PEOPLE OF MI V LUAY DAWOOD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 7, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 213630
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 97-501864
LUAY DAWOD,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Collins and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his jury trial convictions of third-degree criminal sexual
conduct, MCL 750.520d(1)(b); MSA 28.788(4)(1)(b), and two counts of assault with intent to commit
criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520g; MSA 28.788(7). Defendant was sentenced to concurrent
terms of two to fifteen years’ imprisonment for the third-degree criminal sexual conduct conviction and
one to ten years’ imprisonment for each assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct conviction.
We affirm.
Defendant first contends that the prosecutor’s remarks in closing argument constituted error
mandating reversal. We disagree. This Court reviews issues of prosecutorial misconduct on a case by
case basis, the remarks of the prosecutor to be evaluated in context to determine if defendant was
denied a fair and impartial trial. People v Noble, 238 Mich App 647, 660; ___ NW2d ___ (1999).
However, absent a miscarriage of justice, appellate review of alleged instances of prosecutorial
misconduct is precluded if the defendant failed to make a timely objection because the trial court is
otherwise deprived of the opportunity to cure the error. People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687; 521
NW2d 557 (1994).
Defendant, a Chaldean immigrant, contends that the prosecutor improperly referenced his
ethnicity. He asserts that the prosecutor attacked his credibility by implying that witnesses of similar
heritage were purposely uncooperative with investigating police officers in order to help defendant. At
trial, the ethnicity of defendant and others was elicited in the following manner: Defendant testified that
he is Chaldean and had been in the United States for four years prior to trial. Defendant also testified
that complainant’s coworker at the market where the alleged assault occurred, Sam, is a friend of his
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and is also an Iraqi immigrant. Finally, defendant testified that the Chaldean community is very close
knit and stated that Chaldeans help each other out.
In addition, evidence was introduced at trial which demonstrated that defendant’s acquaintances
were, at a minimum, uncooperative in the investigation, and may have actually obstructed the
investigation. Specifically, Officer Michael Gerard interviewed Sam and the store owner, Freddy, who
is also Chaldean. Both denied that there were surveillance cameras in the store. However, it was later
determined that the market was, in fact, equipped with surveillance cameras. Officer Jeffrey Watson
also testified that Sam was uncooperative during his investigation and did not inform him of the presence
of surveillance cameras in the market. Moreover, despite their purported friendship, Sam could not
provide defendant’s last name.
A prosecutor may make comments that are supported by the evidence. Id. at 686. In this
case, the contested statements were all based on credible evidence introduced at trial. Accordingly,
while we are disturbed that the prosecutor felt the need to reference the Chaldean heritage of these
principal witnesses in making the point that defendant's acquaintances were uncooperative, we find no
error mandating reversal under the circumstances. It is clear that any prejudicial effect stemming from
the prosecutor's unnecessary references to ethnicity could have been cured by a cautionary instruction
had defendant not failed to object to the alleged misconduct at trial. Id. at 687. On this record, we
conclude that defendant was not denied a fair and impartial trial.
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in not granting him a new trial based on the
ethnic remarks of the prosecutor. A new trial may be granted on a ground which would support
reversal on appeal or because the verdict resulted in a miscarriage of justice. MCR 6.431(B); People v
Leonard, 224 Mich App 569, 580; 569 NW2d 663 (1997); see also MCL 770.1; MSA 28.1098.
Because the prosecutor’s comments were based on permissible inferences drawn from the evidence
and defendant was not denied his right to a fair and impartial trial, he is not entitled to a new trial. The
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for a new trial. People v Daoust,
228 Mich App 1, 16; 577 NW2d 179 (1998).
Finally, defendant contends that the trial court erred in not allowing defense counsel to argue
that complainant reported an indecent exposure complaint, rather than a rape complaint, when she
called the police. We again disagree.
Defense counsel may not make a statement of fact to the jury that is not supported by the
evidence or constitutes an improper use of the evidence. People v Fisher, 193 Mich App 284, 291;
483 NW2d 452 (1992). Here, the trial court correctly ruled that complainant never testified that she
informed the police she had been the victim of indecent exposure. Rather, two of the investigating
police officers testified that they were told by the dispatcher that they were to respond to a possible
indecent exposure complaint. The statement cannot be attributed to the complainant, especially given
the absence of testimony from the dispatcher. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
restricting defense counsel’s closing argument to relevant, admissible evidence.
Affirmed.
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/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Jeffrey G. Collins
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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