PEOPLE OF MI V JOHN HENRY DIXON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 25, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 208349
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 94-130880-FC
JOHN HENRY DIXON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Meter, P.J., and Griffin and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct, MCL 750.520b; MSA 28.788(2), and was sentenced to two concurrent terms of twenty-five
to fifty years’ imprisonment. He appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant was convicted of sexually assaulting the twelve-year-old daughter of his live-in
girlfriend. The assaults allegedly occurred in October and December 1993.
Defendant first argues that he was denied his right to a speedy trial under US Const, Am VI and
Const 1963, art 1, § 20. See also MCL 768.1; MSA 28.1024; People v Gilmore, 222 Mich App
442, 459; 564 NW2d 158 (1997). We disagree.
In determining whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, four factors must
be balanced: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) whether the defendant
asserted his right to a speedy trial; and (4) prejudice to the defendant from the delay. Barker v Wingo,
407 US 514, 530; 92 S Ct 2182, 2192; 33 L Ed 2d 101 (1972); People v Hill, 402 Mich 272, 283;
262 NW2d 641 (1978); Gilmore, supra at 459.
It is undisputed that there was a forty-one month period of delay in this case, which is thus
“presumptively prejudicial” to defendant and shifts the burden of proving lack of prejudice to plaintiff.
People v Wickham, 200 Mich App 106, 109; 503 NW2d 701 (1993). There is disagreement with
regard to the reasons for the delay. While there is apparently no dispute that part of the delay resulted
from the stipulated adjournment of trial on several occasions, amounting to about eight months’ delay in
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total, and that part of the delay was attributable to docket congestion and a court error in removing the
case from the trial docket, much of the delay was also attributable to a defense motion for discovery of
the complainant’s psychological records. Because most of the delay involving the receipt of the victim’s
psychological records appeared to be unexplained, we attribute it to the prosecutor, see People v
Patterson, 170 Mich App 162, 167; 427 NW2d 601 (1988), remanded 437 Mich 895 (1991), but
give it “a neutral tint and only minimal weight.” Gilmore, supra at 460. It is also apparent from the
record that defendant repeatedly asserted his right to a speedy trial, moving five times for dismissal on
this basis. Nonetheless, we agree with the trial court’s determination that defendant did not suffer any
cognizable prejudice from the delay so as to deprive him of his right to a speedy trial.
Because defendant was out on bond throughout the pretrial period, he did not suffer any
prejudice from pretrial incarceration. Moreover, contrary to defendant’s claim, his mere anxiety over
trial is insufficient to show that he suffered a violation of his right to a speedy trial. Gilmore, supra at
462. Further, there was no evidence that defendant suffered prejudice because of “lost evidence” or
the “unavailability of a key witness.” Although defendant claims that he was unable to locate a witness
who could have refuted the victim’s testimony pertaining to other sexual acts that he allegedly committed
against her, the proposed testimony of this witness would not have addressed the circumstances of the
charged offenses and, therefore, was unrelated to the determination of defendant’s guilt or innocence in
this particular case. Accordingly, on balance, we conclude that the trial court did not err in ruling that
defendant was not deprived of his right to a speedy trial.
Next, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by precluding defendant from admitting evidence
suggesting a prior sexual assault on the victim by an older brother. MCL 750.520j; MSA 28.788(10);
People v Adair, 452 Mich 473, 484-485; 550 NW2d 505 (1996). The evidence was offered as an
alternative explanation for the condition of the victim’s hymenal ring. As the trial court observed,
however, there was no evidence that the victim’s brother had sexually assaulted or abused the victim.
Thus, unlike People v Mikula, 84 Mich App 108; 269 NW2d 195 (1978) and People v Haley, 153
Mich App 400; 395 NW2d 60 (1986), defendant’s proffered evidence was not relevant for purposes
of showing the origin of the victim’s physical condition. Moreover, in this context, any probative value
of the proposed testimony of defendant’s mother was outweighed by “the inflammatory or prejudicial
nature of the rebuttal evidence.” Mikula, supra at 115.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing the victim to testify regarding other
sexual assaults by defendant. Because defendant did not object to this testimony at trial, he must
establish plain error that was outcome-determinative or error that falls under the category of cases
where prejudice is presumed or reversal is automatic. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764;
597 NW2d 130 (1999); People v Grant, 445 Mich 535, 553; 520 NW2d 123 (1994). Here,
defendant has not established plain error in the admission of this testimony. See People v DerMartzex,
390 Mich 410, 415; 213 NW2d 97 (1973). Further, defendant has not established that defense
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to this testimony. People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 303;
521 NW2d 797 (1994). Defendant has not overcome the presumption that counsel’s failure to object
was a matter of trial strategy. People v Mitchell, 454 Mich 145, 163; 560 NW2d 600 (1997).
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Finally, we reject defendant’s argument that his sentences are disproportionate under People v
Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 635-636; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). The sentences are within the range
recommended by the sentencing guidelines, and defendant has failed to present any “unusual
circumstances” to overcome the presumption of proportionality. People v Sharp, 192 Mich App 501,
505-506; 481 NW2d 773 (1992).
Affirmed.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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