PEOPLE OF MI V THADIS LAMARR SPARKS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 13, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 211455
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 97-001793-FC
THADIS LAMARR SPARKS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Markey, P.J., and Gribbs and Griffin, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of armed robbery, MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797,
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2), felon in
possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f; MSA 28.421(6), and carrying a concealed weapon, MCL
750.227; MSA 28.424. He was sentenced as a second habitual offender, MCL 769.10; MSA
28.1082, to concurrent prison terms of eight to twenty years for the armed robbery conviction, forty to
sixty months for the felon in possession of a firearm conviction, forty to sixty months for the carrying a
concealed weapon conviction, and a consecutive two-year term for the felony-firearm conviction.
Defendant appeals by right. We affirm.
I
Defendant first argues that the trial court clearly erred in refusing to grant his motion to suppress
the evidence found in his safe on the ground that the police seized the safe illegally when an officer lifted
it momentarily and its top fell open, revealing its incriminating contents. We disagree. A trial court’s
ruling regarding a motion to suppress evidence as illegally seized will not be reversed on appeal unless
the ruling is clearly erroneous. People v Stevens, 460 Mich 626, 630; 597 NW2d 53 (1999); People
v Hampton, 237 Mich App 143, 148; 603 NW2d 270 (1999); see, also, People v Goforth, 222
Mich App 306, 310; 564 NW2d 526 (1997) (the validity of consent is reviewed for clear error).
However, the application of a constitutional standard to uncontested facts is reviewed de novo as a
question of law on appeal. Stevens, supra at 630-631; Goforth, supra at 310 n 4.
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Both the federal and state constitutions guarantee the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. US Const, Am IV; Const 1963, art 1, § 11; People v Zahn, 234 Mich App 438, 446; 594
NW2d 120 (1999). The lawfulness of a seizure or a search depends on its reasonableness. People v
Armendarez, 188 Mich App 61, 66; 468 NW2d 893 (1991). Generally, a search and seizure
conducted without a warrant is unreasonable per se unless there exist both probable cause and a
circumstance establishing an exception to the warrant requirement. People v Borchard-Ruhland, 460
Mich 278, 293-294; 597 NW2d 1 (1999); People v Mayes (After Remand), 202 Mich App 181,
184; 508 NW2d 161 (1993).
The arguments of the parties and the trial court’s decision primarily concern whether Williamson
had authority to consent to the seizure and search of defendant’s safe. “The consent exception to the
warrant requirement allows a search and seizure when consent is unequivocal, specific, and freely and
intelligently given.” People v Marsack, 231 Mich App 364, 378; 586 NW2d 234 (1998). Generally,
one may consent to a search of himself, his property, or premises. Goforth, supra at 309.
Additionally, a third party who shares common authority over property may consent to its search. Id. at
311-312. Common authority is defined as follows:
Common authority is, of course, not to be implied from the mere property
interest a third party has in the property. The authority which justifies the third-party
consent . . . rests rather on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint
access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the
co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others
have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be
searched. [Id., quoting United States v Matlock, 415 US 164, 171 n 7; 94 S Ct 988;
39 L Ed 2d 242 (1974).]
Further, a warrantless search may be valid where the circumstances are such that the police reasonably
believe that the third party possesses common authority over the premises or property to be searched.
Goforth, supra at 312, quoting Illinois v Rodriguez, 497 US 177, 179, 189; 110 S Ct 2793; 111 L
Ed 2d 148 (1990).
We agree with defendant that the police could not rely on Williamson’s consent to search
defendant’s safe . Although the police obtained Williamson’s express consent to search her house and
were aware that defendant had been staying there, they also knew the safe was defendant’s personal
property. Although Williamson told the police that she moved the safe because it was in her way, she
did not state or imply that she had looked in the safe or had defendant’s permission to do so.
Moreover, the record indicates that defendant had kept the safe closed, albeit unlocked. Based on
these facts and the intrinsic nature of the safe as a private, secure place intended for valuables and other
personal effects, we find that the police could not have believed reasonably that Williamson had
common authority over the safe such that she could permit a search of it. At the very least, the police
were obligated to make further inquiry into Williamson’s ability to validly consent to a search of the safe
because the circumstances were such that a reasonable person would question Williamson’s power or
control over it. See id.; see, also, People v Gary, 150 Mich App 446, 452; 387 NW2d 877 (1986).
