PEOPLE OF MI V LON ALAN TODD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 18, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 217633
Allegan Circuit Court
LC No. 98-010937-FH
LON ALAN TODD,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Gage, P.J., and Meter and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to
deliver, MCL 333.7401(2)(d)(iii); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(d)(iii), and possession of cocaine, MCL
333.7403(2)(a)(v); MSA 14.15(7403)(2)(a)(v), and was sentenced to three years’ probation, with the
first sixty days to be served in the Allegan County Jail. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
I
The first issue is whether the trial court erred by denying defendant’s motion to suppress the
evidence seized during the execution of the search warrant. Defendant argues that the affidavit in
support of the search warrant failed to establish probable cause, the information contained in the
affidavit was “stale,” the scope of the search warrant was overbroad, and that the trial court improperly
interpreted the word “quantity” to mean “substantial quantity.” In fact, the gravamen of defendant’s
argument centers on the interpretation of the word “quantity.”
Generally, we review a trial court’s findings of fact regarding a motion to suppress evidence for
clear error. People v Burrell, 417 Mich 439, 448-449; 339 NW2d 403 (1983). This Court, in
People v Echavarria, 233 Mich App 356, 366-367; 592 NW2d 737 (1999), summarized:
A search warrant affidavit prepared on the basis of information provided to the
affiant by an unnamed person must provide sufficient facts from which a magistrate
could find that the information supplied was based on personal knowledge and that
either the unnamed person was credible or that the information was reliable. . . . When
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reviewing a magistrate’s decision to issue a search warrant, this Court must evaluate the
search warrant and underlying affidavit in a commonsense and realistic manner. This
Court must then determine whether a reasonably cautious person could have concluded,
under the totality of the circumstances, that there was a substantial basis for the
magistrate’s finding of probable cause. [Citations omitted.]
Put somewhat differently, the United States Supreme Court has stated that a magistrate must simply
determine that “there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place.” Illinois v Gates, 462 US 213, 238; 103 S Ct 2317; 76 L Ed 2d 527 (1983),
quoting Jones v United States, 362 US 257, 271; 80 S Ct 725; 4 L Ed 2d 697 (1960). The
reviewing court then assesses the magistrate’s determination to ensure that there was a “ ‘substantial
basis for . . . conclud[ing]’ that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing.” Gates, supra at
236.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by interpreting “quantity” to mean “substantial
quantity,” where the affidavit stated that the confidential informant observed “a quantity of marijuana” at
defendant’s residence. The word quantity, of course, can have different meanings depending on its
context. Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1997) includes several different definitions
for “quantity,” including: “1. an indefinite or aggregate amount . . . 3. a considerable or great amount.”
To the extent that defendant suggests “quantity” could refer to one marijuana cigarette, we do not
believe that is a fair interpretation of this word. Rather, in the absence of a modifying adjective, we
believe that, in the present context, “quantity” is most appropriately defined as “considerable or great
amount.” At the very least, we do not believe that the trial court erred by recognizing that the magistrate
could have applied this common-sense definition in its probable cause inquiry.
Defendant, however, contends that the trial court erred by considering the definition of
“quantity” without limiting itself to the “four corners of the document.” Defendant places particular
reliance on our Supreme Court’s decision in People v Sloan, 450 Mich 160, 168-169; 538 NW2d
380 (1995),1 where it held that reviewing courts must ensure that the magistrate’s decision was based
on actual facts and not merely the affiant’s conclusions. Nevertheless, we do not believe that
interpreting the contextual meaning of a word contained in the affidavit goes beyond the “four corners of
the document,” and defendant cites no authority suggesting that the magistrate or trial court may not do
so. Rather, it has repeatedly been held that affidavits must be interpreted in a “common-sense and
realistic manner.” People v Russo, 439 Mich 584, 604; 487 NW2d 698 (1992); Echavarria, supra
at 366. Thus, we do not believe that interpretation of the word “quantity” required reliance on any
conclusion of the affiant, nor did the ultimate finding of probable cause; rather, the magistrate’s
interpretation was based on a “common-sense and realistic” interpretation of the word “quantity” within
the context of the search warrant affidavit.
Defendant further contends that the information contained in the affidavit was “stale.” Our
Supreme Court has held that “staleness” is a factor to consider when determining whether there was
probable cause for a search. Russo, supra at 605. The Court held, however, that age is not the sole
determinative factor, and that the “staleness” inquiry includes a consideration of the nature of the
property to be seized as well as other factors. Russo, supra at 605-606, citing 2 LaFave, Search and
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Seizure (2d ed), § 3.7(a), p 77 and quoting Andresen v Maryland, 24 Md App 128, 172; 331 A2d
78 (1975), aff’d 427 US 463; 96 S Ct 2737; 49 L Ed 2d 627 (1976). The ultimate determination to
be made is whether, considering the totality of applicable factors, the property to be seized is likely to
be present at the place specified in the search warrant application. Russo, supra at 605-606; People v
Stumpf, 196 Mich App 218, 226; 492 NW2d 795 (1992).
