CASSANDRA BRANCH V MCLAREN GENERAL HOSPITAL INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CASSANDRA BRANCH, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of KIMMIETTA
BRANCH,
UNPUBLISHED
May 9, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 209247
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 96-042743-NH
NORMAN CARTER,
Defendant,
and
BLUE CARE NETWORK,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF MICHIGAN,
Intervenor.
Before: Neff, P.J., and Sawyer and Saad, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant, Blue Care Network (BCN), appeals by leave granted the trial court’s order denying
its motion for partial summary disposition on the issue of whether plaintiff has standing to bring the
present action. We affirm.
According to Cassandra Branch, her daughter, Kimmietta Branch, had been a patient of
Pediatrician Norman Carter since her birth in August 1979. Dr. Carter eventually entered into an
employment contract with defendant BCN. As an employee of BCN, Dr. Carter could treat non
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enrollees of the network as fee-for-service patients.1 Cassandra received Blue Cross Blue Shield health
coverage as a benefit of her employment and was not, at anytime, an enrollee or subscriber of BCN.
In March 1987, Dr. Carter treated Kimmietta for headaches on a fee-for-service basis. In June
1987, Kimmietta received treatment for a cough, congestion and sore throat from a specialist employed
by defendant BCN for which Cassandra was charged $40. The parties dispute whether Cassandra had
notice of that charge and notice of defendant BCN’s warning that nonpayment of the bill would
preclude her from making further appointments at network facilities. It is undisputed that the bill was
never paid. On August 19, 1990, Cassandra took Kimmietta to McLaren General Hospital in Flint
where she was treated for a fever and pain in her throat and neck. The treating physician prescribed an
antibiotic and instructed Cassandra to take Kimmietta to her family doctor in three to four days. On
August 23, 1990, Cassandra arrived at Dr. Carter’s office with Kimmietta, who was listless, feverish
and was suffering from headaches and neck and back pain. Cassandra was told by Dr. Carter’s staff
that Kimmietta could not see Dr. Carter due to the outstanding bill from 1987. Defendant BCN’s “bad
debt” policy precluded fee-for-service patients with outstanding debt of more than 120 days from
making future appointments with network providers. According to Cassandra, she offered to pay the
bill, but was still refused treatment by Dr. Carter. Dr. Carter’s nurse suggested Kimmietta drink fluids
and take Tylenol to reduce her fever. On August 25, 1990, Kimmietta was taken by ambulance to Flint
Osteopathic Hospital with a high fever. Doctors discovered Kimmietta suffered from viral encephalitis,
a brain disease, which eventually caused her to become mentally incompetent and quadriplegic.
Kimmietta lived as such until her death on January 10, 1996.
Plaintiff filed suit soon after Kimmietta’s death, alleging several counts of negligence and medical
malpractice against the doctor and facility that treated Kimmietta on August 19, 1990, and against Dr.
Carter for his refusal to treat Kimmietta four days later. Plaintiff later added defendant BCN to the suit,
claiming defendant BCN was negligent in setting policies that prevented Kimmietta from receiving
necessary medical care, in usurping the authority of its physicians to administer medical care and to
direct nurses, in permitting unqualified personnel to render medical treatment and in failing to properly
train its personnel.2 All of the defendants, aside from defendant BCN, were dismissed below.
Defendant BCN brought a motion for partial summary disposition, arguing specifically that plaintiff
lacked standing to sue for negligence that was based on its board of directors’ policy decisions. The
trial court denied that motion.3
On appeal, defendant BCN argues that the trial court erred in denying summary disposition on
the standing issue because Cassandra and Kimmietta were not enrollees or subscribers of the network
and were precluded standing to sue under the Health Maintenance Organizations Act, MCL 333.21001
et seq.; MSA 14.15(21001) et seq. We disagree. We review a trial court’s grant of summary
disposition de novo. Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998).
A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests whether there is factual support for a
claim. Spiek, supra at 337; Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368, 374; 501 NW2d 155 (1993). This
Court must review the record to determine whether the defendants were entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Morales v Auto-Owners Ins, 458 Mich 288, 294; 582 NW2d 776 (1998); Phillips v
Deihm, 213 Mich App 389, 398; 541 NW2d 566 (1995). A court may rely on affidavits, pleadings,
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depositions, or any other documentary evidence in deciding whether a genuine issue of material fact
exists. Rollert v Dep’t of Civil Service, 228 Mich App 534, 536; 579 NW2d 118 (1998).
Additionally, statutory interpretation is a question of law which is reviewed de novo on appeal.
