FRANKENMUTH MUTUAL INSUR V DAVID A SCHMIDT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
FRANKENMUTH MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,
UNPUBLISHED
July 21, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 215698
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 98-003057-CZ
DAVID A. SCHMIDT d/b/a SCHMIDT
INDUSTRIES, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
TINA GAGE, ANTHONY GAGE, and GAIL
STAUDACHER,
Defendants.
Before: Whitbeck, P.J., and Hoekstra and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant David A. Schmidt, d/b/a Schmidt Industries, Inc., appeals as of right challenging the
trial court’s order granting plaintiff Frankenmuth Mutual Insurance Company’s motion for summary
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) in this declaratory action. The trial court held that
Frankenmuth had no duty to defend or indemnify Schmidt for liability arising out of suits two his former
employees, Tina Gage1 and Gail Staudacher, filed against him for sexual harassment under the Civil
Rights Act, MCL 37.2103 et seq.; MSA 3.548(103) et seq. We reverse.
1
Anthony Gage is Tina Gage’s husband and his claims are purely derivative. Thus, when we refer to
“Gage” in this opinion, we mean Tina Gage.
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I. Basic Facts And Procedural History
According to Gage, in early March 1994, she and Schmidt were discussing a wage increase of
one dollar per hour when Schmidt said that he had a “proposition” for her. He then reportedly said, “If
you work closer with me, I will give you an additional ten thousand dollars a year and a larger Christmas
bonus.” Gage said that she “didn’t know what he meant. So I asked him to explain. And he said that
if I spent one or two days a week with him, he would give me this extra ten thousand dollars a year and
a Christmas bonus and that he would wear a condom.” Gage quit working for Schmidt following this
incident.
Staudacher’s claims arise from three incidents. When she went into the office on the first
Saturday in January 1993 to do extra work, after she had asked for and received permission from
Schmidt to go into the office that day, she was surprised to see Schmidt there. Then, according to
Staudacher, after she had been working at her desk Schmidt came into her office and
put his arms around me and said, how did you like your Christmas bonus?
And then he started kissing me. And he put his arm around me. And I was
pushing on his shoulders and I told him no. No. Stop.
And he said, didn’t you like your Christmas bonus; wasn’t it enough.
And I was saying, no. Stop. He was kissing me and he stuck his tongue in my
mouth. And he grabbed at the front of my shirt and I kept pushing on him.
And he is my employer. I didn’t think he was at all entitled to do any of this.
So I was just pushing him away and he laughed. And he started walking out.
Staudacher also alleged that, in February 1993, Schmidt intentionally touched her breasts with his hands
while grabbing for a locket that she was wearing on a chain around her neck and that during an April
1993 power outage he put his arm around her neck, as if in a headlock, and said “there is not much you
can do when the power is out.” Having been rebuffed, Staudacher averred, Schmidt began criticizing
her job performance and eventually fired her.
Both Staudacher and Gage sued Schmidt. Staudacher alleged sexual harassment, termination
without just cause, severe emotional distress, and intentional interference with an employment
relationship. Gage made the same claims and additionally asserted that Schmidt constructively
discharged her. Both women alleged that Schmidt manufactured “false and malicious claims regarding
[their] job performance,” but did not specifically state whether Schmidt’s representations were slander
or libel. Schmidt then sought indemnification from Frankenmuth, although the policies in question, an
umbrella policy and a general liability policy, did not expressly cover sexual harassment claims by
employees. Frankenmuth denied coverage relying on contractual exclusions for personal and bodily
injuries.
-2
Frankenmuth then brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment that neither its general
liability nor its umbrella policy afforded Schmidt coverage for Gage and Staudacher’s suits. Specifically,
Frankenmuth claimed that there was no genuine issue of material fact that either claimant suffered a
“bodily” or “personal” injury as a result of any sexual harassment. Moreover, Frankenmuth argued, in
the event that one of the above injuries occurred, the suit would still be barred by an exclusion.
The trial court’s October 1998 opinion and order granting Frankenmuth summary disposition
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) found:
(1) All relevant policies issued by plaintiff to Schmidt Industries were
substantially similar except that the General Liability policy effective 01/04/94 thru
01/04/95 contains an “Employment-Related-Practices Exclusion” not found in the other
policies. Said exclusion excludes coverage for “bodily injury” and “personal injury”
arising out of “coercion, demotion, evaluation, reassignment, discipline, defamation,
harassment, humiliation, discrimination or other employment-related practices, policies,
acts or omissions.” Furthermore, said exclusion was in place only during the incident
alleged by defendant Gage.
(2) There were three (3) distinct policy periods which cover the events alleged
by defendants Gage and Staudacher:
NAME
DATE OF INCIDENT
POLICY PERIOD
Staudacher
Staudacher
Staudacher
Gage
January 2, 1993
February, 1993
April 6, 1993
March 8, 1994
01/04/92 - 01/04/93
01/04/93 - 01/01/94
01/04/93 - 01/04/94
01/04/94 - 01/04/95
The trial court noted that there was coverage only for Gage’s and Staudacher’s claims that Schmidt
made false and malicious representations about their job performances because those injuries fit with the
definition of “personal injury.” However, those claims fell under an exclusion for “personal injuries” in
the general liability policy. Therefore, the trial court held that Frankenmuth had no duty to defend
Schmidt. The trial court also held that David Schmidt and Schmidt Industries did not have separate
interests under the language of the policy.
