of the circumstances. Sexton, supra, at 67-68. The following factors should be considered to
determine whether the statement was made voluntarily:
the age of the accused; his lack of education or his intelligence level; the extent of his
previous experience with the police; the repeated and prolonged nature of the
questioning; the length of the detention of the accused before he gave the statement in
question; the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights; whether there
was an unnecessary delay in bringing him before a magistrate before he gave the
confession; whether the accused was injured, intoxicated or drugged, or in ill health
when he gave the statement; whether the accused was deprived of food, sleep, or
medical attention; whether the accused was physically abused; and whether the suspect
was threatened with abuse. [People v Cipriano, 431 Mich 315, 334; 429 NW2d 781
(1988).]
The totality of the circumstances surrounding defendant’s confession suggest that his statements
were voluntarily made. First, defendant was not questioned for an inordinate amount of time; the entire
interview with Arceo during which defendant confessed took a total of two hours and his statement to
Morin afterwards took twenty minutes. Further, defendant was not subjected to constant or repeated
questioning while in police custody. He was initially questioned by Morin on January 9, 1998, and his
examination and interview with Arceo and Morin did not occur until March 4, 1998.
Defendant also appears to have been in good health during the interview. The interview took
place at 9:00 a.m. and defendant indicated that he slept well for 8½ hours the night before. Defendant
indicated he ingested Zantac within the previous twenty-four hours, but he did not maintain that he was
under the influence of drugs or alcohol or that he was deprived of food. Defendant did not appear to be
upset or overly emotional and was described by Arceo and Morin as very quiet and calm during the
interview.
Defendant indicated that he had a tenth or eleventh grade education and he was forty-eight
years old at the time of the interview. The officers were aware that defendant had trouble reading, so
they verbally advised him of his rights and defendant indicated he understood them and signed waivers
to that effect. Moreover, defendant was advised of his rights multiple times throughout this process and
had previous experience with police.
Arceo and Morin testified that defendant was never threatened or intimidated and that they had
no physical contact with him. In fact, it appears that the only allegedly coercive action defendant can
point to was that Arceo raised his voice and told defendant that he did not believe he was telling the
truth. Specifically, defendant testified that Arceo raised his voice and accused defendant of lying until
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defendant “just freaked out” and made an untruthful confession. Arceo admitted that he told defendant
three times that he did not believe he was being truthful; however, Arceo and Morin both testified that
Arceo did not raise his voice or speak in an intimidating or threatening manner. Further, the officers
testified that defendant’s demeanor always remained calm and that there was no sign that defendant
“freaked out” under any actual or imagined pressure.
Where testimony during a Walker hearing conflicts and depends on an evaluation of the
credibility of a witness, this Court defers “to the findings of the lower court since it is in a better position
to evaluate credibility.” People v Shelson, 150 Mich App 718, 724; 389 NW2d 159 (1986).
Accordingly, the trial court’s finding that the testimony of Arceo and Morin was more credible than
defendant’s will not be overturned here. Further, in view of the totality of the circumstances surrounding
defendant’s interrogation, his statements were voluntarily made and there was no due process violation
through any police coercion. Accordingly, the trial court did not clearly err in admitting those statements
at trial after finding that they were freely made.
Next, defendant contends that his due process rights were violated by the police officers’ failure
to electronically record his custodial interrogation. We disagree. To preserve an issue regarding the
admissibility of evidence, the defendant must object below and must specify the same grounds for the
objection as are raised on appeal. MRE 103(a)(1); People v Griffin, 235 Mich App 27, 43-44; 597
NW2d 176 (1999). Defendant concedes that he did not preserve this issue by objecting on these
grounds during the Walker hearing or during trial.
Review of an unpreserved challenge to a trial court’s decision to admit evidence is for plain
error. MRE 103(d); People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 764-766; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). This
Court has previously held that the police are not required to electronically record a custodial
interrogation under the Michigan Constitution. People v Fike, 228 Mich App 178, 183; 577 NW2d
903 (1998). Therefore, defendant has failed to show plain error by the trial court in failing to suppress
defendant’s confession on this ground and he is not entitled to reversal.
Lastly, defendant contends that he is entitled to reversal because the trial court erred in
instructing the jury. We disagree. To preserve an issue regarding jury instructions given by the trial
court, the defendant should make a timely objection at trial. People v Hess, 214 Mich App 33, 36;
543 NW2d 332 (1995). In this case, defendant failed to object to the jury instructions below and, in
fact, defense counsel expressed satisfaction with the trial court’s reading of the instructions. Id.
This Court reviews “jury instructions in their entirety to determine whether error requiring
reversal exists.” People v Mass, 238 Mich App 333, 339; 605 NW2d 322 (1999). “Even if
somewhat imperfect, there is no error if the instructions fairly presented the issues to be tried and
sufficiently protected defendant’s rights.” Id. Defendant’s claim of error involves the trial court’s failure
to instruct the jury on an element of the crime of second-degree CSC.
Second-degree CSC, MCL 750.520(c)(1)(b); MSA 28.788(3)(1)(b), in this case, required the
prosecutor to prove, in pertinent part:
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(b) That other person is at least 13 but less than 16 years of age and any of the
following:
(i) The actor is a member of the same household as the victim.
The jury instructions for second-degree CSC also provide that the trial court should instruct the
jury that it must find that defendant and the victim lived in the same household. CJI2d 20.2, 20.4. The
trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on that factor. This error was plain because both the statute
and the standard jury instruction specifically require a showing that the actor and victim resided in the
same household to support a conviction. MCL 750.520(c)(1)(b); MSA 28.788(3)(1)(b).
Unpreserved, plain errors regarding jury instructions may require reversal if the error affected
the defendant’s substantial rights or if the error seriously affected “the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” Carines, supra at 771-772. Defendant has failed to make such a
showing. As both the prosecutor and defendant note in their appellate briefs, the uncontested evidence
at trial showed that the victim and defendant lived in the same household when defendant had sexual
contact with her. Specifically, the victim testified that she was living in defendant’s trailer when he
touched her breasts. She further stated that the first touching occurred just after April 27, 1997, and
another touching occurred a few days later. The victim and her twelve-year-old brother both testified
that they lived with defendant from August 1996 to sometime in June 1997. Also, the victim’s ten-year
old brother testified that they lived with defendant and that he saw defendant tickling her. Moreover,
the victim’s mother, who appeared on defendant’s behalf, testified that the children lived with defendant,
even though she did not testify regarding the date they moved out.
In short, it is apparent from the record that defendant’s sexual contact with the victim occurred
while she was living with him. There was no conflicting testimony regarding where she was living at the
time and defendant did not contest that fact below or in his appellate brief. Because of this, the
outcome of the trial would not have been different had the trial court correctly read the jury instruction
and defendant has failed to show his substantial rights were affected by the error. Carines, supra at
763-764. Accordingly, he has forfeited this issue by not objecting below. Id. at 772.
Even had defendant established prejudice resulting from this plain instructional error, we would
still not reverse defendant’s conviction. The evidence that the victim resided in the same household as
defendant was overwhelming and the issue was uncontroverted at trial and on appeal. Id. at 766.
Accordingly, the complained-of error neither “resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent
defendant” nor “seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
Id. at 763.
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Janet T. Neff
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