Oakland Co Bd of Rd Comm’rs v Michigan Property & Casualty Guaranty Ass’n, 456 Mich 590,
610; 575 NW2d 751 (1998).
To have standing, a plaintiff must have a “legally protected interest that is in jeopardy of being
adversely affected.” Donaldson v Alcona Co Bd of Co Rd Comm’rs, 219 Mich App 718, 722; 558
NW2d 232 (1997); Wortelboer v Benzie Co, 212 Mich App 208, 214; 537 NW2d 603 (1995). The
plaintiff must “allege a sufficient personal stake in the outcome of the dispute to ensure that the
controversy sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversarial setting that is capable of judicial
resolution.” Donaldson, supra at 722. In the present case, plaintiff has standing to bring the present
negligence action. The Health Maintenance Organizations Act, MCL 333.21001 et seq.; MSA
14.15(21001) et seq., does not expressly preclude fee-for-service patients standing to challenge an
HMO’s conduct. While the act provides an express grievance procedure only for enrollees in an
HMO, see MCL 333.21035; MSA 14.15(21035); MCL 333.21063; MSA 14.15(21063); MCL
333.21065; MSA 14.15(21065), the Legislature’s failure to express a similar procedure for patients
who pay on a fee-for-service basis does not exclude such patients from challenging the reasonableness
of an HMO’s policy that has affected them. Whether an individual is provided treatment from an HMO
as an enrollee or on a fee-for-service basis, the patient is part of a class of customer of the HMO.
Thus, it is unreasonable to interpret the Legislature’s failure to include a broader grievance procedure as
wholly precluding fee-for-service patients standing to challenge an HMO’s conduct. See Grand
Rapids v Grand Rapids Employees Ass’n of Public Administrators, 235 Mich App 398, 406; 597
NW2d 284 (1999). Furthermore, MCL 333.20203(2); MSA 14.15(20203)(2), specifically reserves
patients’ remedies at law with respect to suits against health facilities or agencies.4 There is no authority
precluding plaintiff standing to bring the present negligence action against defendant BCN. Plaintiff, as
personal representative of Kimmietta’s estate, has a sufficient personal stake in the outcome of the
present dispute to permit standing. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying defendant BCN’s
motion for partial summary disposition on the narrow issue of standing.
In other words, defendant BCN places too much stock on the fact that plaintiff’s decedent was
not an enrollee or subscriber to BCN’s HMO plan. The fact that she was not an enrollee or subscriber
means that the act is inapplicable. The act only regulates the relationship between an HMO and its
subscribers or enrollees. The relationship is different between an HMO and fee-for-service patients—it
is no longer an HMO-enrollee relationship, but is now a traditional provider-patient relationship.
That is, because plaintiff’s decedent was a fee-for-service patient, plaintiff’s rights are the same
as if Dr. Carter had been employed by “XYZ Medical Center,” a private company employing
physicians and providing medical care for patients. In other words, for purposes of this lawsuit, BCN is
not an HMO, but that of a private medical provider treating fee-for-services patients. Simply put,
BCN’s rights, duties and responsibilities to plaintiff and plaintiff’s decedent are not that of an HMO, but
that of a private company providing medical services to fee-for-services patients. Nothing more, but
also nothing less.
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We decline to express any view on the merit of plaintiff’s factual support for her claim that
defendant BCN was negligent based on its board of directors’ implementation of its “bad debt” policy.
The narrow issue before this Court is whether plaintiff has standing to bring the present suit and our
holding is limited to that issue. See City of Lansing v Hartsuff, 213 Mich App 338, 351; 539 NW2d
781 (1995). Accordingly, we express no opinion on the merits of plaintiff’s claim. We only hold that
she has the same standing to sue defendant BCN as she would if BCN were a private physicians group
or other medical provider rather than an HMO.
Affirmed.
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Henry W. Saad
1
Fee-for-service patients do not prepay to participate in an HMO, but instead, are billed for each
specific service rendered by an HMO caregiver.
2
Blue Cross Blue Shield was added to the suit as an intervening plaintiff for the purpose of protecting its
right to reimbursement of medical expenses under the subrogation clause in its contract with Cassandra.
3
Defendant BCN brought a separate motion for partial summary disposition, arguing it did not have a
duty to treat Kimmietta on the date in question. The trial court granted that motion, which is not at issue
on this appeal.
4
An HMO is included within the meaning of “health facility or agency” referenced in MCL 333.20201;
MSA 14.15(20201) and MCL 333.20202; MSA 14.15(20202). MCL 333.20106(1)(e); MSA
14.15(20106)(1)(e).
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