PEOPLE OF MI V ROBERT KEITH STRAY JR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 28, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 213003
Montcalm Circuit Court
LC No. 98-000037-FC
ROBERT KEITH STRAY, JR,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Gage, P.J., and Meter and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL
750.520b(1)(a); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(a), and sentenced to eight to twenty-five years’ imprisonment.1
Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury. Because defendant
failed to object to the instruction, the issue is unpreserved. People v Grant, 445 Mich 535, 546; 520
NW2d 123 (1994). This Court reviews a claim of unpreserved instructional error for plain error to
determine if the claim has been forfeited. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 761-763, 767; 597
NW2d 130 (1999). In Carines, supra at 763-764, our Supreme Court summarized the plain error
analysis as follows:
To avoid forfeiture under the plain error rule, three requirements must be met: 1) error
must have occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, 3) and the plain error
affected substantial rights. . . . The third requirement g
enerally requires a showing of
prejudice, i.e., that the error affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings. . . .
Finally, once a defendant satisfies these three requirements, an appellate court must
exercise its discretion in deciding whether to reverse. Reversal is warranted only when
the plain, forfeited error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or
when an error “ ‘seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings’ independent of the defendant’s innocence.” [Citations omitted.]
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After the trial court instructed the jurors and dismissed them to deliberate, the court met with
counsel in chambers and defense counsel, although stating that he had no objections to the court’s
instructions, commented that he was unsure if the court had instructed the jury concerning the “time,
place, and venue” of the offense. The court then brought the jurors back to the courtroom and gave
them the following instruction:
In connection with this finding, ladies and gentlemen, it would be, that this
alleged act with which the defendant is charged happened on or about the 21st or 22nd
of November in Ferris Township of Montcalm County.
Defendant did not object to this instruction. However, on appeal defendant contends that it
constituted a finding of fact by the trial court regarding the date and time of the alleged incident.
Defendant argues that the date of the alleged incident was a key issue in the case, given that defendant
presented several alibi witnesses, and that the court’s instruction effectively extinguished any factual
controversy. Defendant asserts that he is entitled to a new trial, and relies on People v Place, 226
Mich 212; 197 NW 513 (1924); People v Allensworth, 401 Mich 67; 257 NW2d 81 (1977); and
People v Brocato, 17 Mich App 277; 169 NW2d 483 (1969). We find these cases inapplicable.
In Place, supra, the alleged victim testified that the defendant took certain indecent liberties
with her in the afternoon of February 3, 1923, in the defendant’s office. Place, supra at 214. The
defendant presented various witnesses who testified that they had been with the defendant, in his office,
during the afternoon on the date of the alleged incident. Id. When instructing the jurors, the trial court
refused a defense request for an instruction specifically limiting the time and date of the offense to the
afternoon of February 3, 1923, and instead instructed them that they needed only to determine if the
defendant committed the alleged acts “on or about” February 3, 1923. Our Supreme Court held that
the trial court erred in not specifically confining the temporal element of the charge to the afternoon of
February 3, 1923, given the specificity of the allegations. Id. at 217.
Place is distinguishable from this case. First, in the present case, the victim’s allegations
regarding the date of the incident were not limited to a particular date and time. Rather, based on both
his testimony and various statements he made to others, the victim was not absolutely certain whether
the molestation occurred on Friday, November 21, 1997, or Saturday, November 22, 1997. The
prosecution’s complaint and the felony information also alleged that the acts giving rise to the present
case took place on either November 21 or 22, 1997. Second, the present case, unlike Place, involves
a claim of error that is not preserved. Third, the Place court’s reversal of the defendant’s conviction
did not rest solely on its finding that the jury instruction was improper. Rather, the Supreme Court’s
holding was inextricably intertwined with its finding that the trial court also committed errors in admitting
certain evidence against the defendant. Place, supra at 216-217. Moreover, we note that in this case
defendant used the victim’s uncertainty regarding the date, time, and place of the incident to argue that
the victim’s testimony was not credible or worthy of belief; to that extent, it assisted the defense to have
the judge instruct the jury regarding two possible dates because that uncertainty dovetailed with the
defense theory that the victim was fabricating this incident. Finally, the basic defense in this case was
not a dispute over time or place, it was that the incident never happened.
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The Brocato decision is similarly unavailing. In Brocato, the felony information charged the
defendant with taking indecent liberties with a female who was under the age of sixteen. Id. at 281
282. The information also contained a statement that the victim positively knew that the alleged
misconduct occurred on Tuesday, September 28, 1965. Id. at 286. This Court held that the trial court
erred in failing to instruct the jurors to confine their deliberations to a determination whether the alleged
offense took place on September 28, 1965 because there was nothing in the record to indicate that the
incident occurred at some other time, and because defendant and his witnesses were able to account for
defendant’s activities during the specific time period alleged by the victim. Id. at 288.
In the present case, however, the court’s instruction limited the jurors to considering whether the
alleged acts happened on either November 21 or 22, 1997. These were the same dates contained in
the complaint and information, and to which the victim testified at trial, and so the trial court did not give
the jurors free rein to consider dates that were unsupported by the record.
In Allensworth, supra at 69, the trial court instructed the jury that it need not deliberate, and
could find as a matter o fact that a murder took place on a particular date. In the present case,
f
however, the court did not command the jurors to find that defendant committed the prohibited act at a
specific time. This Court reviews jury instructions as a whole, and balances the general tenor of the
instructions against the potentially misleading effect of a single sentence contained within them. People v
Bell, 209 Mich App 273, 276; 530 NW2d 167 (1995); People v Davis, 199 Mich App 502, 515;
503 NW2d 457 (1993); People v Freedland, 178 Mich App 761, 766; 444 NW2d 250 (1989). A
review of the lower court record indicates that defense counsel requested the court to instruct the jury
on “time, place, and venue.” The court instructed the jury that in order to convict defendant of the
charged offense, the jurors would have to find that the alleged events occurred on either November 21
or 22, 1997. The instruction contained the key terms “would be” and “alleged,” and did not include
any imperatives. The instruction was proper, and therefore did not constitute plain error.
Nor has defendant demonstrated that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s instruction. As we
observed above, the gist of the defense was that this incident never happened, not that it might have
happened at a time other than Friday or Saturday night. The victim’s uncertainty regarding the time was
only material insofar as it provided defendant with a basis for arguing that the victim fabricated the
incident. Thus, the trial court’s instruction did not prejudice defendant. Accordingly, we conclude that
defendant has failed to demonstrate plain error and prejudice; this claim was therefore forfeit by
defendant’s failure to object to the court’s instruction.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred when it calculated his sentence. According to
defendant the court should not have scored fifteen points under offense variable five because the record
did not support a finding that the victim was moved to another place of greater danger or was held
captive. However, because the former sentencing guidelines do not have the force of law, a claim of a
miscalculated variable is not in itself a claim of legal error. People v Mitchell, 454 Mich 145, 175,
178; 560 NW2d 600 (1997). Thus, a putative error in the scoring guidelines is simply not a basis upon
which an appellate court can grant relief. People v Raby, 456 Mich 487, 499; 572 NW2d 644
(1998).
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Affirmed.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Donald S. Owens
1
Defendant’s codefendant, the victim’s father, John Frederick Schutte, was tried and convicted of first
degree criminal sexual conduct in a separate trial. His case has also been appealed to this Court.
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