PEOPLE OF MI V KENNETH DWAYNE JONES
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 22, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 214172
Saginaw Circuit Court
LC No. 98 015394 FC
JAMIE HARRINGTON SYLVESTER,
Defendant-Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 214187
Saginaw Circuit Court
LC No. 98 015393 FC
KENNETH DWAYNE JONES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Gribbs, P.J., and Cavanagh and Gage, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
After a jury trial, defendant Sylvester (Docket No. 214172) and defendant Jones (Docket No.
214187) was each convicted of one count of second degree murder, MCL 750.317; MSA 28.549,
and one count of conspiracy to assault with the intent to commit great bodily harm less than murder,
MCL 750.84, 750.157a; MSA 28.279, 28.354(1). Each defendant received a sentence of life in
prison for the second degree murder conviction, and a concurrent term of 80 to 120 months for the
conspiracy to assault conviction. Defendants appeal as of right. In each of these consolidated appeals,
we affirm.
I
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Both defendants first contend that the trial court erred in denying their motions to sever the joint
trials of Sylvester, Jones, Evee Demarko Cooper and Christopher Robert Mitchell because all four
defendants possessed antagonistic trial defenses.
[P]ursuant to MCL 768.5; MSA 28.1028, and MCR 6.121(D), the decision to
sever or join defendants lies within the discretion of the trial court. Severance is
mandated under MCR 6.121(C) only when a defendant provides the court with a
supporting affidavit, or makes an offer of proof, that clearly, affirmatively, and fully
demonstrates that his substantial rights will be prejudiced and that severance is the
necessary means of rectifying the potential prejudice. The failure to make this showing
in the trial court, absent any significant indication on appeal that the requisite prejudice in
fact occurred at trial, will preclude reversal of a joinder decision. [People v Hana, 447
Mich 325, 346; 524 NW2d 682 (1994).]
There is a strong policy favoring joint trials in the interests of justice, judicial economy and
administration, and a defendant does not have an absolute right to a separate trial. People v Etheridge,
196 Mich App 43, 52; 492 NW2d 490 (1992). Severance should be granted only if there is a serious
risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury
from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence. Id. at 359-360.
At trial, all four defendants moved for severance on the basis that during a joint trial each
defendant would attempt to minimize his own involvement in the crime while maximizing the other
defendants’ culpability. While a joint trial of codefendants presenting antagonistic defenses has serious
negative implications for the accused, the standard for severance is not lessened in this situation. Hana,
supra at 347. Mere inconsistency of defenses is not enough to mandate severance; rather, the defenses
must be mutually exclusive or irreconcilable. “[D]efenses are mutually exclusive within the meaning of
this rule if the jury, in order to believe the core evidence offered on behalf of one defendant, must
disbelieve the core of the evidence offered on behalf of the codefendant.” Id. at 349-350. Incidental
spillover prejudice, which is almost inevitable in a multidefendant trial, does not suffice. Id. at 349.
The four defendants essentially conceded at trial that Cooper commenced the assault on the
victim by striking him twice in the face before returning to his bunk, and that Sylvester, Jones and
Mitchell subsequently continued the victim’s beating by gathering around the victim’s body and
punching, kicking and stomping the victim. Moreover, defendant Jones did not contest that he had
jumped from a top bunk bed onto the victim’s body. Instead, Sylvester, Jones and Mitchell attempted
to suggest that the other defendants inflicted the critical damage to the victim’s head. These individual
defense theories are merely inconsistent with respect to the extent of each defendant’s participation in
the group beating and the extent of damage each defendant inflicted on the victim’s brain. None of the
defenses are so mutually exclusive that they require the jury to conclude that only certain defendants
attacked the victim while others did not. Hana, supra at 349-350.