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Thus, to the extent the trial court’s decision on the suppression issue was premised on the consent
doctrine, it was incorrect.
Nevertheless, we believe that the parties and the trial court misapprehended the basic,
controlling issue. The trial court found that Officer James Santa merely moved defendant’s safe when its
door popped open, revealing its contents. Defendant argues that Officer Santa’s initial act of moving
the safe constituted a “seizure” for constitutional purposes, and thus, in the absence of Williamson’s
power to consent to the police action, it was necessary for the police to obtain a warrant permitting the
seizure. However, for constitutional purposes, a seizure occurs “when there is some meaningful
interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.” United States v Jacobsen, 466
US 109, 113; 104 S Ct 1652; 80 L Ed 2d 85 (1984) (emphasis added).1 Defendant cannot plausibly
assert that Officer Santa “seized” the safe in constitutional parlance when he merely picked it up to
move it, and its door fell open. At that point, there had been no meaningful interference with
defendant’s property interest in the safe. See Arizona v Hicks, 480 US 321, 324; 107 S Ct 1149; 94
L Ed 2d 347 (1987) (no meaningful interference with property interest where police merely recorded
serial numbers from stolen property). Thus, there was no seizure of the safe and its contents when
Santa originally moved it.
Once the safe fell open inadvertently, the police were not required to ignore its contents, which,
according to the record, could be viewed easily from outside the safe without disturbing them. The
police were able to view the contents of the safe from a lawful vantage point pursuant to Williamson’s
authorization to search her house. Defendant’s safe being open to view, it was permissible for the
police to glance inside it. See People v Champion, 452 Mich 92, 101-102; 549 NW2d 849 (1996)
(“It would be unreasonably inconvenient to require the police, once they have made a valid intrusion and
have discovered probable evidence in plain view, to leave, obtain a warrant, and return to resume a
process already in progress.”).
Thereafter, the police acted reasonably by securing defendant’s safe until a search warrant
could be obtained because they would have acted reasonably had they searched the safe at the scene.
The exigent circumstances exception to the general warrant requirement allows a warrantless entry and
search where the police have probable cause to believe the area to be searched contains evidence of a
crime and specific and objective facts indicate that immediate action is necessary to prevent the
imminent destruction of evidence and/or to protect the police officers or others. People v Snider, 239
Mich App 393, 408; 608 NW2d 502 (2000), quoting In re Forfeiture of $176,598, 443 Mich 261,
271; 505 NW2d 201 (1993). In light of all the circumstances, including their legal view into the safe,
we find that the police had probable cause, or a substantial basis, to believe a search of the safe would
uncover evidence of the armed robbery. See Snider, supra at 406-407. Further, exigent
circumstances justified the police to act immediately. The safe was unlocked and located in
Williamson’s house. Although the police lacked a reason to arrest Williamson for the armed robbery,
1
Absent a compelling reason to impose a different interpretation, the Michigan Constitution is construed
to provide the same protection as that secured by the Fourth Amendment. People v Levine, 461 Mich
172, 178; 600 NW2d 622 (1999).
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they had no way of knowing whether she would attempt to remove and destroy the evidence contained
in the safe, or, indeed, whether she would obtain the gun from the safe and use it against the officers in
her home. Further, the record indicates that Williamson had young children who could enter the
unlocked safe and obtain the gun. Thus, the exigent circumstances exception would have justified an
immediate, warrantless search of the safe at the scene. Id. at 408. Moreover, it was reasonable for the
police to take the less drastic route of securing the safe in order to obtain a search warrant before
conducting a full-scale search. See Champion, supra at 115-117 (where police have probable cause
to arrest and conduct full-scale search of arrestee, failure of police to arrest does not negate validity of
full-scale search). Although the trial court decided against suppression on an incorrect basis, we find
that because it reached the right decision, we affirm its decision. See People v Rodriguez, 236 Mich
App 568, 574; 601 NW2d 134 (1999).
