ALLAN J SPERLE V DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ALLAN J. SPERLE, Personal Representative of the
Estate of TAMMY L. SPERLE,
UNPUBLISHED
April 21, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellant
v
No. 211793
Court of Claims
LC No. 98-016877 CM
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Gage and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff-appellant Allan K. Sperle, the personal representative of the estate of Tammy L.
Sperle, appeals as of right from the trial court’s order granting defendants-appellees’ motion for
summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (8). We affirm.
Plaintiff initiated this wrongful death action against the Michigan Department of Corrections
(hereafter MDOC), Director Kenneth L. McGinnis, Warden Andrew Jackson, Deputy Warden
Geraldine Williams and Custody and Security Supervisor Donald Prough, after the February 1996
murder of his wife, Tammy L. Sperle, by inmate Clarence Herndon at the Huron Valley Men’s Facility
(hereafter HVMF). Decedent worked as a civilian employee in the prison supply store. Herndon was
a member of the Prisoner Store Committee and, in this capacity, worked directly with the decedent.
Plaintiff filed a five-count complaint alleging claims under the intentional tort exception to the exclusive
remedy provision of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act (hereafter WDCA), MCL 418.131(1);
MSA 17.237(131)(1), and the Public Building provision of the Governmental Liability for Negligence
Act, MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996 (107)(1), as well as claims for gross negligence, intentional infliction
of emotional distress, and wrongful death. The gravamen of plaintiff’s complaint is that defendant
Jackson was warned by another inmate of Herndon’s plan to murder the decedent, but refused to
discuss the matter with the informant, and that all of the defendants failed to take proper action to
protect the decedent, despite knowledge of Herndon’s violent background and criminal record.
Defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4), (7) and (8). The trial
court first held that defendants Williams and Prough were not subject to Court of Claims’ jurisdiction
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because they were not “state officials,” and dismissed plaintiff’s claim against these defendants pursuant
to MCR 2.116(C)(4). The trial court then ruled that reading § 7(1) of the governmental immunity
statute, MCL 691.1407(1); MSA 3.996(107)(1), in pari materia with § 131(1) of the WDCA, as it
was required to do, plaintiff failed to plead facts sufficient to sustain an intentional tort as a matter of law.
Specifically, the trial court found that, under Travis v Dreis & Krump Mfg Co, 453 Mich 149; 551
NW2d 132 (1996), although plaintiff pleaded facts that, if true, would establish that defendants may
have had actual knowledge of a dangerous condition (i.e., Herndon’s violent propensities), plaintiff’s
complaint failed to allege facts to support a claim that defendants were aware that injury to the decedent
was certain to occur. Accordingly, the trial court ruled that plaintiff’s remaining claims were barred by
the exclusive remedy provision of the WDCA, and granted summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(7) and (8).
On appeal, plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition to
defendants MDOC, McGinnis and Jackson under MCR 2.116(C)(7) on the basis that they are entitled
to governmental immunity from liability. Plaintiff contends that operation of the HVMF prisoner store
was a proprietary function because it sold goods and products to the inmates for a pecuniary profit, and
thus, governmental immunity did not apply. Plaintiff did not allege in his complaint that operation of the
prison store at the time of this incident was a proprietary function; nor did plaintiff raise the argument
before the trial court. As such, the trial court neither addressed nor resolved this precise issue below.
Issues not raised before and decided by a trial court are not properly preserved for appellate review.
Alford v Polllution Control Indus of America, 222 Mich App 693, 699; 565 NW2d 9 (1997).
Although this Court may, nevertheless, consider an unpreserved issue when it implicates a purely legal
question and all the facts necessary to resolve the issue have been presented, Poch v Anderson, 229
Mich App 40, 52; 580 NW2d 456 (1998), the essential facts necessary for resolving whether
defendant was performing a proprietary function at the time of the decedent’s death have not been
presented.1 Thus, we decline to address this unpreserved issue.