Furthermore, the prosecutor pursued murder convictions pursuant to an aiding and abetting
theory of liability. To establish guilt under an aiding and abetting theory, the prosecutor must show that
(1) the crime charged was committed by the defendant or some other person, (2) the defendant
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performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted the commission of the crime, and (3) the defendant
intended the commission of the crime or had knowledge that the principal intended its commission at the
time he gave aid and encouragement. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 768; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
An aider or abettor “may . . . be prosecuted, indicted, tried and on conviction shall be punished as if he
had directly committed such offense.” MCL 767.39; MSA 28.979. The Supreme Court in Hana
stated as follows regarding the aiding and abetting theory in the context of a joint trial:
The risk of prejudice is reduced even more in these cases by the significant fact
that the prosecutor charged defendant . . . as an aider and abettor, MCL 767.39; MSA
28.979, and did not contend that he fired the fatal shot. Finger pointing by the
defendants when such a prosecution theory is pursued does not create mutually
exclusive antagonistic defenses. The properly instructed jury could have found both
defendants similarly liable without any prejudice or inconsistency because one found
guilty of aiding and abetting can also be held liable as a principal. [Hana, supra at 360
361.]
To the extent that at trial the defendants’ defenses focused on the allegedly varying degrees of each
other’s participation in the beating, any distinctions in this respect cannot be deemed material when each
defendant remains potentially liable as an aider and abettor on the basis of his participation, irrespective
of the degree of injury his own blows may have inflicted. We therefore conclude that the defendants at
trial did not possess mutually exclusive defenses, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying defendants’ severance motions.
II
Defendant Sylvester next argues that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury pursuant
to CJI2d 16.15, which would have permitted the jury to determine that Jones’ leap from the bunk onto
the victim represented an independent intervening cause of the victim’s death that absolved Sylvester of
any liability for his participation in the beating. The trial judge bears responsibility for instructing the jury
regarding the l w applicable to the case, and fully and fairly presenting the case to the jury in an
a
understandable manner. People v Moore, 189 Mich App 315, 319; 472 NW2d 1 (1991). The failure
to give a requested instruction constitutes error requiring reversal only if the requested instruction (1) is
substantially correct, (2) was not substantially covered in the charge given to the jury, and (3) concerns
an important point in the trial so that the failure to give it seriously impaired the defendant’s ability to
effectively present a given defense. People v Moldenhauer, 210 Mich App 158, 159-160; 533
NW2d 9 (1995).
Defendant Sylvester incorrectly argues that CJI2d 16.15 applies to the facts of this case. This
instruction’s language that “[i]t is not enough that the defendant’s act made it possible for the death to
occur” contradicts the theory of aiding and abetting liability that the trial court presented to the jury.
Pursuant to the theory of aiding and abetting liability, Sylvester’s participation in the victim’s beating
renders him liable for murder of some degree, or one of several lesser included offenses irrespective of
whether one of his blows or one of Jones’ blows could arguably be considered the definitively fatal
blow. This contradiction between CJI2d 16.15 and the aiding and abetting instructions explains the
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CJI2d 16.15 use note’s admonition, “Do not use this instruction for cases involving aiding and abetting,
concert of action, or conspiracy.” Because CJI2d 16.15 did not correctly apply within the context of
the instant case’s facts, charges and theories, and because the trial court’s instructions otherwise fully
and fairly presented the case to the jury in an understandable manner, the trial court properly refused
defendant’s requested instruction. Moldenhauer, supra; Moore, supra.
III
Defendant Sylvester also contends that the trial court improperly denied his motion for directed
verdict regarding the first degree murder charge because no evidence showed that he either intended to
kill the victim or premeditated and deliberated the crime. In reviewing a motion for a directed verdict of
acquittal, a court must consider the evidence presented by the prosecutor up to the time the motion is
made in the light most favorable to the prosecutor, and determine whether a rational trier of fact could
have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v
Vincent, 455 Mich 110, 121; 565 NW2d 629 (1997). Circumstantial evidence and reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom may be sufficient to prove the elements of a crime. People v Jolly, 442
Mich 458, 466; 502 NW2d 177 (1993).