The trial court concluded that no more than 82½ hours elapsed between the confidential
informant’s observation of the marijuana at defendant’s residence and the execution of the search
warrant. Defendant does not challenge this finding by the trial court. As stated above, we conclude that
the affidavit supports the trial court’s interpretation of the word “quantity” to mean “substantial
quantity.” Observation of a “quantity” (as defined above) of marijuana suggests either the existence of
an on-going conspiracy, or at least, an amount for personal use sufficiently large enough not to be used
up in a few days’ time. Andresen, supra at 172. Moreover, the observation was made at defendant’s
home, not on the street, suggesting that the marijuana would still be at that location. Id. Accordingly,
we are not convinced that a “quantity” of marijuana could dissipate within this time frame sufficient to
render the confidential informant’s observations “stale.”
Next, defendant contends that the search warrant was “grossly overbroad” because it
authorized a search for items related to drug trafficking based on facts alleging only the presence of
marijuana at defendant’s residence. Our Supreme Court has held, however, that evidence of a delivery
of a controlled substance to a defendant’s residence is sufficient to support a search for drug trafficking
paraphernalia. People v Landt, 439 Mich 870; 475 NW2d 825 (1991). Although the instant matter
does not involve evidence of a delivery of a controlled substance, the facts suggest that defendant was
already in possession of the marijuana. At the very least, we interpret this decision to not require
specific proof of a controlled substance transfer from defendant to a third party to support a probable
cause finding for drug trafficking. Moreover, to the extent that the affidavit suggests a “quantity” of
marijuana was observed at defendant’s residence, this provides further support for the magistrate’s
finding of probable cause as to the drug trafficking paraphernalia.
Finally, from the testimony presented at trial, it appears that defendant directed the police to his
bedroom closet and that was where the contraband and drugs were seized. The police would have
been justified, under the “plain view” exception to the warrant requirement, in seizing readily apparent
contraband from the closet even had such items not been listed in the search warrant. Coolidge v New
Hampshire, 403 US 443; 91 S Ct 2022; 29 L Ed 2d 564 (1971); People v Champion, 452 Mich 92,
101-103; 549 NW2d 849 (1996). Accordingly, even if the search warrant was overbroad, defendant
has failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to suppression of the cocaine, methamphetamine, scales, and
money that was seized along with the marijuana. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err
by denying defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized under any of defendant’s individual
grounds.
Turning to the combined effect of defendant’s individual grounds to suppress the evidence, we
must determine whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonably cautious person could
have concluded that there was a “substantial basis,” or “a fair probability that the items will be found in
a particular place,” for the magistrate’s finding of probable cause. Russo, supra at 604; Echavarria,
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supra, at 366-367. In the instant matter, a reliable, confidential informant2 stated that a “quantity” of
marijuana was observed at defendant’s residence within about 82½ hours preceding the execution of the
search warrants. Consequently, notwithstanding defendant’s arguments to the contrary, we conclude
that there was indeed a “substantial basis” to conclude that there was a “fair probability” that the
marijuana would still be present at defendant’s home.
II
Next, defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying defendant’s motion to compel
disclosure of the confidential informant. Specifically, defendant argued that the informant must have
observed defendant and the marijuana, that the informant would have to testify that he or she did not
observe defendant actually delivering marijuana to anyone, and that this testimony would thus support
defendant’s claim that he did not intend to deliver the marijuana. Moreover, defendant doubted that the
confidential informant existed because none of defendant’s acquaintances acknowledged being the
informant. Defendant contended that at the very least, a hearing in camera was required to determine
whether the informant’s identity should be compelled.
We review a trial court's decision to not compel disclosure of the identity of a confidential
informant under a clearly erroneous standard. People v Acosta, 153 Mich App 504, 509; 396 NW2d
463 (1986) (citing MCR 2.613(C)).
In People v Underwood, 447 Mich 695; 526 NW2d 903 (1994), our Supreme Court held
that “the most useful [procedural vehicle] for helping a trial judge to strike the appropriate balance
between these competing interests is the in camera hearing.” Id. at 706 (quoting People v Stander, 73
Mich App 617, 622-623; 251 NW2d 258 (1977)). The Underwood Court further held:
Thus, where the government invokes the privilege in the face of a defense
request for disclosure, and where the accused is able to demonstrate a possible need
for the informant's testimony, the trial judge should require production of the
informant and conduct a hearing in chambers, and out of the presence of the defendant.
At this hearing the court will have an opportunity to examine the informant in order to
determine whether he could offer any testimony helpful to the defense. [Underwood,
supra at 706 (quoting Stander, supra at 622-623) (emphasis added).]
Thus, as noted by the trial court, the issue in the instant matter becomes whether defendant
demonstrated a possible need for the informant’s testimony.
