PEOPLE OF MI V WILLIE JAMES COOLEY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 19, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 217829
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 98-006050-FC
WILLIE JAMES COOLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Bandstra, C.J., and Jansen and Whitbeck, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
A jury convicted defendant Willie James Cooley of first-degree premeditated murder, MCL
750.316(1)(a); MSA 28.548(1)(a). The trial court sentenced Cooley to a mandatory sentence of life
without parole. Cooley appeals as of right. We affirm.
I. Basic Facts And Procedural History
This case arises from an altercation between Cooley and Catherine Graves on May 25, 1998,
during which Cooley murdered Graves. Although Cooley initially denied having any involvement or
knowledge of any crime, he ultimately confessed to stabbing and shooting Graves during an argument.
At trial, Cooley claimed that he acted in self-defense when he stabbed Graves, that he accidentally shot
her, and that he was too intoxicated to have been able to premeditate killing Graves.
II. Lack Of Premeditation
A. Preservation Of The Issue And Legal Standard
Cooley argues that, because he was intoxicated when he killed Graves, he lacked the requisite
intent to commit first-degree murder, and that h should have been found guilty of second-degree
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murder. He therefore contends that there was insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation.
No special motion or procedure is necessary to preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
for appellate review. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515-516; 489 NW2d 748, amended 441 Mich
1201 (1992). Therefore, we address Cooley’s claim.
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When determining whether the prosecution has presented sufficient evidence to sustain a
conviction, this Court “‘must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and
determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime
were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’” People v Jermell Johnson, 460 Mich 720, 723; 597
NW2d 73 (1999), quoting Wolfe, supra at 515-516.
B. Premeditation As An Element Of First-Degree Premeditated Murder
The crime of first-degree premeditated murder under MCL 750.316(1)(a); MSA 28.548(1)(a),
requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt “that the defendant intentionally killed the
victim and that the act of killing was premeditated and deliberate.” People v Anderson, 209 Mich App
527, 537; 531 NW2d 780 (1995). “Premeditation and deliberation require sufficient time to allow the
defendant to take a second look.” People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 642; 588 NW2d 480 (1998).
The elements of premeditation and deliberation may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the
killing.” Id. The prosecutor may use the following four factors to prove premeditation: “(1) the prior
relationship of the parties; (2) the defendant’s actions before the killing; (3) the circumstances of the
killing itself; and (4) the defendant’s conduct after the homicide.” Anderson, supra at 537.
C. Intoxication As A Defense
The Michigan Supreme Court has noted that intoxication can be a defense to first-degree
murder “if the facts of the case could allow the jury to conclude that the defendant’s intoxication was so
great that the defendant was unable to form the necessary intent.” People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 82;
537 NW2d 909 (1995). If a defendant’s intoxication negated his ability to premeditate, then the
defendant would be guilty of second-degree murder. See People v Langworthy, 416 Mich 630, 651;
331 NW2d 171 (1982).
Cooley does not deny that he killed Graves; however, he argues that there was insufficient
evidence to allow the jury to conclude that he had formed the intent to kill her in advance of the killing.
The Michigan Supreme Court has noted that “[i]t is the province of the jury to determine questions of
fact and assess the credibility of witnesses.” People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 637; 576 NW2d 129
(1998). In the present case, the prosecutor demonstrated that Cooley did not act in self-defense and
was sufficiently sober to premeditate killing Graves. For example, the jurors heard several police
officers testify that Cooley did not appear to be intoxicated, that he obeyed orders when he was
arrested, and that he lied during his May 26, 1998, interrogation. Further, the jurors heard Cooley
testify that he lied to his girlfriend, Sharon “Renee” Ray, shortly after murdering Graves by telling Ray
that he had been in a fight with drug dealers. Rosie Cooley, Cooley’s sister, testified that on the day of
Graves’ murder, she heard Cooley tell Graves “Cathy, God damn it, give me the f-----g money” when
Graves refused to give Cooley $20, which could be construed as evidence of both motive and
premeditation. Although Cooley claimed that he accidentally shot Graves, it is undisputed that he used
two separate weapons, a knife and gun, to kill her, which tends to show that Cooley engaged in some
thinking about the murder. People v Haywood, 209 Mich App 217, 230; 530 NW2d 497 (1995).
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Notably, the trial testimony revealed that Cooley stabbed Graves seven times and shot her
point-blank in her left eye. Further, the medical examiner noted that two of the knife wounds were
characteristic of defense wounds, suggesting that Graves attempted to prevent her assailant from
stabbing her. See Anderson, supra at 538. The medical examiner also noted that one of the knife
wounds on Graves’ neck “would take an adult person using virtually all of his or her strength to draw
the knife across the neck.” Also, Cooley admitted at trial that he washed his hands after the murder and
went to his wife’s house in order to change his bloodied clothes. See Haywood, supra at 230
(“evidence of defendant’s attempt to clean up the blood after the killing could be used to infer that he
acted with deliberation and premeditation”).
