PEOPLE OF MI V DENNIS LEE STICKLER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 9, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 214590
St. Clair Circuit Court
LC No. 98-000478-FH
DENNIS LEE STICKLER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Gribbs, P.J., and Hoekstra and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of unarmed robbery, MCL 750.530; MSA
28.798. He was sentenced to 270 days in jail and two years’ probation. Defendant appeals as of right.
We affirm.
Defendant argues that under either a sufficiency of the evidence standard or the great weight of
the evidence standard, his conviction should be vacated and his case remanded for entry of a judgment
of acquittal or, in the alternative, a new trial should be ordered. We disagree.
Due process requires that the prosecution introduce evidence sufficient to justify a trier of fact in
concluding that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Johnson, 460 Mich 720,
723; 597 NW2d 73 (1999). When determining whether sufficient evidence has been presented to
sustain a conviction, this Court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and
determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.; People v Godbold, 230 Mich App 508, 522; 585 NW2d 13
(1998). This Court reviews a trial court's determination that a verdict was not against the great weight
of the evidence for an abuse of discretion. People v Brown, 239 Mich App 735, 744-745; __ NW2d
__ (2000). “[A] trial court may grant a motion for a new trial based on the great weight of the evidence
only if the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict so that it would be a miscarriage of justice
to allow the verdict to stand.” People v Gadomski, 232 Mich App 24, 28; 592 NW2d 75 (1998).
Michigan’s unarmed robbery statute provides:
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Any person who shall, by force and violence, or by assault or putting in fear, feloniously
rob, steal and take from the person of another, or in his presence, any money or other
property which may be the subject of larceny, such robber not being armed with a
dangerous weapon, shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state
prison not more than 15 years. [MCL 750.530; MSA 28.798.]
To be convicted of unarmed robbery, the prosecution is required to prove each of the following
essential elements: (1) a felonious taking of property from another, (2) by force, violence, or assault or
putting in fear, and (3) being unarmed. Id.; see People v Reeves, 458 Mich 236, 242; 580 NW2d 433
(1998); People v Chandler, 201 Mich App 611, 614; 506 NW2d 882 (1993).
Defendant’s argument on appeal is narrow. Relying on People v Tinsley, 176 Mich App 119;
439 NW2d 313 (1989), defendant contends that a “taking” could not have occurred, and therefore
defendant could not have been found guilty of unarmed robbery, because he had not reached a
temporary place of safety before the Kmart store loss control employees detained him. Defendant’s
reliance is misplaced.
Although Michigan views robbery as a continuous offense that is not complete until the
perpetrator reaches a place of temporary safety, Tinsley, supra at 121-122, that is not to say that a
taking is not complete until the perpetrator has accomplished his escape. Rather, “the use of force or
intimidation in retaining the property taken or in attempting to escape rather than in taking the property
itself is sufficient to supply the element of force or coercion essential to the offense of robbery.” Id.
Contrary to defendant’s reasoning, we are convinced that the Tinsley line of cases merely stands for the
proposition that a robbery may begin with a taking and end after the perpetrator reaches a place of
temporary safety, for purposes of determining the crime(s) to be charged, but that the essential elements
of the robbery may be completed before the escape. See People v Turner, 120 Mich App 23; 328
NW2d 5 (1982);1 see also People v Gimotty, 216 Mich App 254; 549 NW2d 39 (1996). In other
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In Turner, supra at 28, 29, this Court explained:
[R]obbery is . . . a continuous offense: it is not complete until the perpetrators
reach temporary safety. As such, while the essential elements were completed, the
offense continued during the escape. The evidence is, therefore, sufficient to convict
[defendant] of armed robbery as an aider and abettor because she helped hide the
money during the escape.
***
Superficially this reasoning seems to be contradictory. On the one hand, a
criminal is guilty of a completed robbery and not merely of an attempt if he moves the
stolen goods a short distance. On the other hand, the crime is continuous and not
completed until the parties have reached temporary safety. Thus, a person who aids
during an escape is guilty as an aider and abettor although the crime has apparently
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words, reaching a place of temporary safety may extend the offense enhancement period, but is not an
essential element of any specific robbery crime. See Turner, supra. Thus, we conclude that it was
unnecessary for defendant to have reached a place of temporary safety to be charged with and
convicted of unarmed robbery.
With regard to the sufficiency of the evidence, we find defendant’s argument without merit.
Viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence that defendant took a pack of
cigarettes from a display case inside the Kmart store, put it in his pocket, left the store without paying
for the cigarettes, and when confronted by store security struck one of them several times and
attempted to flee established facts from which a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements
of unarmed robbery were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See Johnson, supra. Likewise, on this
record, there is no credible argument that the great weight of the evidence presented at trial militated
against defendant’s conviction for unarmed robbery. We are convinced that the evidence in the present
case did not preponderate so heavily against defendant’s guilty verdict that it would be a miscarriage of
justice to allow the verdict to stand, and thus the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
defendant’s motion for new trial. Brown, supra.
Affirmed.
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Jane E. Markey
concluded. Although these two legal principles may seem to create a double-edged
sword, they do not. Just because a completed escape is not a necessary element of the
offense does not preclude it from being a part of it. [Citations omitted.]
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