BILLY SIMMONS V JAMES FRIGO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
BILLY SIMMONS and DEAN VANBRAGT,
UNPUBLISHED
May 5, 2000
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v
No. 216541
Allegan Circuit Court
LC No. 97-021018-NO
JAMES FRIGO,
Defendant,
and
PAUL BRINKLEY, ROBERT BANNER, TINA
HARTLEY MALIVUK, SUE DIANE HARRIS,
GREG VAUGHN, DEBRA HITCHCOCK, SUSAN
MENCARELLI, CORY SMITH, and LINDA L.
MYERS,
Defendants-Appellants.
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Bandstra, C.J., and O’Connell, J.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants1 appeal by leave granted the order compelling defendants to answer interrogatories
submitted by plaintiffs. We remand.
This case arises out of numerous instances of alleged assault, battery, and sexual abuse suffered
by plaintiffs, who are both mentally handicapped adults. In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that they
were abused and sexually assaulted while in the care of defendants Frigo and Hitchcock, who are
employees of Allegan County Community Mental Health. Plaintiffs’ complaint further alleged that the
other named defendants, who are also employees of Allegan County Community Mental Health, were
aware of the sexual abuse, but neglected to protect plaintiffs from the abuse and failed to report the
abuse to the appropriate authorities.
During discovery, defendants objected on the grounds of statutory privilege to a number of
interrogatories served on them by plaintiffs. Specifically, defendants objected to questions regarding
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four individuals who are not parties to this action but who are alleged to have been recipients of
treatment at Allegan County Community Mental Health. Defendants argued that supplying the
information requested would “violate statutory confidentiality as provided in the mental health code and
penal code.”
On appeal, defendants argue that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering defendants to
answer interrogatories requesting information subject to statutory privilege because the interrogatories in
question require employees of Allegan County Community Mental Health to disclose information
obtained “in the course of employment” about the sexual behavior of four non-party individuals whom
plaintiffs identify as being recipients of the services of Allegan County Community Mental Health.
Defendants argue that the information is privileged because defendants obtained the information about
the sexual conduct of these individuals in defendants’ various positions of psychologists, counselors, or
social workers in the course of treatment, diagnosis, or counseling.
Generally, this Court reviews a trial court’s grant or denial of discovery for abuse of discretion.
Mercy Mt Clemens Corp v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 219 Mich App 46, 50-51; 555 NW2d 871 (1996).
However, the trial court’s decision whether a statutory privilege applies to the information sought by
plaintiffs involves the interpretation of a statute, the application of which is a question of law that this
Court reviews de novo. People v Webb, 458 Mich 265, 274; 580 NW2d 884 (1998); People v
Sartor, 235 Mich App 614, 618-619; 599 NW2d 532 (1999).
Michigan has a strong commitment to open discovery, and thus its discovery rules are liberally
construed. Generally, parties may obtain discovery regarding any unprivileged matter that is relevant to
the pending action. MCR 2.302(B)(1); Domako v Rowe, 438 Mich 347, 353; 475 NW2d 30 (1991);
Reed Dairy Farm v Consumers Power Co, 227 Mich App 614, 616; 576 NW2d 709 (1998).
However, our Supreme Court has recently ruled that “[t]he concept of privilege . . . supersedes even
the liberal discovery principles of this state.” Dorris v Detroit Osteopathic Hospital Corp, 460 Mich
26, 37; 594 NW2d 455 (1999).