II
Next, defendant argues that admission of Emily Catanese’s testimony was improper because it
violated MCL 775.7; MSA 28.1244, which forbids the prosecutor from paying fees to witnesses on
behalf of the people in any prosecution, except in certain circumstances. We disagree.
The primary goal of judicial interpretation of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intent
of the Legislature. People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 658; 521 NW2d 557 (1994). In determining
the intent of the Legislature, the first criterion is the specific language of the statute. Borchard-Ruhland,
supra at 284. “The fair and natural import of the terms employed, in view of the subject matter of the
law, is what should govern.” People v Morey, 461 Mich 325, 330; 603 NW2d 250 (1999), quoting
People ex rel Twitchell v Blodgett, 13 Mich 127, 168 (1865) (Cooley, J.). If the plain and ordinary
meaning of the language is clear, judicial construction is normally neither necessary nor permitted.
Morey, supra.
Turning to the statute, we do not find that it prohibits prosecutors from entering into plea
agreements with witnesses in exchange for testimony. MCL 775.7; MSA 28.1244 clearly contemplates
the procedure by which the court may pay certain witnesses for the prosecution�the poor and those
who have traveled from other states, territories, and countries�to alleviate the financial burden of
appearing in court to testify. In the event that a witness qualifies for such a payment, the court may enter
an order directing the county treasurer to pay the witness a reasonable sum for the expenses. Finally,
the statute directs, “no fees shall be allowed or paid to witnesses on the part of the people in any
criminal proceeding or prosecution except as is provided in this section and act.” Within the context of
the statue and according to its natural meaning, the word “fee” clearly means a monetary payment in
exchange for services. See Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1992).2 Thus, the statute
in question neither forbids nor even considers prosecutorial plea agreements in exchange for testimony.
Moreover, we read the language of a statute in light of previously established rules of common
law, including common law adjudicatory principles. Nummer v Dep’t of Treasury, 448 Mich 534,
2
A court may consult dictionary definitions when interpreting a statute. Morey, supra.
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544; 533 NW2d 250 (1995). We doubt highly that, by enacting MCL 775.7; MSA 28.1244, the
Legislature intended to prohibit by mere implication the longstanding practice of granting prosecutorial
leniency to witnesses in exchange for their testimony. Accordingly, we reject defendant’s argument that
MCL 775.7; MSA 28.1244 prohibited the prosecutor from granting Catanese leniency in exchange for
her testimony against defendant.
III
Next, defendant argues that the statute under which he was convicted for being a felon in
possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f; MSA 28.421(6), unconstitutionally violates Const 1963, art 1,
§ 6, which guarantees the “right to keep and bear arms.” However, at least two panels of this Court
have addressed this issue and found that the felon-in-possession statute is a reasonable exercise of the
state’s police power and, thus, not violative of the Michigan Constitution. People v Green, 228 Mich
App 684, 692; 580 NW2d 444 (1998); People v Swint, 225 Mich App 353, 375; 572 NW2d 666
(1997). Thus, defendant’s claim is without merit.
Defendant also argues cursorily that he was prejudiced because the jury was told that he had
been convicted of a prior felony. Defendant agreed to stipulate that he had been convicted of a prior,
unnamed felony; the jury was instructed accordingly. We will not allow defendant to assign error on
appeal to something his own counsel deemed proper. Green, supra at 691.
IV
Finally, defendant argues that he was denied a fair trial because the prosecutor impermissibly
commented to the jury that defense counsel was not truthful. Because defendant failed to object to the
allegedly improper comments, appellate review is precluded unless any prejudicial effect could not have
been cured by a cautionary instruction, or unless our failure to consider the issue would result in a
miscarriage of justice. People v Cooper, 236 Mich App 643, 650; 601 NW2d 409 (1999). Reading
the prosecutor’s comments in context, as is our practice, People v Kennebrew, 220 Mich App 601,
608; 560 NW2d 354 (1996), we find that they were made as a proper response to defense counsel’s
closing argument. Further, a timely requested curative instruction would have cured any prejudicial
effect the prosecutor’s comments may have had. Accordingly, appellate relief is not warranted.
We affirm.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
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