IN RE COLLEEN STEINBRECHER MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of BRIDGET M. MARTIN, Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
May 23, 2000
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 218660
Dickinson Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 98-000512-NA
ROSEMARY MARTIN,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
FRANK HILL,
Respondent.
In the Matter of COLLYN STEINBRECHER, Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 218694
Dickinson Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 98-000513-NA
ROSEMARY MARTIN,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
SHAWN STEINBRECHER,
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Respondent.
In the Matter of COLLEEN STEINBRECHER,
Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 218695
Dickinson Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 98-000525-NA
ROSEMARY MARTIN,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
SHAWN STEINBRECHER,
Respondent.
Before: Hood, P.J., and Saad and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, respondent appeals as of right from three family court orders
terminating her parental rights to the minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii), (g) and (j); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(3)(b)(ii), (g) and (j). We affirm.
Respondent’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court clearly erred in admitting the out-of
court statements made by her four-year-old daughter to a police trooper and an emergency room nurse,
indicating that she directed the child to conceal the fact that respondent’s boyfriend caused the child’s
vaginal injuries. Respondent urges us to conclude that the court erred in permitting testimony regarding
the child’s statements under MCR 5.972(C)(2) because they were not corroborated.
The crux of the child’s hearsay statement, as it related to respondent, was that respondent
instructed her daughter to lie about the source of her vaginal injuries. An emergency room nurse
testified at trial that the child’s story appeared to be rehearsed. The nurse also testified that the child
continuously repeated her story in respondent’s presence, but that after respondent left the room, she
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became upset and began to cry. A police trooper testified that the child was calm during a two and
one-half hour interview, except when the trooper asked the child about the cause of her injuries. The
child became upset and began to cry. In our view, this evidence was indicative of a child torn between
the truth and lies, and corroborated the child’s story that respondent instructed her to conceal the true
source of her injuries. In re Brimer, 191 Mich App 401, 406; 478 NW2d 689 (1991).
We likewise reject respondent’s claim that the child’s statements did not fall within the definition
of child abuse contained in MCL 722.622(e); MSA 25.248(2)(e).1 Initially, we note that respondent
has failed to sufficiently argue this position. An appellant may not merely announce a position and leave
it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for the claim. Wilson v Taylor, 457 Mich 232,
243; 577 NW2d 100 (1998).
In any event, we conclude that respondent’s act of directing her four-year-old daughter to
conceal the fact that respondent’s live-in boyfriend had sexually abused her, under the circumstances of
this case, may properly be considered abuse. MCL 722.622(e); MSA 25.248(2)(e) includes within its
definition of the term “child abuse,” any “harm or threatened harm to a child’s health or welfare by a
parent,” and includes “maltreatment.” Had the act been successfully concealed, respondent’s boyfriend
would have continued to pose a threat to the child’s health and welfare. Therefore, respondent’s
attempt to conceal the act and to protect her boyfriend at least qualified as maltreatment, if not an
enabling mechanism for further sexual abuse. The trial court did not err in admitting the child’s out-of
court statements.
We also note that, contrary to respondent’s claim, even if we determined that the testimony was
improperly admitted, given the sufficiency of the untainted evidence, any error was harmless. MCR
2.613(A); People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 495-496; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). Our review of the
lower court proceedings reveals that respondent had a history of covering-up for her boyfriend’s abuse
toward her children, and for making excuses on his behalf.
Affirmed.
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
1
At the time of the lower court proceedings, the definition of “child abuse” currently found in
722.622(e); MSA 25.248(2)(e) was contained in 722.622(c); MSA 25.248(2)(c). See 1996 PA 581.
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