In this case, defendants rely on the psychologist-patient privilege, MCL 333.18237; MSA
14.15(8237), the social worker privilege, MCL 339.1610; MSA 18.425, and the professional
counselor-client privilege under MCL 333.18117; MSA 14.15(18117). The admissibility of privileged
communications is governed by MCL 330.1750; MSA 14.800(750), which provides that such
communications “shall not be disclosed in civil . . . cases or proceedings . . . unless the patient has
waived the privilege . . . .” Furthermore, the psychiatrist/psychologist-patient privilege prohibits
disclosure of “the fact that the patient has been examined or treated or undergone a diagnosis” except
where that information is relevant to a health care provider’s or insurer’s rights or liabilities unless the
patient has waived the privilege. MCL 330.1750(3); MSA 14.800(750)(3). The most common cases
where a waiver of the privilege has been found is “a civil action by or on behalf of the patient . . . arising
from the treatment of the patient against the mental health care practitioner for malpractice.” MCL
330.1750(d); MSA 14.800(750)(d). However, in this case, the interrogatories at issue ask defendants
to disclose information they possessed about individuals who plaintiffs allege were recipients of care at
Allegan County Community Mental Health, but who are not parties to this action. Specifically, the
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interrogatories asked for details known by defendants regarding incidents of sexual contact involving the
non-party individuals and defendant Frigo or any other individuals.
In Dorris, supra, our Supreme Court recently overruled Porter v Michigan Osteopathic
Hospital Ass’n, 170 Mich App 619, 39 n 7; 428 NW2d 719 (1988), which held that names of other
patients are not protected by the psychiatrist-patient or physician-patient privilege. Dorris, supra at 26.
In Dorris, our Supreme Court held that the name of an unknown patient is privileged information, and
that where a patient has neither voluntarily nor impliedly waived the privilege, there are strong public
policy reasons for applying the privilege to disclosure of an unknown patient’s name. Id. at 48. The
majority of the Dorris Court specifically held that “defendant hospitals have a duty to refrain from
disclosure.” Id. at 28 (emphasis added). The Dorris Court reasoned as follows:
Historically, confidentiality has been understood to be necessary to promote full
disclosure of a patient's medical history and present medical concerns. See
Breisenmeister v Knights of Pythias, 81 Mich 525, 531; 45 NW 977 (1890). As the
dissent notes, “information falls within the purview of the physician-patient privilege only
if it was ‘necessary’ to enable a physician ‘to prescribe’ for a patient.” The dissent
goes on to argue that we have disregarded this language and render the language of the
statute surplusage. However, patients armed with the knowledge that their name may
not be kept confidential may not be as willing to reveal their full medical history for fear
that, ultimately, that information, too, may lose its confidential status. This chilling of the
patient’s desire to disclose would have a detrimental effect on the physician’s ability to
provide effective and complete medical treatment and is therefore “necessary” to enable
a physician “to prescribe” for a patient.
***
We hold that the names of unknown patients are protected by the physician
patient privilege, MCL 600.2159; MSA 27A.2157, and that the defendant hospitals
have a duty to refrain from disclosure. [Id. at 38-39, 48.]
In this case, to answer the interrogatories defendants would be forced to identify the four
individuals whose names are referenced in the disputed interrogatories as patients at Allegan Community
Mental Health. Specifically, interrogatories 19(e)-(h) ask each defendant whether they had “contact
with or knowledge of” the four non-party individuals “in the course of [their] employment.” Assuming
plaintiffs correctly state that these people had been patients, an answer to this question would
necessarily require an affirmation that the non-party individuals were examined, treated, or diagnosed at
Allegan County Community Mental Health. We believe that this would be contrary to the rationale set
forth in Dorris. See also Baker v Oakwood Hosp Corp, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___
(Docket No. 206407, dec’d 1/18/00), slip op p 4.
In the instant case, defendants have maintained the confidentiality of the identity of Allegan
County Community Mental Health patients by refusing to disclose whether the four individuals named in
the interrogatories were patients at Allegan County Community Mental Health. The question then
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becomes whether any privilege preventing disclosure applies to defendants, either because they are
within a professional classification giving rise to such a privilege or because of their relationship with
Allegan County Mental Health. See Dorris, supra at 38, n 6. The trial court, which did not have the
benefit of the Dorris decision, did not answer this question, and the lower court record does not
adequately disclose the nature of the employment relationship between Allegan County Community
Mental Health and the defendants. Accordingly, we remand this matter to the trial court for
reconsideration in light of Dorris and Baker.
Remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Jurisdiction is not retained.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
1
Defendant James Frigo is not a party to this appeal.
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