PEOPLE OF MI V THEODORE MAX JOHNSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 2, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 214358
Mason Circuit Court
LC No. 97-013281-FH
THEODORE MAX JOHNSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Saad, P.J., and Jansen and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
A jury convicted defendant of exposing an animal to a poisonous substance, MCL 750.50b;
MSA 28.245(b). The trial court sentenced defendant to one year in jail and to eighteen months’
probation. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed
verdict because the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to establish the charged offense. We
disagree. In reviewing a trial court’s decision on a motion for a directed verdict, this Court views the
evidence presented by the prosecutor up to the time the motion was made in the light most favorable to
the prosecution and determines whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements were
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Crawford, 232 Mich App 608, 615-616; 591 NW2d
669 (1998).
A conviction for exposing an animal to a poisonous substance requires proof that the defendant
(1) willfully, maliciously and without just cause or excuse (2) exposed an animal to any poisonous
substance (3) with the intent that the substance be taken or swallowed by the animal. MCL 750.50b;
MSA 28.245(b). It is well established that circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn
from it may be sufficient to prove the elements of the crime. Crawford, supra at 616; see also People
v Bottany, 43 Mich App 375, 377-378; 204 NW2d 230 (1972) (the identity of the defendant as the
person who committed a crime may be established beyond a reasonable doubt by segments of
circumstantial proof in combination, even if each element standing alone might not be sufficient).
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Here, the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution established that:
defendant and complainant lived next door to each other for twenty-five years; complainant’s dog,
Zack, liked to visit the compost pile in defendant’s back yard when he was not confined; on the day of
the alleged poisoning Zack was placed in a fenced-in-yard, but escaped sometime between 9:00 a.m.
and 4:30 p.m. while complainant’s family was gone; when the family returned, Zack appeared
disoriented and was vomiting a “bright green clear liquid”; Zack was eventually diagnosed with kidney
failure and was euthanized several days after the symptoms first appeared; specialists confirmed that
Zack’s condition was consistent with antifreeze poisoning; a bowl containing dog food and a green
liquid that tested positive for antifreeze – a substance animals like to consume because it has a sweet
taste – was found on defendant’s compost pile; another bowl that appeared to contain the same
substances was found underneath bushes in the front of defendant’s house; when the police first asked
defendant about the bowls and confronted him with the contents, he denied that he had any knowledge
of the bowls and abruptly emptied them; defendant subsequently told police that he had taken the bowls
outside, but forgot to empty them onto the compost pile. Viewed in a light most favorable to the
prosecutor, we conclude that this circumstantial evidence was more than sufficient to enable the jury to
find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the charged offense. While defendant
presented testimony showing that there were other possible sources of antifreeze and that Zack came
running from a direction opposite defendant’s home on the day of the alleged poisoning, questions
pertaining to the weight of the evidence are appropriately left for the trier of fact. People v Wolfe, 440
Mich 508, 514-515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992). Consequently, the trial court did not err in denying
defendant’s motion for a directed verdict.
Defendant next contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence
surrounding a 1991 incident in which defendant initiated proceedings to have complainant’s previous
dog euthanized, and testimony regarding a 1997 incident in which defendant allegedly poisoned a
neighbor’s lawn in retaliation for the neighbor having blown grass clippings onto his lawn. Again, we
disagree. T Court reviews a trial court’s decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion.
his
People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 385; 582 NW2d 785 (1998).
Pursuant to MRE 404(b) evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible if the evidence
is (1) offered for a proper purpose rather than to prove the defendant’s character or propensity to
commit a crime (2) relevant to an issue or fact of consequence at trial, and (3) sufficiently probative to
outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice. People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 55; 508 NW2d 114
(1993), amended 445 Mich 1205 (1994). Accord Crawford, supra at 385; People v Starr, 457
Mich 490, 496; 577 NW2d 673 (1998).
To the extent the contested evidence could be characterized as other acts evidence to which a
MRE 404(b) analysis applies, we hold that it was properly admitted for the proffered purpose of
showing defendant’s motive. In People v Hoffman, 225 Mich App 103, 106; 570 NW2d 146
(1997), this Court defined the term “motive” for purposes of 404(b) as follows:
Cause or reason that moves the will and induces action. An inducement, or that
which leads or temps the mind to indulge in a criminal act. [] In common usage intent
and “motive” are not infrequently regarded as one in the same thing. In law there is a
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distinction between them. “Motive” is the moving power which impels to action for a
definite result. Intent is the purpose to use a particular means to effect such a result.
“Motive is that which incites or stimulates a person to do an act.” [Citations omitted.]
The prosecutor in this case did not offer or use the contested evidence to establish that
defendant acted in conformity with a propensity to commit bad acts. Rather, the prosecutor used the
evidence to counteract defendant’s general denial that he attempted to poison complainant’s dog by
establishing defendant’s motive for doing so. See Starr, supra, 457 Mich 501. The contested
evidence tended to establish that defendant was extremely protective of his property and took serious
issue when anything encroached upon it. Defendant’s apparently powerful protectiveness – a
protectiveness that was exemplified with evidence that he became upset even when grass clippings,
dogs, or dog excrement came onto his property – would tend to provide the jury with an explanation for
why defendant may want to commit the otherwise inexplicable crime of poisoning his neighbor’s dog.
Moreover, the background evidence establishing defendant’s motivation put the crime in context and
helped the jury understand why defendant might be interested in leaving traps on his lawn that would
expel (perhaps permanently) any unwanted invader. Under these circumstances, we hold that the
evidence was properly admitted to establish defendant’s motive for committing what might otherwise be
considered an inexplicable crime, and the probative value of the evidence was not substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Hoffman, supra. Therefore, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting the contested evidence at trial.
Finally, defendant argues that the prosecutor’s remarks and questioning denied him a fair trial.
Because defendant neither objected nor requested curative instructions, appellate review is foreclosed
unless no curative instruction could have removed any undue prejudice to defendant or failure to
consider the issue would result in manifest injustice. People v Reid, 233 Mich App 457, 466; 592
NW2d 767 (1999). After a contextual review of the prosecutor’s remarks and questions, we find no
impropriety. Moreover, any prejudice resulting from the prosecutor’s conduct was cured by the trial
court’s instruction that the attorney’s statements were not evidence and that the jurors should only
accept comments supported by the evidence. People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 281; 531 NW2d 659
(1995). Accordingly, manifest injustice will not result from our failure to review the alleged misconduct.
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
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