As the final judge of credibility, see Lemmon, supra at 637, the jury here chose to believe the
prosecution’s witnesses, as evidenced by its guilty verdict. Clearly, based on the direct and
circumstantial evidence viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a jury could find beyond a
reasonable doubt that Cooley committed first-degree premeditated murder. Kelly, supra at 642. We
will not interfere with the jury’s decision to discredit Cooley’s self-defense and intoxication defenses.
Wolfe, supra at 514.
III. Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel
A. Preservation Of The Issue And Standard Of Review
Cooley argues that his defense counsel made two serious mistakes that violated his
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. According to Cooley, he was denied the effective
assistance of counsel because his attorney recommended that he refuse a plea offer, and because his
attorney failed to interview two people who could have provided favorable testimony regarding his
intoxication defense. At trial,1 Cooley failed to request an evidentiary hearing under People v Ginther,
390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973); therefore, this Court reviews his claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel only to the extent that defense counsel’s mistakes are apparent on the record.
People v McCrady, 213 Mich App 474, 478-479; 540 NW2d 718 (1995).
B. Standards Relating To Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel
The Michigan Supreme Court adopted the United States Supreme Court’s standard for
reviewing ineffective assistance of counsel claims articulated in Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668,
687; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984). People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 326; 521 NW2d
797 (1994). Under Strickland, a defendant must satisfy a two-pronged test to establish a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Strickland, supra at 687. The defendant must first demonstrate that
counsel’s performance was deficient by “showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was
not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. Then the
defendant must demonstrate that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense by “showing
that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is
reliable.” Id.
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C. The Plea Offer
Cooley claims that his defense counsel failed to advise him to accept the prosecution’s plea
offer of second-degree murder. “The decision to plead guilty is the defendant’s, to be made after
consultation with counsel and after counsel has explained the matter to the extent necessary to permit
the client to make an informed decision.” People v Corteway, 212 Mich App 442, 446; 538 NW2d
60 (1995). Counsel does not necessarily have to recommend whether to accept a plea offer because
“[t]he test is whether the attorney’s assistance enabled the defendant to make an informed and voluntary
choice between trial and a guilty plea.” Id.
Here, the lower court record is silent regarding the plea offer and what advice defense counsel
gave to Cooley regarding the offer. Although Cooley has attached his own affidavit and the affidavit of
his sister, Linda Harris, to his supplemental brief on appeal, he did not introduce the substance of those
affidavits at a Ginther hearing, McCrady, supra at 478-479, and they are not a part of the record,
MCR 7.210(A)(1). Therefore, the affidavits cannot alter our conclusion that his counsel provided the
minimum amount of assistance necessary to be constitutional.
Furthermore, as the prosecution notes in its brief, Cooley “does not contend that counsel failed
to inform him of the options available to him, rather, [he] merely contends that counsel was ineffective
because counsel was wrong when he assured the defendant that the jury would not convict the
defendant of first-degree murder.” “The question is not whether a court would, in retrospect, consider
counsel’s advice to be right or wrong, but whether the advice was within the range of competence
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” People v Thew, 201 Mich App 78, 89-90; 506 NW2d 547
(1993). Because the lower court record is silent regarding the plea offer and what defense counsel told
Cooley about the offer, Cooley has failed to demonstrate that defense counsel’s advice was not within
the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Id. Therefore, this claim fails.
D. Witness Interviews
Cooley claims that defense counsel failed to interview Harris and Lossie Cooley, who is his
niece and Rosie Cooley’s daughter, regarding his intoxication defense. The failure to interview
witnesses does not, itself, constitute deficient performance. People v Caballero, 184 Mich App 636,
642; 459 NW2d 80 (1990). Cooley has failed to show his attorney’s failure to interview these
witnesses “resulted in counsel’s ignorance of valuable evidence which would have substantially benefited
the accused.” Id. Moreover, the trial transcript reveals that defense counsel adequately supported
Cooley’s intoxication defense by attempting to present evidence that Cooley had been drinking all day
on the day of Graves’ murder. Therefore, Cooley cannot demonstrate that defense counsel’s
performance was deficient. People v LaVearn, 448 Mich 207, 216; 528 NW2d 721 (1995).
Even assuming that defense counsel’s failure to interview various witnesses constitutes deficient
performance, Cooley cannot establish “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result would have been different.” People v Johnnie Johnson, 451 Mich 115, 124; 545
NW2d 637 (1996). The trial record is devoid of any proof that Cooley advised defense counsel of
Harris and Lossie Cooley’s potential testimony. Cooley never even mentioned Harris or Lossie Cooley
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in his trial testimony. As a result, the record is silent regarding what Harris and Lossie Cooley in fact
would have testified to regarding Cooley’s intoxication defense. Thus, Cooley has not demonstrated
that a reasonable probability exists that, if counsel had interviewed and called Harris and Lossie Cooley
as witnesses, the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. See Pickens, supra at 312.
E. Conclusion
Each of Cooley’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel fails the two-pronged test in
Strickland because defense counsel’s performance was not deficient. Moreover, even if we were to
find that defense counsel’s performance was deficient in both claims, Cooley has failed to demonstrate
that prejudice resulted.
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
1
This Court denied Cooley’s motion to remand for a Ginther hearing based upon the same claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel.
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