Viewing the evidence presented at trial and the reasonable inferences arising therefrom in the
light most favorable to the prosecutor, a reasonable jury could have concluded beyond any reasonable
doubt that defendant Sylvester acted with intent to kill the victim and premeditated and deliberated his
attack on the victim. With respect to Sylvester’s intent to kill, this may reasonably be inferred from the
brutality and length of the beating the victim suffered. People v Hoffmeister, 394 Mich 155, 160; 229
NW2d 305 (1975). Some testimony estimated that Jones, Sylvester and Mitchell continuously and
repeatedly over a two-minute period kicked and stomped on the victim’s head.
Premeditation and deliberation may be established through evidence indicating a possible motive
to kill the victim, together with evidence of a defendant’s actions before the killing and the circumstances
of the killing itself. People v Schollaert, 194 Mich App 158; 486 NW2d 312 (1992); People v
Conklin, 118 Mich App 90, 93; 324 NW2d 537 (1982). Regarding possible motives to kill the victim
in this case, some testimony showed that the victim behaved in a confrontational manner on the morning
of the assault, and shortly before the beating commenced many of the cellmates, including Sylvester,
Jones, Mitchell and Cooper, read from some papers brought into the cell that the victim had been
charged with gross indecency involving another man. Following this discovery, Sylvester suggested to
the inmates gathered around the cell table that the first one to roll seven starts it (the fight) off. Dice then
proceeded several times around the table of six to eight inmates before Cooper rolled seven. Cooper
then left the table, approached the victim, spoke with him briefly, then twice punched the victim’s face.
Immediately thereafter, Sylvester, Jones and Mitchell together descended on the victim, punching him
down to one knee and then down to the ground. Sylvester, Jones and Mitchell then repeatedly
stomped, kicked the victim at or near his head, with Jones even leaping from a bunk onto the victim’s
head. From the totality of these circumstances, a jury could have reasonably concluded that Sylvester,
Jones, Mitchell and Cooper premeditated and deliberated the victim’s murder, and that the time they
spent rolling dice before the attack and the two minute length of the beating afforded ample opportunity
for defendant Sylvester to reconsider the murder. People v Anderson, 209 Mich App 527, 537-538;
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531 NW2d 780 (1995); Schollaert, supra at 170. Therefore, the trial court properly denied the
motion for directed verdict.
IV
Defendant Sylvester lastly claims that his life sentence represents a disproportionate sentence
and cruel and unusual punishment. Sylvester’s sentencing information report places him within second
degree murder offense level IV-C of the sentencing guidelines, which recommend fifteen to thirty years
or life. Because Sylvester’s sentence falls within the guidelines’ range, it is presumed proportionate.
People v Kennebrew, 220 Mich App 601, 609; 560 NW2d 354 (1996). In light of the brutal nature
of the beating, the lack of significant provocation, and the fact that defendant accumulated several
convictions by his twentieth birthday, and absent any suggestion by defendant that some unusual
circumstances warranted a lesser sentence, we find the life sentence proportionate to the circumstances
surrounding defendant and his crime. People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 635-636, 661; 461 NW2d
1 (1990). Furthermore, because defendant’s sentence is proportionate, it represents neither cruel or
unusual punishment under the Michigan Constitution nor cruel and unusual punishment under the United
States Constitution. People v Bullock, 440 Mich 15, 27-31; 485 NW2d 866 (1992); People v
Williams (After Remand), 198 Mich App 537, 543; 499 NW2d 404 (1993).
V
Defendant Jones contends that his lack of representation by counsel during a critical stage of the
trial proceedings, specifically the prosecutor’s motion one day prior to trial to amend his witness list,
deprived Jones of due process and a fair trial. Because defendant never raised an objection to this lack
of representation before the trial court, we “should reverse only [if] the defendant is actually innocent or
the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of [the] judicial proceedings.”
