PEOPLE OF MI V JAMES LEROY ROSE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 21, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 208810
Recorder’s Court
LC No. 97-000784
JAMES LEROY ROSE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Griffin, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr., and J.B. Sullivan*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his jury trial convictions for two counts of felonious assault,
MCL 750.82; MSA 28.277, and second-degree child abuse, MCL 750.136b(3); MSA 28.331(2)(3).
Defendant was sentenced to two years and eight months to four years’ imprisonment for each
conviction. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the prosecutor was guilty of misconduct for her introduction of other
bad acts evidence. We disagree. In reviewing claims of prosecutorial misconduct, this Court must
examine the record and evaluate the challenged remarks in context. People v Rice (On Remand), 235
Mich App 429, 435; 597 NW2d 843 (1999). “The test is whether defendant was denied a fair and
impartial trial.” People v Paquette, 214 Mich App 336, 342; 543 NW2d 342 (1995). After
reviewing the statements in context, we conclude that the prosecutor was not guilty of misconduct.
Additionally, the trial court sustained some of defense counsel’s objections to evidence that
defendant now challenges, and later instructed the jury that excluded evidence was not to be considered
in reaching a verdict. Jurors are presumed to follow the instructions given. People v Graves, 458
Mich 476, 486; 581 NW2d 229 (1998). We conclude that defendant was not prejudiced by the
prosecutor’s introduction of other bad acts evidence.
Even if we were to determine that the challenged testimony amounted to prosecutorial
misconduct, reversal is not warranted unless it is more probable than not that the error was outcome
* Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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determinative. People v Brownridge (On Remand), 237 Mich App 210, 216; 602 NW2d
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584 (1999), quoting People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). Defendant was
charged with two counts of assault with intent to murder, MCL 750.83; MSA 28.278, and first-degree
child abuse, MCL 750.136b(2); MSA 28.331(2)(2). The trial court instructed the jury that they could
consider lesser offenses in determining defendant’s guilt. Defendant was convicted of two counts of
felonious assault, MCL 750.82; MSA 28.277, and second degree child abuse, MCL 750.136b(3);
MSA 28.331(2)(3).
We conclude that the challenged testimony was not outcome determinative. The assault element
of felonious assault was proven by Carrillo’s testimony that she was afraid. Also, a police officer
testified that there was a red substance on the hammer which might have been blood. The intent
element was proven by Carrillo’s description of the assault, and a treating physician’s corroborating
description of her injuries. Defendant testified that he did not intend to hit Carrillo with the hammer, but
admitted he was holding the hammer and he must have hit her with it once. Defendant said that he
“freaked out” when Carrillo reached for the shelf where an air gun was kept; however, a police officer
testified that he did not find a gun when he searched the house. Given this evidence, the jury could have
found that the prosecution proved all of the elements of the felonious assault without considering the
testimony regarding the prior abuse.
The second-degree child abuse conviction was also established through the evidence. Carrillo
testified that defendant continued to hit her with the hammer while she was holding the child. Carrillo
stated that defendant hit the child in the head with the hammer. A treating physician testified that the
child had a depressed fracture of the left frontal bone, which was a serious injury. Given this evidence,
the jury could have found that the prosecution proved all of the elements of second-degree child abuse
without considering the testimony of prior abuse. The challenged testimony was not outcome
determinative.
Defendant challenges some of the prosecutor’s remarks that were not objected to at trial.
Absent objection at trial, review is precluded unless the prejudicial effect of the misconduct could not
have been cured by a cautionary instruction or manifest injustice would result by not considering the
issue. People v Truong (After Remand), 218 Mich App 325, 336; 553 NW2d 692 (1996). We
conclude that defendant cannot establish that the prejudicial effect of the misconduct could not have
been cured by a cautionary instruction or that manifest injustice would result from this Court’s failure to
consider the issue. Therefore, this issue is not properly before this Court, and we decline the
opportunity to address these remarks.
Defendant’s final argument is that the trial court erred when it admitted evidence of defendant’s
other bad acts.1 We disagree. Evidentiary rulings are within the discretion of the trial court, and are
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Starr, 457 Mich 490, 494; 577 NW2d 673 (1998).
Admissibility rulings should only be reversed where there is a clear abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of
discretion occurs when there is no justification for the trial court’s ruling in light of the facts presented.
People v Ullah, 216 Mich App 669, 673; 550 NW2d 568 (1996).