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred in granting defendants’ motion for summary
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) because his complaint pleaded sufficient facts to state a claim
under the intentional tort exception to the exclusive remedy provision of the WDCA. Plaintiff contends
that, had discovery proceeded, plaintiff would have shown that Warden Jackson actually knew that an
injury was certain to result from the decedent’s continuous exposure to a dangerous criminal. We
disagree.
This Court reviews a trial court’s grant of summary disposition de novo. Beaty v Hertzberg &
Golden, PC, 456 Mich 247, 253; 571 NW2d 716 (1997). Summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(8) should be granted where the opposing party has failed to a state a claim for which relief
could be granted. Horace v City of Pontiac, 456 Mich 744, 749; 575 NW2d 762 (1998). A motion
under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s complaint, and should only be
granted when the claim is so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could
possibly justify recovery. ABB Paint Finishing, Inc v Nat’l Union Fire Ins Co of Pittsburgh, 223
Mich App 559, 561; 567 NW2d 456 (1997). The motion is tested on the pleadings alone, and all
factual allegations in support of the claim are accepted as true. Id. However, a mere statement of a
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pleader’s conclusions, unsupported by allegations of facts, will not suffice to state a cause of action.
ETT Ambulance Service Corp v Rockford Ambulance, Inc, 204 Mich App 392, 395; 516 NW2d
498 (1994).
Generally, the right to recover disability benefits for personal injury under the WDCA is an
employee’s exclusive remedy against an employer, unless it is shown that the injuries were intentionally
inflicted by the employer:
The right to the recovery of benefits as provided in this act shall be the
employee’s exclusive remedy against the employer for a personal injury or occupational
disease. The only exception to this exclusive remedy is an intentional tort. An
intentional tort shall exist only when an employee is injured as a result of a deliberate act
of the employer and the employer specifically intended an injury. An employer shall be
deemed to have intended to injure if the employer had actual knowledge that an injury
was certain to occur and willfully disregarded that knowledge. The issue of whether an
act was an intentional tort shall be a question of law for the court. [MCL 418.131(1);
MSA 17.237(131)(1).]
See Gray v Morley, 460 Mich 738, 741-742; 596 NW2d 922 (1999); McNees v Cedar Springs
Stamping Co (After Remand), 219 Mich App 217, 224; 555 NW2d 481 (1996). The WDCA is
broadly construed to provide coverage as the exclusive remedy for claims brought under the act. Nardi
v American Motors Corp, 156 Mich App 275, 277-278; 401 NW2d 348 (1986).
In Travis, supra at 172, our Supreme Court held that in order for a plaintiff to avoid the
exclusive remedy provision of the WDCA, the plaintiff must either show that the employer specifically
intended an injury occur to the plaintiff, or show that the employer or managerial employee had actual
knowledge that an injury would follow from what the employer or manager deliberately did or did not
do, and that the employer or manager willfully disregarded that knowledge. “Actual knowledge” of an
injury means
that constructive, implied, or imputed knowledge is not enough. [It is not] sufficient to
allege that the employer should have known, or had reason to believe, that injury was
certain to occur. [Id. at 173.]
That the injury was “certain to occur” means there must be no doubt that the injury would indeed occur
as a result of the employer’s conduct.2 Id. Conclusory statements are insufficient to allege certainty of
injury, and the laws of probability (i.e. the odds that something will occur) play no part in determining
the certainty of injury. Id. at 174.
More recently, in Gray, supra, the Court explained that when a plaintiff’s allegations “suggest
conduct on the part of defendant that was reckless or deliberately indifferent, such allegations sound in
gross negligence and are therefore insufficient to constitute an intentional tort within the meaning of the
WDCA.” Id. at 744.