Carines, supra at 774. The prosecutor’s addition to his witness list of Helen Randolph, the substance
of whose testimony was that she spoke with defendant at or near the time of his death and heard noise
in the background, did not constitute “prosecutorial activity which has some effect on the determination
of guilt or innocence which could properly be avoided, or mitigated, by the presence of counsel.”
People v Killebrew, 16 Mich App 624, 627; 168 NW2d 423 (1969). Even assuming that the motion
hearing qualified as a critical stage of the proceedings, defendant Jones has failed to explain how his lack
of counsel prejudiced him when other defense counsel present objected to Randolph’s addition to the
list. Therefore, we find no error requiring reversal. Carines, supra.
VI
Defendant Jones next argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by calling four inmate
witnesses while knowing that these witnesses would refuse to testify concerning the victim’s beating,
thus effectively invoking their Fifth Amendment rights. The prosecutor’s calling of a witness who
invokes his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination may result in some level of error,
constitutional or evidentiary. People v Gearns, 457 Mich 170; 577 NW2d 422 (1998). In this case,
however, none of the witnesses about whose testimony defendant complains in fact invoked his Fifth
Amendment rights. Consequently, all four trial defense counsel had the opportunity to cross examine
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the witnesses who incredibly disclaimed knowledge of the victim’s beating to ascertain the bases for the
witnesses’ lacks of knowledge and to negate any alleged inference that these witnesses were somehow
associated with the four trial defendants. Because defendant Jones offers no authority to support his
suggestion that a witness’ evasive testimony effectively parallels a witness’ invocation of his Fifth
Amendment rights, we need not further review this issue. People v Sowders, 164 Mich App 36, 49;
417 NW2d 78 (1987) (finding claims of error abandoned on appeal because no support was cited for
the argument).
VII
Defendant Jones additionally asserts that the trial court improperly admitted several unfairly
prejudicial autopsy photographs of the victim’s skull and brain. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting the photographs. People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 76; 537 NW2d 909 (1995).
The photographs, taken one day after the victim’s death and which illustrated the location, nature and
extent of the victim’s injuries, were relevant proof with respect to whether the four trial defendants
possessed the specific intent to kill the victim and whether the four trial defendants premeditated and
deliberated the murder. MRE 401; Mills, supra at 71; Anderson, supra at 536. Furthermore, the
forensic pathologist testified that the photographs would assist him in conveying the nature and extent of
the victim’s injuries, and the photographs thus were relevant to this witness’ credibility. Mills, supra at
72-73. Given the photographs’ relevance to these several purposes, we conclude that any potential
unfair prejudice arising fom the photographs’ gruesome nature did not substantially outweigh their
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significant probative value. MRE 403; Mills, supra at 74-80.
VIII
Lastly, Defendant Jones claims that the trial court incorrectly assigned to second degree murder
offense variable (OV) four twenty-five points on the basis of an aggravated physical assault when Jones
already “was charged and convicted of Assault with Intent to Commit Great Bodily Harm, which
conviction naturally encompasses an aggravated physical assault. Thus, defendant was convicted of
such an offense and then subsequently scored again for such an offense on the sentencing information
report.” Because defendant raises no challenge to the factual predicate on which his sentence rests, but
instead argues that the trial court misinterpreted and therefore misapplied OV four, defendant has failed
to state a cognizable claim for relief. People v Mitchell, 454 Mich 145, 175-177; 560 NW2d 600
(1997) (“[A]pplication of the guidelines states a cognizable claim on appeal only where (1) a factual
predicate is wholly unsupported, (2) a factual predicate is materially false, and (3) the sentence is
disproportionate.”). Furthermore, in light of the brutal nature of the crime, defendant Jones’ actions,
which included at least once jumping off the bunk bed onto the victim’s head, and Jones’ criminal
background, we find his life sentence proportionate. Milbourn, supra at 635-636.
Affirmed.
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
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