PEOPLE OF MI V JAMES RANDOLPH ROBERTS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 22, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 213325
LC No. 91-002045-FH
JAMES RANDOLPH ROBERTS,
Defendant,
and
DEAN C. METRY,
Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 214277
LC No. 91-002045-FH
JAMES RANDOLPH ROBERTS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Hood, P.J., and Smolenski and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In Docket No. 214277, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of concealing a motor vehicle
with the intent to mislead, MCL 750.415(2); MSA 28.647(2), and one count of receiving stolen
property exceeding $100, MCL 750.535(1); MSA 28.803(1). He was sentenced to thirty-two to
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forty-eight months’ imprisonment for concealing with the intent to mislead and forty to sixty months’
imprisonment for receiving stolen property exceeding $100 with credit for 906 days served. As part of
a plea agreement, an habitual offender charge was dismissed. Defendant appeals as of right. We
affirm. In Docket No. 213325, defendant’s attorney, Dean Metry, appeals from an order holding him
in contempt of court for failing to prepare a writ of habeas corpus authorizing defendant’s presence at
sentencing. We reverse.
Defendant’s sole claim in Docket No. 214277 is that the trial court considered inaccurate
information in imposing sentence. A claim that a sentence is based on inaccurate information is a due
process claim. People v Potts, 55 Mich App 622, 639; 223 NW2d 96 (1974). We review
constitutional claims de novo. People v White, 212 Mich App 298, 304-305; 536 NW2d 876
(1995). Defendant contends that in sentencing him, the trial court considered information regarding a
pending charge in the state of Tennessee for theft over $10,000. This information was contained in
defendant’s presentence investigation report and objected to by defendant at his sentencing hearing.
According to defendant, this charge had been dismissed.
A defendant is entitled to be sentenced based on accurate information. People v Smith, 423
Mich 427, 448; 378 NW2d 384 (1985). The purpose of the presentence investigation report is to give
the sentencing court as much information as possible so that the sentence can be tailored to both the
offense and the offender. People v Miles, 454 Mich 90, 97; 559 NW2d 299 (1997). The sentencing
court is permitted to consider facts underlying uncharged offenses, pending charges, and acquittals.
People v Coulter (After Remand), 205 Mich App 453, 456; 517 NW2d 827 (1994). When a
defendant claims that a presentence report contains an error, and a sentencing court disregards
information challenged as inaccurate, the court effectively determines that the information is irrelevant
and the defendant is entitled to have the information stricken from the report. People v Swartz, 171
Mich App 364, 381; 429 NW2d 905 (1988). The failure to strike disregarded information can be
harmless error. People v Fisher, 442 Mich 560, 567 n 4; 503 NW2d 50 (1993).
In this case, we conclude the trial court did not consider the pending Tennessee charge alone
but, rather, considered defendant’s entire pattern of past criminal behavior as set forth in the PSIR.
Although there was some dispute on the record, defendant admitted that he had at least five prior felony
convictions and the PSIR demonstrated that defendant had “an extensive criminal record that span[ned]
more than 20 years.” Further, at the time of his sentencing, defendant was serving a two-to-twenty
year state sentence for intent to pass a false title and a concurrent federal sentence of fifteen months for
fraud. The record indicates defendant had no employment except that of a “career criminal,” and that
his life had been one of “stealing, cheating, and sponging off anyone who’s available.” Moreover, even
if the trial court did consider the disputed information and failed to strike it, this error was harmless;
minus the pending Tennessee charge, defendant’s criminal history remained “extensive” and his sentence
was not disproportionate. See People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630; 461 NW2d 1 (1990).
We next turn to defense counsel’s challenge in Docket No. 213325 to the trial court’s decision
to hold counsel in contempt for failing to writ defendant for sentencing on two separate occasions and
the court’s order that counsel pay $400 to a charity of counsel’s choice. Defense counsel argues that
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the trial court abused its discretion when it found him in contempt of court. We agree. MCL
600.1701; MSA 27A.1701 states, in pertinent part:
The supreme court, circuit courts, and all other courts of record, have power to
punish by fine or imprisonment, or both, persons guilty of any neglect or violation of
duty or misconduct in all of the following cases:
***
(c) All attorneys . . . for any willful neglect or violation of duty, for disobedience
of any process of the court, or any lawful order of the court . . . .
