PEOPLE OF MI V EURAL KIRKSEY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 26, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 211356
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 97-005734
EURAL KIRKSEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Meter, P.J., and Griffin and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right from his conviction, following a bench trial, of attempted larceny
from a motor vehicle, MCL 750.356a; MSA 28.588(1); MCL 750.92; MSA 28.287. The trial court
sentenced him to six to thirty months in prison. We remand for further findings of fact.
This case arises from the carjacking of a Chevrolet Astro van owned by Lawrence Houston on
July 14, 1997. Houston had just finished pumping gas at a gas station located at 17707 Plymouth Road
in Detroit when his van was stolen by two males. Later that evening, two Detroit police officers spotted
defendant attempting to remove the tires of the van in the backyard of a house at 9101 Norcross Street
in Detroit. The officers apprehended defendant at this time.
At trial, defendant claimed that he did not know the van was stolen when he attempted to
remove the tires. He claimed that he was approached by two men in the Astro van while he was visiting
a friend and that he agreed to switch the vans’ tires with the tires of another vehicle in exchange for
money. Additionally, defendant denied taking part in the carjacking; he testified that he had not been at
17707 Plymouth Road on July 14, 1997.
At the conclusion of the trial, the court set forth its findings and conclusions as follows:
THE COURT: The Court finds that the defendant Kirksey was at 17707
Plymouth Street [sic, Road], in the City of Detroit, on July 14th, 1997.
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MR. SKYWALKER [THE PROSECUTOR]: Judge, if that’s your finding,
we would ask that you consider that it was a continuous transaction that went to
9101 Norcross.
THE COURT: All right. And also 9101 Norcross. While at that address, he
did attempt to commit the offense of larceny from a motor vehicle. The police officers
who testified at the trial said that they saw the defendant attempting to remove a tire
from a motor vehicle that was owned by Mr. Lawrence Houston. He did not have Mr.
Houston’s permission to do so. The defendant Kirksey intended to commit the crime of
attempted larceny from a motor vehicle. He committed an overt act necessary to
commit that crime by laying on the ground with the necessary tools, near the tire, and
had already removed a hubcap from the tire. The defendant attempted an unlawful –
attempted to unlawfully remove the tires from the 1987 Chevy Astro van that belonged
to Mr. Lawrence Houston. Therefore, the Court finds the defendant guilty of attempt to
commit a larceny from a motor vehicle. [Emphasis added.]
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in finding that defendant was present at 17707 Plymouth
Road on July 14, 1997. We review a trial court’s findings of fact for clear error. People v Everard,
225 Mich App 455, 458; 571 NW2d 536 (1997). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if, after
reviewing the entire record, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made. Id.
We agree with defendant that the trial court clearly erred in finding that defendant was present at
17707 Plymouth Road on July 14, 1997. Indeed, not one witness testified that defendant was present
at the gas station on the day of the carjacking. While it is true that defendant’s alibi for July 14, 1997
was somewhat suspect, and while defendant was the same race and height as one of the carjackers
spotted at the gas station by Mr. Houston, those facts alone were insufficient to support a finding that
defendant was present at the gas station on the day in question. Moreover, after Houston was
questioned about whether he had previously identified defendant as one of the carjackers, the trial court
stated:
It’s the Court’s understanding that the question is: “Did you identify the
defendant as being at the car-jacking?” And this Court feels that it’s irrelevant whether
or not Mr. Kirksey was at the car-jacking. He’s not being charged with having had
anything to do at the car-jacking scene, so therefore it’s irrelevant. Therefore, the
Court will . . . disallow the question as being irrelevant.
Because the court itself precluded questioning regarding defendant’s presence at the carjacking scene,
and because no evidence supported a finding that defendant was indeed involved with or present during
the carjacking, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake in
finding that “defendant Kirksey was at 17707 Plymouth Street, in the City of Detroit, on July 14th,
1997.”
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We note that because the trial court itself precluded questioning about defendant’s presence at
the carjacking scene, it is possible that the trial c
ourt misspoke itself in finding that defendant was
present at 17707 Plymouth Road on the day in question. From this record, however, given the wording
of the trial court’s findings, we are left with the impression that the trial court intentionally made a finding
that defendant was present at the carjacking scene and that the attempted larceny was a continuous
transaction that carried over from 17707 Plymouth Road to 9101 Norcross Street.
Defendant contends that the inadequacy of the trial court’s factual findings merits a remand for
further findings. MCR 6.403 states:
When trial by jury has been waived, the court with jurisdiction must proceed
with the trial. The court must find the facts specifically, state separately its conclusions
of law, and direct entry of the appropriate judgment. The court must state its findings
and conclusions on the record or in a written opinion made a part of the record.
As this Court stated in People v Kemp, 202 Mich App 318, 322; 508 NW2d 184 (1993), the factual
findings made in conjunction with a bench trial are sufficient under MRE 6.403 as long as it appears that
the trial court was aware of the factual issues and correctly applied the law. See also People v
Wardlaw, 190 Mich App 318, 321; 475 NW2d 387 (1991). A central issue in this case was whether
defendant knew the van was stolen at the time he attempted to remove the tires. The trial court, in
rendering a guilty verdict, implicitly concluded that defendant did indeed possess the necessary guilty
knowledge.
It is unclear from this record, however, whether the trial court based its implicit finding of guilty
knowledge on (1) its erroneous conclusion that defendant either participated in or witnessed the
carjacking, or (2) other, competent evidence, such as the circumstances surrounding the removal of the
tires. Indeed, we cannot tell from the current record whether the trial court was sufficiently aware of the
factual issues as required by Kemp, supra at 322, and Wardlaw, supra at 321 (i.e, we cannot tell if the
trial court made the necessary finding that defendant’s guilty knowledge was independently supported
by something other than his alleged presence at the gas station during the carjacking). Under these
circumstances, we must remand this case to the trial court for further findings of fact regarding
defendant’s state of mind at the time he attempted to remove the tires. See Kemp, supra at 325. The
trial court shall have fifty-six days from the date of this opinion in which to make such further findings
and certify them to this Court. We will review defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
after obtaining the trial court’s updated factual findings.
Remanded for further findings of fact. We retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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