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In the instant case, it is uncontested that the decedent was murdered during the course of her
employment, and that the WDCA would provide plaintiff ’s exclusive remedy absent a showing that
defendants committed an intentional tort within the meaning of the act. However, accepting the facts as
pleaded by plaintiff as true, we find that the trial court correctly concluded this case does not plead facts
constituting an intentional tort within the meaning of the WDCA as a matter of law. Plaintiff alleged that
a prison inmate informed Warden Jackson that Herndon had threatened to kill the decedent, but
Jackson refused to speak with the informant or inquire into the matter. Plaintiff also alleged that Jackson
knew that Herndon had previously assaulted women, including a female prison guard, that Herndon
hated women, and that Herndon had previously killed another woman. Even assuming that plaintiff’s
alleged facts established that defendants had actual knowledge of Herndon’s dangerous propensities
toward women, plaintiff has nonetheless failed to allege particular facts to substantiate his claim that
Warden Jackson had a specific intent to injure the decedent, or that he had actual knowledge that the
decedent would certainly be injured or attacked by Herndon, particularly when the complaint alleges
that Herndon was assigned to work with the decedent “on a very frequent basis.” Travis, supra.
Indeed, plaintiff’s attorney acknowledged on the record that Warden Jackson was not warned that the
planned killing was of Tammy Sperle specifically. A statement of fact conceded by an attorney during a
legal proceeding is binding on his client. See Ann Arbor Tenants Union v Ann Arbor YMCA, 229
Mich App 431, 440; 581 NW2d 794 (1998); City of Ferndale v Ealand, 88 Mich App 107, 111;
276 NW2d 534 (1979). Thus, because these facts are not in dispute, as a matter of law we find that
plaintiff’s complaint failed to plead facts sufficient to establish that defendants specifically intended to
injure the decedent or that they were certain that injury to the decedent would occur. Gray, supra;
Travis, supra. See Bazinau v Mackinac Island Carriage Tours, 233 Mich App 743, 752-753; 593
NW2d 219 (1999) (under the standards set forth in Travis, the plaintiff failed to establish that the
defendant had actual knowledge that injury was certain to occur).
Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s claims against defendant
Prough for lack of jurisdiction.3 We disagree.
Under MCL 600.6419; MSA 27A.6419, the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over
suits against public officials acting in their official capacity as well as suits against state agencies or
departments. Burnett v Moore, 111 Mich App 646, 648; 314 NW2d 458 (1981); Grunow v
Sanders, 84 Mich App 578; 269 NW2d 683 (1978). In determining whether an individual qualifies as
a “state officer,” the primary focus is on the degree of discretion and independence associated with the
position. Lowery v Dep’t of Corrections, 146 Mich App 342, 348; 380 NW2d 99 (1985). Only the
highest ranking officers of a state governmental agency are deemed “state officials” that can be sued in
the Court of Claims. Burnett, supra at 648-649. We agree with the trial court’s finding that Donald
Prough, the security supervisor at the prison, was not an “executive officer of a state department and
commission,” given his limited degree of discretion and independence. Lowery, supra at 348.
Accordingly, Prough was not a state officer over whom the Court of Claims would have jurisdiction.
In light of our resolution of the above issues, we need not address plaintiff’s remaining claims.
Affirmed.
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/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
1
No evidence was presented regarding whether the prison supply store in which the decedent worked
was operated primarily for the purpose of making a profit or whether the store existed primarily for the
purpose of supplying inmates with personal items without having prisoners leave the prison grounds to
secure such goods. Furthermore, no facts were developed on the record regarding where the store’s
profits, if any, were deposited.
2
“Although [the] decision in Travis generated separate opinions, a majority of the Court agreed that the
Legislature intended that actions falling within the intentional tort exception encompassed only those in
which an employer acts with a specific purpose to injure an employee.” Gray, supra at 743, n 3, citing
Travis, supra at 191-192.
3
Both the trial court’s opinion and order and plaintiff’s claim of appeal address dismissal of the claims
against defendant Williams, however, neither plaintiff’s statement of questions presented nor his brief
claim any error regarding defendant Williams’ dismissal. Accordingly, this claim is deemed abandoned
on appeal. See Hilliard v Schmidt, 231 Mich App 316, 318; 586 NW2d 263 (1998); Dresden v
Detroit Macomb Hospital Corp, 218 Mich App 292, 300; 553 NW2d 387 (1996).
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