IN RE PARKER/ALEXANDER MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of GRACEY ALEXANDER-PARKER,
JUDAH JEREMIAH PARKER, and ALLISON
MARIE ALEXANDER, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
April 25, 2000
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 219614
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 97-354696
ALFRED ALEXANDER,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
ANNIE JEANETTE PARKER,
Respondent.
In the Matter of GRACEY ALEXANDER-PARKER,
JUDAH JEREMIAH PARKER, and ALLISON
MARIE ALEXANDER, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 219990
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 97-354696
ANNIE JEANETTE PARKER,
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Respondent-Appellee,
and
ALFRED ALEXANDER,
Respondent.
Before: Kelly, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr., and Griffin, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, respondents Alfred Alexander and Annie Jeanette Parker appeal
as of right from the family court order terminating their parental rights to the minor children, Gracey
Alexander-Parker, Judah Jeremiah Parker, and Allison Marie Alexander,1 pursuant to MCL
712A.19b(3)(a)(ii), (c)(i), (g), and (j); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(a)(ii), (c)(i), (g), and (j). We affirm.
Docket No. 219614
Respondent Alfred Alexander argues that the trial court clearly erred in finding that the statutory
grounds for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (g); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i) and
(g) were established by clear and convincing evidence. We disagree.
In an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, the trial court’s findings of fact are
reviewed for clear error. MCR 5.974(I); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989);
In re Vasquez, 199 Mich App 44, 51; 501 NW2d 231 (1993). A finding is clearly erroneous when
the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. In re
Newman, 189 Mich App 61, 65; 472 NW2d 38 (1991). Once the trial court finds at least one
statutory ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence, the court must terminate parental
rights unless it finds that there has been a showing by the respondent that doing so is clearly not in the
child’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5); In re Hall-Smith, 222 Mich
App 470, 472-473; 564 NW2d 156 (1997); In re Perry, 193 Mich App 648, 650-651; 484 NW2d
768 (1992); In re McIntyre, 192 Mich App 47, 50; 480 NW2d 293 (1991).
Because respondent selectively challenges only two of the four statutory grounds for the
termination of his parental rights, issues regarding the two remaining unchallenged bases for termination
have been waived on appeal and provide adequate justification for affirmation of the trial court’s order.
In any event, addressing respondent’s appellate claims, we conclude the trial court did not clearly err in
finding that the conditions leading to the adjudication continued to exist at the time of trial and there was
no reasonable likelihood that the conditions would be rectified in a reasonable time considering the ages
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of the children, MCL 712A.19(b)(3)(c)(i); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i), or that respondent failed
to provide proper care or custody for the children and there was no reasonable expectation he would
do so within a reasonable time considering the ages of the children, MCL 712A.19(b)(3)(g); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(3)(g).
The minor children were taken into care after police officers, responding to a call, found them
alone and unsupervised at home on May 4, 1997. According to the testimony of one of the officers, the
children and the home were filthy. A parent agency agreement was formulated and presented to
respondent. According to the terms of the agreement, respondent was required to visit the minor
children, obtain suitable housing, a legitimate source of income, attend all court hearings, maintain
contact with the worker, complete parenting classes, and seek substance abuse assessment and
treatment. However, respondent failed to substantially comply with these requirements during the
period when the children were under the jurisdiction of the court.
The testimony at the permanent custody hearing indicated that problems were encountered
during respondent’s visits with the minor children, including verbal confrontations with the caretaker
relatives arising from respondent’s intoxicated state during these visits. Subsequent visits were ordered
by the court to be supervised at the petitioner agency; however, respondent ceased all visitation and
failed to visit the children from July 22, 1998, to October 20, 1998, even though he was provided with
ample bus tickets. Consequently, the visits were suspended pursuant to MCL 712A.19a(7); MSA
27.3178(598.19a)(7). Respondent never obtained suitable housing, living with different relatives and
friends, and failed to provide proof of a legitimate source of income. Respondent testified that he did
not work but “mostly hustled,” meaning he took odd jobs to support himself. Out of fifty-three
scheduled drug screens, respondent submitted only four, testing positive for drugs in one instance and
cocaine in another. Respondent testified at trial that he drank alcoholic beverages every day; despite
this evidence of chronic alcoholism, he failed to submit verification that he attended NA/AA meetings or
properly completed a substance abuse program.
Given these circumstances, we find no clear error in the trial court’s decision terminating
respondent’s parental rights. Respondent’s failure to comply with even the minimal requirements of the
parent-agency agreement warranted the court’s conclusion that there would not be a change in his
ability to provide a proper home for the children in the future. See In re Hall, 188 Mich App 217; 469
NW2d 56 (1991); In re Miller, 182 Mich App 70; 451 NW2d 576 (1990); In re Ovalle, 140 Mich
App 79; 363 NW2d 731 (1985). Respondent has failed to rebut the mandatory presumption that
termination was clearly in the best interests of the minor children. See MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(5).
Respondent also argues that the trial court’s zero tolerance policy regarding the use of alcohol
violates his fundamental liberty interest in maintaining his family and is clearly erroneous. This argument
is devoid of merit. Respondent testified that “I drinks [sic] every day if I can” and further testified he
had been drinking for thirty-five years. The court’s zero tolerance policy was eminently reasonable
when viewed in the context of respondent’s chronic alcoholism and the ramifications thereof, including
the fact that he quit school in the seventh grade, had been unemployed since 1975, worked odd jobs as
his sole means of support, and had no permanent home.
-3
Docket No. 219990
Respondent Annie Jeanette Parker contends on appeal that the trial court’s order terminating
her parental rights was reached without clear and convincing evidence of a single statutory basis
indicating that the best interest of the minor children would be served by such termination. We disagree.
The circumstances leading to the termination of respondent’s parental rights mirror those of
corespondent Alfred Alexander, the father of the affected children. Respondent likewise failed to
comply with the terms of her parent agency agreement. Although respondent visited the children when
they resided at a relative’s house, such visits were discontinued because of respondent’s intoxicated
state. The trial court ordered future visits to be supervised at the agency, but between July 1998 and
October 1998 respondent attended none of these supervised visits even though she was provided with
bus tickets and transfers. Respondent never obtained suitable housing and never provided proof of
employment. Significantly, with respect to drug treatment, the testimony indicated that between
October 1997 and September 1998, respondent was scheduled for fifty-four screens but attended none
of them. Despite the fact that two of the minor children tested positive for cocaine at birth, respondent
neither sought assessment for drug treatment nor attended any NA/AA meetings as required by the
parent agency agreement until one month prior to the permanent custody trial.
“In determining whether the return of the child would cause a substantial risk of harm to the
child, the court shall review the failure of the parent to substantially comply with the terms and conditions
of the case service plan . . . as evidence that return of the child to his or her parent would cause a
substantial risk of harm to the child’s life, physical health, or mental well-being.” MCL 712A.19a(4);
MSA 27.3178(598.19a)(4). See also, Hall, supra; Miller, supra; Ovalle, supra. In rendering its
decision in this case, the trial court relied in part on the fact that respondent evidenced little intent to
comply with the parent agency agreement and there was no indication of her willingness or ability to do
so.
In light of these proofs, we find no clear error in the trial court’s determination that termination
of respondent’s parental rights pursuant to subsections (3)(a)(ii), (c)(i), (g), and (j) was supported by
clear and convincing evidence. Respondent presented no evidence to the contrary showing the
termination of her parental rights was clearly not in the best interests of the children.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
1
Although respondent-appellant father also argues against the termination of his parental rights to Terri
Lee Alexander, this child is in fact not a party in this appeal.
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