Contempt of court is a willful act, omission, or statement tending to impair the authority or
impede the functioning of a court. In re Contempt of Robertson, 209 Mich App 433, 436; 531
NW2d 763 (1995). The power to punish for contempt is awesome and carries with it the equally great
responsibility to apply it judiciously and only when the contempt is clearly and unequivocally shown.
People v Kurz, 35 Mich App 643, 651; 192 NW2d 594 (1972).
All contempt is either direct or indirect. Williams Int’l Corp v Smith, 144 Mich App 257,
262; 375 NW2d 408 (1995), rev’d on other grounds sub nom In re Contempt of Dougherty, 429
Mich 81; 413 NW2d 392 (1987). Contempt is direct if committed in the immediate view and presence
of a sitting court and may be punished summarily. Robertson, supra at 437-438; Williams, supra at
262. Direct contempt occurs when all the facts necessary to find the contempt are within the personal
knowledge of the judge. Id. Indirect contempt is committed outside the immediate view of the court
and cannot be punished summarily. Id. Here, we conclude that defense counsel’s contempt was direct.
In the trial court’s presence, defense counsel admitted to being aware of the court’s expectation and of
having knowledge of the court’s procedure, yet he chose not to initiate a writ of habeas corpus for his
client’s sentencing hearing. Furthermore, contempt may be civil or criminal, depending on the purpose
sought to be achieved. Spalter v Wayne Circuit Judge, 35 Mich App 156, 160; 192 NW2d 347
(1971). “If it is to punish the offender for his disobedience or contumacious behavior, then it is criminal
contempt. If, however, the purpose is to compel obedience to an order of the court, then it is civil
contempt.” Id. at 160-161. On review of the record, we conclude that defense counsel was found in
criminal contempt.
The record shows that the prosecuting attorney attempted to address the issue of who was
responsible for ensuring that an incarcerated defendant was present at sentencing by implementing an
administrative policy placing this responsibility on defense counsel. The record also shows that no
written order or general or local court rule existed directing defense attorneys practicing in St. Clair
County to writ their clients in for sentencing. However, the record does demonstrate that on two
separate occasions, the trial court verbally directed defense counsel to produce his client and that
defense counsel failed to do so. In our view, the real question in this matter is whether defense counsel
should have been cited for contempt. Administrative policies are permitted only for the limited purpose
of governing internal court management. Schlender v Schlender, 235 Mich App 230, 232; 596
NW2d 643 (1999). Where an administrative policy extends beyond court management, it is
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considered more an attempt at promulgating a local court rule. Id. Circuit courts are permitted to
adopt local court rules, but the rules must be submitted to and approved by the Supreme Court if they
are to be enforced. Id. See also MCR 8.112(A)(2).
We conclude that the prosecuting attorney’s letter to the judges and court administrators
informing them of the county’s policy regarding writs exceeded the limited purpose of governing internal
court management. The policy not only affected the procedural operation of the prosecutor’s office but
also directly impacted every defense attorney practicing within St. Clair County. Because the
prosecuting attorney’s policy extended beyond internal court management, it must be considered an
attempt at promulgating a local court rule. However, the record is devoid of any indication that this
policy was submitted to and approved by the Supreme Court. It was therefore unenforceable as a local
court rule.
Moreover, the record shows that on each occasion the trial court directed defense counsel that
it was his responsibility to writ his client in for sentencing, the directive was oral. The record further
shows that the trial court refused to issue a written order requiring defense counsel to take the requested
action. However, a court speaks through written judgments and orders rather than oral statements or
written opinions. People v Jones, 203 Mich App 74, 82; 512 NW2d 26 (1994). Although defense
counsel’s actions in defying the trial court’s requests were clearly and unequivocally shown, we
conclude that the trial court acted without judicious responsibility in relying on the prosecuting attorney’s
administrative policy and in refusing to enter a written order directing defense counsel to writ in his
client. In doing so, the trial court abused its discretion in summarily punishing defense counsel. The
absence of a lawful written order, court rule, or other authority should have been considered by the trial
court before finding counsel in contempt. While the trial court’s frustration with defense counsel’s
inaction in producing his client may be understandable, it was incumbent on the court to invoke proper
and responsible authority in concluding that counsel was in contempt.
We therefore conclude that the trial court abused its discretion and reverse its contempt order
against defense counsel. Docket No. 214277 affirmed; Docket No. 213325 reversed.
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
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