The United States Supreme Court recognized the unfairness that can result to a defendant’s
case with an unlimited informer’s privilege. Roviaro v United States, 353 US 53, 60-61; 77 S Ct
623; 1 L Ed 2d 639 (1957). In Roviaro, the confidential informant was the only other party to an
illegal drug transaction with the defendant and thus was the only witness who could possibly testify on
behalf of the defendant or contradict the testimony of the government witnesses. Id. at 64. The
Supreme Court therefore concluded that, under the circumstances, the trial court erred by not
compelling disclosure of the informant. Id. at 65.
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In the instant matter, however, defendant argued that there were individuals at his residence who
denied being the informant, suggesting that the informant might have been fabricated. Defendant’s claim
proceeds from the assumption that the informant, who sought confidentiality from the police, would have
willingly revealed to defendant that he had informed on defendant to the police. We find defendant’s
underlying assumption tenuous. In any event, defendant was free to call any of these individuals as
witnesses to rebut the prosecutor’s circumstantial evidence of an intent to deliver marijuana. In other
words, unlike Roviaro, there were additional witnesses to defendant’s conduct and there was no
evidence suggesting the uniqueness of the informant’s testimony. To the extent that defendant narrowed
the number of possible informants, defendant cites no authority suggesting that the prosecutor was
required to disclose which one, if any, was the informant.
Moreover, defendant presented no evidence supporting his assertion that Deputy Gardiner
fabricated the confidential informant or submitted a false affidavit. Along the same lines, there was no
evidence presented supporting entrapment. Presumably, if defendant knew who he obtained the
marijuana from, he could have interviewed or named that individual as a witness; in other words,
confirming that individual as the confidential informant was still possible without dissolving the
informant’s privilege. As noted by the trial court, defendant has simply made the statement that the
confidential informant might have information necessary to a defense, without supporting this assertion
whatsoever. Thus, we believe that the facts and circumstances of this case do not warrant abrogation of
the informant’s privilege. We conclude that the trial court did not err by denying defendant’s request for
the prosecutor to reveal the identity of the confidential informant.
III
Finally, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s
conclusion regarding the “intent to deliver” element. Specifically, defendant has noted Deputy
Gardiner’s testimony that it was possible that: (i) a personal user of marijuana could purchase in greater
quantity to benefit from a lower per-unit price; (ii) an individual could possess 256 grams of marijuana
for personal use; and (iii) a personal user could own a triple-beam scale to measure the accuracy of
purchases. In other words, defendant contends that Gardiner’s concessions prevented a finding of
intent to deliver beyond a reasonable doubt.
This Court has held that the “intent to deliver” element may be proven by circumstantial
evidence, and may be inferred from the amount of a controlled substance possessed by the accused.
People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 524; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992);
People v Abrego, 72 Mich App 176, 181; 249 NW2d 345 (1976)). In Abrego, this Court deemed
the evidence sufficient to support a possession with intent to deliver charge, rather than mere
possession, where the defendant possessed enough heroin to produce only “35 to 46 hits.” Abrego,
supra at 182. This Court has also held that possessing almost four ounces of marijuana, divided into
different types of packages, was sufficient to support an intent to deliver. Wayne Co Prosecutor v
Recorder's Court Judge, 119 Mich App 159, 163; 326 NW2d 825 (1982).
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In the instant matter, Deputy Gardiner testified that, in his experience, defendant possessed
enough marijuana to make roughly 512 marijuana joints — more than ten times the units in Abrego.
Furthermore, Gardiner testified that a typical purchase for personal use would be about twenty-eight
grams. Gardiner also testified that defendant possessed a triple-beam scale that is commonly used by
drug dealers to weigh narcotics and $2,900 in cash, and that both were found in the same closet as the
marijuana. In light of the case law and viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution,
Wolfe, supra at 515, we conclude that sufficient evidence was presented to justify the trial court’s
finding that defendant possessed the requisite intent to deliver the marijuana beyond a reasonable doubt.
Affirmed.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Donald S. Owens
1
This decision was overruled on other grounds by our Supreme Court in People v Wager, 460 Mich
118; 594 NW2d 487 (1999).
2
Even where a search warrant affidavit is based on statements of an unnamed informant, the magistrate
is only required to determine, under a totality of the circumstances, that the search warrant sets forth
probable cause to believe that the items sought will be in the enumerated location. Illinois v Gates,
supra at 230-239. Allegations in the affidavit that demonstrate the basis for the informant’s knowledge
and that show that the informant is credible or that his information is reliable will, when analyzed
properly under a totality of the circumstances, support the magistrate’s probable cause determination.
Id. In this case, the informant told Deputy Gardiner that he had personally observed the quantity of
marijuana (basis of knowledge) and Gardiner stated that the informant had previously provided
evidence that led to the issuance of eight search warrants, the execution of which resulted in the
recovery of “marijuana, methamphetamine, cocaine, LSD, and weapons” (credibility of the informant).
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