II. Standard Of Review
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s order granting summary disposition pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(10). Professional Rehabilitation Ass’n v State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co (On
Remand), 228 Mich App 167, 170; 577 NW2d 909 (1998). Likewise, the interpretation of
contractual language is an issue of law that is reviewed de novo on appeal. Morley v Automobile Club
of Michigan, 458 Mich 459, 465; 581 NW2d 237 (1998).
III. Legal Standards
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The appellate court, like the trial court, must view the depositions, affidavits and documentary
evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must make all legitimate inferences in
favor of the nonmoving party. Quinto v Cross & Peters, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314
(1996). When the nonmoving party has the burden of proof at trial, that party may not rest on mere
allegations or denials in the pleadings. MCR 2.116(G)(4). Rather, the party must come forward with
documentary evidence setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Grossheim v Associated Truck Lines, Inc, 181 Mich App 712, 715; 450 NW2d 40 (1989).
As for construing the insurance agreement itself, we take our guidance from the plain language
of the insurance policy and attempt to enforce it as written. Arco Industries Corp v American
Motorists Ins Co, 448 Mich 395, 402; 531 NW2d 168 (1995). We interpret the words of the policy
“in accordance with their ‘commonly used meaning,’” and “take into account the reasonable
expectations of the parties.” Id. at 403.
IV. Coverage Generally
Generally speaking, whether an insurance company must provide a defense in an underlying tort
action depends on the allegations in the complaint and extends to allegations that even arguably come
within the policy coverage. Detroit Edison Co v Michigan Mutual Ins Co, 102 Mich App 136, 142;
301 NW2d 832 (1980). Yet, “the duty to defend and the duty to provide coverage are not
synonymous.” Illinois Employers Ins of Wausau v Dragovich, 139 Mich App 502, 506; 362 NW2d
767 (1984).
[I]t is necessary to focus on the basis for the injury and not the nomenclature of the
underlying claim in order to determine whether coverage exists. Inasmuch as the insurer
must look beyond the precise wording of the allegations in a third party’s complaint
against its insured to determine whether coverage is possible, so must the allegations be
examined to determine the substance, as opposed to the mere form, of the complaint.
[Id. at 507.]
As Frankenmuth notes, in Allstate Insurance v Freeman, 432 Mich 656, 668; 443 NW2d 734
(1989), the Michigan Supreme Court stated that “the proper construction of a contract requires that we
first determine whether coverage exists, and then whether an exclusion precludes coverage.”
V. “Occurrences”
This case involves an umbrella policy, a general liability policy, and an “employment-related
practices” exclusion to the general liability policy that is only relevant if the general liability policy would
otherwise provide coverage for Gage’s suit.2 Coverage under the general liability and the umbrella
policy hinges on whether there was an “occurrence” resulting in “bodily injury” or “personal injury.”
2
This exclusion was only in effect during 1994, when Schmidt allegedly harassed Gage, and does not
apply to Staudacher’s claims. Nor does it affect, to any extent, whether the umbrella policy covers
either woman’s claims.
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Schmidt apparently has never claimed coverage for a “bodily injury,” but instead claims that the alleged
“occurrence” in this case resulted in a potential “personal injury” to Gage or Staudacher. The question,
then, is whether there were one or more “occurrences” resulting in a “personal injury” to Gage or
Staudacher as defined by the policy and without exclusion.
VI. The General Liability Policy
The general liability policy broadly defines an occurrence as “an accident, including continuous
or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.” The general liability policy
does not, however, define an “accident.” Because Frankenmuth argues that it “is hard to imagine” that
Schmidt made statements to or touched Gage and Staudacher in the ways that they claimed he did, it
suggests that our analysis should focus on the “injury-causing act” and that the injury-causing act here
“certainly was not done ‘accidentally.’” Gage and Staudacher both claimed, when describing
Schmidt’s conduct, that Schmidt acted “intentionally.” It is indeed difficult to imagine that such conduct,
if it occurred, was unintentional.
The Michigan Supreme Court recently discussed whether an intentional act can be considered
an accident in Frankenmuth Mutual Ins Co v Masters, 460 Mich 105; 595 NW2d 832 (1999).
Quoting the concurrence in Auto Club Group Ins Co v Marzonie, 447 Mich 624, 527 NW2d 760
(1194) and referring to the dissent in Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co v Piccard, 440 Mich 539; 489
NW2d 422 (1992), the Court noted that “‘an insured need not act unintentionally’ in order for the act
to constitute an ‘accident’ and therefore an ‘occurrence.’” Id. at 115. Thus, an intentional act may still
constitute an “accident” and therefore an “occurrence.” The Masters Court, however, carefully
distinguished between an intentional act with an unintended, harmful result and an intentional act that
leads to leads to an intended, harmful result. Id. at 115-117.
