RANDY BLOCK V BYRON CENTER PUBLIC SCHOOLS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
RANDY BLOCK, Personal Representative of the
Estate of GERALD CRANE, and BYRON CENTER
EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,
UNPUBLISHED
May 26, 2000
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v
BYRON CENTER PUBLIC SCHOOLS and
BYRON CENTER PUBLIC SCHOOLS BOARD
OF EDUCATION,
No. 218945
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 99-000777-CK
Defendants-Appellants.
Before: Doctoroff, P.J., and Sawyer and Cavanagh, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this breach of contract action, defendants appeal as of right the trial court order granting
summary disposition for plaintiffs pursuant to MCR 2.116(I)(2). We affirm.
I
In their first issue, defendants argue that the trial court erroneously considered matters outside
the record. This presents a question of law that is subject to de novo review. See Teadt v Lutheran
Church Missouri Synod, 237 Mich App 567, 574; 603 NW2d 816 (1999).
After reviewing both the trial court’s opinion and the lower court record, we find no error
requiring reversal. A court is not prohibited from including facts outside the record in its opinion in
order to provide context, as long as its ultimate decision is based only on facts contained in the record.
See, e.g., Syrkowski v Appleyard, 420 Mich 367, 369, n 2; 362 NW2d 211 (1985). For purposes
of this case, the trial court’s conclusion that summary disposition for plaintiffs was proper could be
based only on the pleadings.
Defendants assert that the court’s conclusion that the parties’ contract was predominately a
promise to pay for past performance was improperly based on facts outside the record. Defendants
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maintain that “[o]nly by adding these non-record facts could the court come to its conclusions that,” for
defendants, a key benefit of the agreement between defendants and Gerald Crane was Crane’s
resignation and that defendants continued to benefit despite Crane’s death.
However, the pivotal fact upon which the trial court based its conclusion was that Crane’s
resignation had already taken place, a fact that was included in the complaint. The trial court’s
references to defendants’ apparent motives, Crane’s sexual orientation, and the events leading to
Crane’s resignation are merely contextual and do not alter in any way the fact that Crane had resigned.
It is apparent from a simple perusal of the settlement agreement between defendants and Crane that a
“key benefit” to defendants was the immediate and permanent cessation of Crane’s employment with
defendants. Specifically, the agreement provided that Crane’s resignation would be effective
immediately and that Crane would not apply for employment with defendants in the future. Because the
trial court’s conclusion that the decedent’s resignation was a benefit to defendants was amply supported
by the record, the trial court’s extraneous explanation of why it was a benefit to defendants does not
require reversal.
II
Next, defendants argue that the trial court erred in denying their motion for summary disposition.
Defendants assert that their obligation to pay Crane’s salary ended when Crane died because Crane
was no longer able to seek alternate employment, as required by the parties’ agreement.
A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim
by the pleadings alone. This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) to determine whether the claims are so clearly unenforceable
as a matter of law that no factual development could possibly justify recovery. All factual allegations
supporting the claim, and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the facts, are accepted as
true. Smith v Stolberg, 231 Mich App 256, 258; 586 NW2d 103 (1998).
We conclude that defendants’ argument fails because, under the parties’ agreement, the
consideration for their obligation to make salary payments was not Crane’s promise to make good-faith
efforts to obtain employment during the applicable period. Paragraph 6 of the agreement provides:
In consideration of the salary and insurance continuation stated above, Mr. Crane, on
behalf of himself, his heirs and all those who might claim through him, agrees to waive
and release any and all claims, except as specifically stated in paragraphs 4 and 5
above, which he has or may have, known or unknown, against the Byron Center School
District, its Board of Education members, its administrators, employees and/or agents.
This release includes, but is not limited to, all claims for discrimination, breach of
contract, interference with contract, libel, slander, or violation of statutory or
constitutional rights.
Thus, the contract specifically identifies Crane’s waiver of any and all claims against defendants
as the consideration for defendants’ payment of Crane’s salary and insurance. Because the agreement
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binds both Crane and his heirs, Crane’s death terminates neither the detriments nor the benefits of the
parties’ bargain. Accordingly, defendants’ obligation to make the salary payments, as set forth in the
agreement, did not end with Crane’s death, and the trial court properly denied defendants’ motion for
summary disposition. See id.
III
Defendants further contend that the trial court erred entering judgment for plaintiffs without
affording them an opportunity to file an answer and present its affirmative defenses. We disagree.
Instead of filing an answer to plaintiffs’ complaint, defendants opted to file a motion for summary
disposition. By doing so, defendants opened the door for the trial court to render judgment on plaintiffs’
complaint pursuant to MCR 2.116(I)(2). We have already determined that the trial court did not err in
finding that plaintiffs were entitled to summary disposition. Defendants have not identified, either in the
trial court or on appeal, any crucial facts or applicable defenses of which the trial court was unaware
when it rendered its decision. Accordingly, reversal is not warranted.
IV
Finally, defendants argue that they are entitled to a new judge on remand. However, we have
not found that remand is required. We briefly note, however, that even if remand were necessary, we
would not find that disqualification of the trial judge is warranted, as the record is devoid of any
indication of actual bias or prejudice. See B & B Investment Group v Gitler, 229 Mich App 1, 17
18; 581 NW2d 17 (1998).
Affirmed.
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
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