MRE 404(b) is not implicated unless the defendant’s character can be inferred from the act and
the conduct in question can be inferred from the defendant’s character. People v VanderVliet, 444
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Mich 52, 62-64; 508 NW2d 114 (1993), modified 445 Mich 1205 (1994). “Therefore, if the
proffered other acts evidence is logically relevant, and does not involve the intermediate inference of
character, Rule 404(b) is not implicated.” Id. at 64. Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable that it would be without the evidence. MRE 401; People v Brooks, 453 Mich 511, 517; 557
NW2d 106 (1996); People v Campbell, 236 Mich App 490, 503; 601 NW2d 114 (1999).
Contrary to defendant’s assertion, we conclude that the prosecution’s questions concerning
defendant’s betting did not elicit bad act evidence, but relevant evidence under MRE 401. Throughout
his testimony, defendant attempted to portray Carrillo as the antagonist in the relationship. Defendant
testified that Carrillo started the argument that led to the assault on January 9, 1997. Defendant stated
that he was afraid of Carrillo due to prior instances of her abusing him. Defendant testified that Carrillo
had attacked him with a dagger, called the neighbors to beat him up, “sucker punched” him, and hit him
with a gun. Defendant stated that he picked up the hammer in order to defend himself if Carrillo
attacked him. Defendant denied that he intended to strike Carrillo with the hammer. In his efforts to
portray Carrillo as the aggressor, defendant made his gambling relevant. While defendant’s character
may have been inferred from his gambling, defendant’s assault of Carrillo and the child could have been
inferred from any character inferences that arose from the testimony of his gambling. Therefore, MRE
404(b) was not implicated by the testimony that defendant gambled.
Relevant evidence may be excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” MRE 403; People v Mills, 450
Mich 61, 75; 537 NW2d 909, modified 450 Mich 1212 (1995). We conclude that the probative value
of defendant’s testimony regarding his betting on horses was not substantially outweighed by any of the
considerations put forth in MRE 403. While the testimony was potentially damaging, this does not mean
that it was unfairly prejudicial. Mills, supra at 74-75.
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence that defendant threatened
Carrillo after the court told defendant not to have contact with her. Again, we disagree.
MRE 404(b) prohibits the use of other acts evidence to establish character in order to prove
conformity with that character. MRE 404(b); Lukity, supra. However, character evidence is
admissible to prove motive, intent, lack of mistake, identity, and a common scheme or plan. Id. In
ruling on the admissibility of other act evidence under MRE 404(b), the trial court must determine:
First, that the evidence be offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b); second, that
it be relevant under Rule 402 as enforced through Rule 104(b); third, that the probative
value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice; fourth, that the
trial court may, upon request, provide a limiting instruction to the jury. [Starr, supra,
quoting VanderVliet, supra.]
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The prosecution bears the initial burden of establishing relevance of the evidence to prove a fact within
one of the exceptions to the general exclusionary rule of MRE 404(b). People v Crawford, 458 Mich
376, 385; 582 NW2d 785 (1998).
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the testimony
regarding defendant’s threatening of Carrillo. The prosecution explained to the trial court that the
question concerning the no contact order was relevant to defendant’s state of mind. Due to the crimes
that were charged, defendant’s intent was a key issue in the trial. Defendant testified that Carrillo
instigated the argument that led to the assault on January 9, 1997. Defendant stated that he had the
hammer for self-defense purposes only, and that his intention was to be peaceful. The act of threatening
a witness can demonstrate the defendant’s consciousness of guilt, and is generally admissible. People v
Scholl, 453 Mich 730, 740; 556 NW2d 851 (1996). In light of the facts presented, the trial court’s
ruling was justified.
Even if we were to determine that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence
of defendant’s threats, the erroneous admission of evidence should not be reversed because any such
error would have been harmless. MCR 2.613(A); People v Travis, 443 Mich 668, 686; 505 NW2d
563 (1993). Whether an error was harmless is determined by assessing it in the context of the untainted
evidence to determine whether it is more probable than not that a different outcome would have resulted
without it. Lukity, supra. We find that it would not.
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Joseph B. Sullivan
1
Defendant does not specify on appeal which evidentiary rulings were an abuse of discretion.
Therefore, we assume that defendant is referring to the errors mentioned in Issue I of his brief on
appeal. Since defendant’s question presented states that the evidence was admitted over defense
counsel’s objections, the bad acts evidence that we review will be limited to those errors contained in
Issue I that were objected to during trial.
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