PEOPLE OF MI V JERELL ARMSTRONG
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 20, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 210724
Wayne Circuit Court
Criminal Division
LC No. 97-002323
JERELL ARMSTRONG,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Sawyer and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a joint trial by separate juries, defendant was convicted, on an aiding and abetting
theory, of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317; MSA 28.549, and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2), and his codefendant, James Quarles, was
acquitted. Defendant was sentenced to twenty to forty years’ imprisonment for the second-degree
murder conviction to be served consecutive to a two-year term for the felony-firearm conviction.
Defendant now appeals as of right. We affirm.
I
Defendant first argues that the jury verdict was against the great weight of the evidence and that
he is entitled to a new trial. Defendant did not preserve this issue by moving for a new trial below and,
therefore, we need not address the issue absent manifest injustice. People v Noble, 238 Mich App
647, 658; 608 NW2d 123 (1999), citing People v Winters, 225 Mich App 718, 729; 571 NW2d
764 (1997). Testimony of several eyewitnesses as well as defendant’s statement to the police
supported the verdict. The evidence suggests defendant and Quarles approached the victim when they
saw him chasing two other young men. Defendant admitted handing Quarles the sawed-off shotgun he
was carrying and telling Quarles to shoot the victim. Several eyewitnesses testified Quarles then shot
and killed the victim. Although several witnesses testified defendant and Quarles were present at a
friend’s house on the date of the murder, the evidence did not clearly weigh in defendant’s favor. From
the evidence presented, the jury could reasonably determine that Quarles committed second-degree
murder, defendant performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted the commission of the crime and
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that defendant intended the commission of the crime or had knowledge that Quarles intended its
commission at the time he gave aid and encouragement. The evidence likewise supported a finding that
defendant aided and abetted in the commission of felony-firearm, by supplying Quarles the shotgun.
See People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 757-758; 597 NW2d 130 (1999); People v Johnson, 411
Mich 50, 54; 303 NW2d 442 (1981). Consequently, manifest injustice will not result from our failure
to review this issue or to remand for a hearing on the issue.
II
Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow witness Rose
Myles to testify at trial. We disagree. Defendant first requested that the trial court endorse Myles as a
witness on the fourth day of trial. Defendant claimed Myles’ testimony would bolster the testimony of
an alibi witness. We review a trial court’s decision to allow the late endorsement of a witness for an
abuse of discretion. People v Gadomski, 232 Mich App 24, 32-33; 592 NW2d 75 (1998); People v
Canter, 197 Mich App 550, 563; 496 NW2d 336 (1992). An abuse of discretion exists when the
court’s decision is so grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences perversity of will, defiance of
judgment, and the exercise of passion or bias, or, stated differently, when an unprejudiced person,
considering the facts on which the trial court acted, would say there was no justification or excuse for
the ruling. Gadomski, supra at 33; People v Ullah, 216 Mich App 669, 673; 550 NW2d 568
(1996).
Here, defendant failed to comply with MCR 6.201(A)(1), and with the discovery order entered
by the trial court, by disclosing that he intended to call Myles at trial. No explanation was offered for
defendant’s failure to disclose this witness. Moreover, Myles’ testimony that she dropped off two
acquaintances of defendant at a house where defendant claims to have been at the time of the murders
and saw two Asian girls near the house would have been cumulative to other witnesses’ testimony that
the two acquaintances and the Asian girls were present at the house on the night in question. Therefore,
we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Myles’ testimony. See MCR
6.201(J).1
III
Finally, defendant argues that he was denied a fair and impartial trial due to the alleged
mischaracterization of a witness’ testimony by the trial court and the prosecutor. Defendant did not
object to the comments of the trial court and prosecutor at trial and, therefore, this issue is not
preserved for appellate review. See People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687; 521 NW2d 557
(1994); People v Cooper, 236 Mich App 643, 650; 601 NW2d 409 (1999); People v Sardy, 216
Mich App 111, 117-118; 549 NW2d 23 (1996). Defendant has not established that he was
prejudiced by the alleged errors such that the outcome of the lower court proceedings was affected.
Any prejudice resulting from the prosecution’s alleged improper statement could have been cured by a
1
To the extent Myles, herself, could be considered an alibi witness, it was not error to exclude her
testimony given defendant failed to comply with MCL 768.21(1); MSA 28.1044(1), which requires a
defendant to notify the prosecution in writing of the names of alibi witnesses.
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cautionary instruction. Stanaway, supra at 687; Cooper, supra at 650.
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Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to a reversal of his convictions on the basis of this unpreserved
issue. Carines, supra at 763-767, 774.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
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