Applying the law to the facts of the case, the Masters Court found that the underlying act, a fire
caused by arson to a clothing store that spread to adjacent buildings, resulted from an act intended to
damage the property. Id. at 107, n 1. The Court concluded that the underlying intentional act could not
be characterized as an “accident,” which it had previously defined as “‘an undesigned contingency, a
casualty, a happening by chance, something out of the usual course of things, unusual, fortuitous, not
anticipated, and not naturally to be expected.’” Id. at 114, quoting Arco, supra at 404-405.
Therefore, there was no “occurrence” for purposes of coverage. Id. at 116.
We give Schmidt the benefit of every reasonable doubt as the nonmovant and do not assume
that Gage and Staudacher will be able to prove that he committed the conduct alleged, including that it
was “intentional.” Quinto, supra at 362. However, if they do prove that he committed the conduct as
alleged, we see no reasonable way to construe the harmful results of that conduct as unintentional.
Consequently, there is no factual basis in the record from which to conclude that the incidents in the
underlying were “accidents,” as is relevant to the definition of the term “occurrence.” Having failed to
come forward with any evidence of a triggering event under the general liability policy, Schmidt cannot
claim that Frankenmuth had a duty to defend or indemnify him under that policy.
-5
VII. The Umbrella Policy
Although similar in many ways, the umbrella policy is different from the general liability policy in
that it defines an occurrence in the context of a “personal injury” as “the commission of any of the
offenses included within” the definition of a “personal injury.” We acknowledge that the umbrella policy
does refer to “accidents” when defining an “occurrence” that results in “bodily injury.” However, as
we stated above, this case does not involve “bodily injury.” Thus, in order to conclude whether the
umbrella policy covers Schmidt, we must determine if any of the underlying allegations fit within the
umbrella policy’s definition of a “personal injury,” which is:
a. False arrest, detention or imprisonment;
b. Malicious prosecution;
c. Wrongful entry into or eviction of a person from, [sic] a room, dwelling or premises
that the person occupies;
d. Oral or written publication or material that slanders or libels a person or organization
or disparages a person’s or organization’s goods, products or services; or
e. Oral or written publication of material that violates a person’s right of privacy;
Arising out of the conduct of your business, excluding advertising, publishing,
broadcasting or telecasting done by or for you.
Quite clearly, neither Gage nor Staudacher’s allegations involve any of the conduct described in
parts (a) through (c), or (e). What is not perfectly certain is whether Gage and Staudacher’s claims that
Schmidt maligned their job performance fits within part (d) because his statements slandered or libeled
their “services.” Part of the problem is the vague nature of their claims, which makes them vulnerable to
a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) in the underlying actions. Though these
allegations are vague, Frankenmuth has not come forward with any evidence to suggest that the facts
surrounding the allegations are so settled that Schmidt’s alleged conduct cannot, in any circumstance, fit
within the “personal injury” definition in part (d). As we said in Detroit Edison, supra at 142, “The
duty to defend cannot be limited by the precise language of the pleadings.” In this case, this rule may be
restated to the effect that the duty to defend cannot be limited by the imprecise language of the
pleadings. The insurer still has a duty to look at the substance of the claims, which, in this case, appear
to be some sort of libel or slander. Id. Accordingly, the umbrella policy does appear to provide
coverage.
The next question is whether any of the express exclusions for personal injuries apply here. The
umbrella policy states it does not apply to “personal injury”:
(1) Arising out of oral or written publication of material, if done by or at the direction of
the insured with knowledge of its falsity;
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(2) Arising out of oral or written publication of material whose first publication took
place before the beginning of the policy period;
(3) Arising out of the willful violation of a penal statute or ordinance committed by or
with the consent of the insured; or
(4) For which the insured has assumed liability in a contract or agreement. This
exclusion does not apply to liability for damages that the insured would have in the
absence of the contract or agreement.
Because Frankenmuth goes down what we consider to be the wrong path in arguing that the exclusions
for bodily injuries apply in this case, it has not identified which of these provisions it would contend
excuse it from indemnifying or defending Schmidt in a suit involving personal injuries. The only exclusion
that we see that might fit in this case is part (1). Yet, as Schmidt points out in his brief on appeal, there
is no record evidence from which we could conclude that any of his allegedly false or malicious
representations about Gage or Staudacher were made while Schmidt knew they were false. Again, part
of the problem with producing evidence on this issue s the vagueness of Gage and Staudacher’s
i
allegations. However, that only suggests that Frankenmuth will have little problem defending against
those allegations, or little probability of being in a position where it will have to indemnify Schmidt
because of liability for those allegations.
The absence of evidence on this issue does not lead to any presumption that the exclusion
applies. Although applied as clearly written, courts construe exclusions strictly against the insurer. See
Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co v Moore, 190 Mich App 115, 118; 475 NW2d 375 (1991). Furthermore,
Frankenmuth, as the movant, clearly had the burden of providing evidence that would settle the facts
showing that this exclusion did apply before the trial court could grant summary disposition in its favor.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred when it determined that Frankenmuth does not have
to defend or indemnify Schmidt in the underlying actions.
Reversed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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