IN RE POMEROY MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of ALLISON POMEROY, RYAN C.
POMEROY, and KELSEY N. POMEROY, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
March 10, 2000
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
CONSTANCE M. FALING, a/k/a CONNIE
FALING,
No. 217536
Jackson Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 97-019258-NA
Respondent-Appellant,
and
BRIAN FALING,
Respondent.
Before: Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and Smolenski and Collins, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-appellant Constance M. Faling (“appellant”) appeals as of right from an order
terminating her parental rights to the minor children pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (g); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i) and (g). We affirm in part and reverse in part.
In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one of the statutory
grounds for termination has been met by clear and convincing evidence. In re McIntyre, 192 Mich
App 47, 50; 480 NW2d 293 (1991). This Court reviews the trial court’s findings of fact for clear
error. MCR 5.974(I); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989).
The family court terminated appellant’s parental rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and
(g); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i) and (g), which provide in pertinent part:
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(3) The court may terminate a parent’s parental rights to a child if the court
finds, by clear and convincing evidence, 1 or more of the following:
***
(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter,
182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, and
the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:
(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no
reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time
considering the child’s age.
***
(g) The parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or custody
for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to
provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.
Here, the condition leading to the initial adjudication was appellant’s educational neglect of her
children, which arose from the children’s excessive absenteeism from school. Chronic absenteeism is a
form of educational neglect. See, e.g., In re Nash, 165 Mich App 450, 456; 419 NW2d 1 (1987).
Because educational neglect is one statutory ground granting the trial court jurisdiction over minors,
MCL 712A.2(b)(1); MSA 27.3178(598.2b)(1), a parent’s failure to rectify this condition after an initial
dispositional order can result in termination of parental rights. See MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i).
The record shows that all four of appellant’s children were removed from appellant’s custody in
December 1997 on the basis of educational neglect.1 In July 1998, Allison Pomeroy was returned to
appellant’s custody. A foster care worker testified that only Allison was returned to appellant because
“Allison was seen as the most difficult child for her to handle, and we wanted her to be able to focus
attention on Allison.” However, on September 16, 1998, because Allison had attended school only
twice since the first of that month, the court ordered Allison back into foster care. Given that Allison’s
chronic absenteeism continued after she was returned to appellant’s custody, we find that the family
court did not clearly err in finding that MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i) was
established by clear and convincing evidence with respect to Allison Pomeroy. Because the family court
found clear and convincing evidence to support termination of appellant’s parental rights as to Allison
under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i), we n not address appellant’s
eed
contention that the court erred in terminating her rights to Allison pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(g);
MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(g). Further, appellant has failed to show that termination of her parental
rights to Allison was clearly not in Allison’s best interests.
MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA
23.3178(598.19b)(5); In re Hall-Smith, 222 Mich App 470, 472-473; 564 NW2d 156 (1997).
Accordingly, we find that the family court did not err in terminating appellant’s parental rights as to
Allison Pomeroy.
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We conclude, however, that the trial court erred in terminating appellant’s parental rights as to
Ryan Pomeroy and Kelsey Pomeroy. MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i) was
not established by clear and convincing evidence with regard to the two youngest Pomeroy children.
Although educational neglect is a ground for granting the circuit court jurisdiction over minors, MCL
712A.2(b)(1); MSA 27.3178(598.2b)(1), once Ryan and Kelsey were removed from appellant’s
custody, appellant never had the chance to demonstrate that she could get them to school. Appellant
testified that the younger children had missed school because of head lice or illness. The court did not
express doubts concerning appellant’s testimony in this regard. The evidence shows that appellant
maintained a clean and safe home and that she has completed parenting classes, attended visits with her
children regularly, generally cooperated with case workers, and remained under medical care for her
mental illness. To the extent that appellant was given the chance to demonstrate her ability to rectify the
conditions that led to the initial adjudication, i.e., educational neglect, it was with Allison alone, the most
difficult child. Because appellant had no opportunity after Ryan and Kelsey were removed from her
custody to demonstrate an improved ability to get them to school, with or without Allison being in the
home, it is premature to conclude that reform is not likely in this regard within a reasonable time. See In
re Newman, 189 Mich App 61, 68-69; 472 NW2d 38 (1991).
Moreover, MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(g); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(g) was not established by
clear and convincing evidence with regard to the two youngest children. Although the evidence shows
that appellant suffers from a mental illness for which she takes medication, that she sometimes handles
anger inappropriately, and that a clinical psychologist found her to be immature, oppositional, verbally
aggressive, irresponsible, and manipulative, there were no allegations or evidence of abuse, and it is
undisputed that appellant’s home was clean and stocked with food. With regard to the evidence of
educational neglect, as discussed above, because appellant was not afforded the opportunity, after Ryan
and Kelsey were removed from her custody, to show that she could get them to school, it is premature
to conclude that she would not be able to do so within a reasonable time.
The family court’s order is affirmed with regard to the termination of appellant’s parental rights
to Allison Pomeroy, and it is reversed with regard to the termination of appellant’s parental rights to
Ryan Pomeroy and Kelsey Pomeroy.
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Jeffrey G. Collins
1
In accordance with petitioner’s position, the trial court did not terminate parental rights as to
appellant’s eldest child, Beth Marie Pomeroy.
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