IN RE J EDWARD KLOIAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In re J. EDWARD KLOIAN.
J. EDWARD KLOIAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 11, 2000
Petitioner-Appellant,
v
ROBERT G. MORRISON, and JAMES WINES,
No. 213480
Washtenaw Probate Court
LC No. 98-112351 PO
Respondent-Appellee.
Before: Hood, P.J., and Smolenski and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner appeals as of right from the probate court’s order denying his petition for a protective
order. We affirm.
On April 21, 1998, a petition requesting a protective order was filed. In the petition, it was
requested that:
[T]he court enter a protective order which provides for a stay of proceeding in
circuit court pending hearing on petition and scheduling cases so that I [petitioner] won’t
be overwhelmed & disfunctional [sic].
On May 8, 1998, respondent James Wines filed, as an interested party, an answer and objection to the
petition. Wines asserted that petitioner had previously requested the appointment of a conservator in
probate court, but had rejected the conditions of appointment. As a result of the rejection of the terms,
the prior petition had been dismissed. Wines asserted that petitioner was seeking to delay other
litigation to which Wines was a party. An order denying the prior petition for conservatorship was
submitted with Wines’ objections to petitioner’s request for a protective order. On May 22, 1998,
respondent Robert Morrison filed an answer to the petition for protective order which requested
outright dismissal based on the deficiencies of the prior petition.
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On June 25, 1998, the probate court heard oral arguments regarding the request for protective
order. At the hearing, petitioner’s counsel objected to respondents’ presence, alleging that they were
not interested parties as defined by statute. The probate court rejected counsel’s assertion and allowed
respondents to state their positions regarding the petition. At the hearing, counsel acknowledged that
his request for a protective order sought the appointment of a “special scheduling master to coordinate
the litigation cases and space them far enough apart so that the scheduling does not interfere with the
disability [depression] of Mr. Kloian [petitioner].” Counsel asserted that actions were pending in
Washtenaw Circuit Court, Oakland Circuit Court, and in “any of the district courts.” The probate court
rejected petitioner’s argument that failure to appoint a special master would deny petitioner access to
the courts based on his disability. Additionally, counsel admitted that although he was hired to represent
petitioner’s interests, he had not attempted to contact the attorneys in the various cases to address
scheduling issues. The probate court heard additional arguments regarding res judicata before indicating
that a written opinion would issue.
On July 9, 1998, the probate court denied the petition in an opinion and order. The probate
court held that there were procedural deficiencies in the petition, and it failed to establish that petitioner
had been denied access to the courts. However, even assuming that petitioner could correct those
deficiencies, the probate court held that an order appointing a special master could not “empower that
individual to schedule cases in Washtenaw County Circuit Court, much less Oakland County Circuit
Court.” (emphasis in original).
Petitioner raises various arguments on appeal. However, we need not address the merits of
those arguments because we conclude that the probate court lacked jurisdiction to grant the petition.
While petitioner correctly notes that MCL 700.461; MSA 27.5461 and MCL 700.469; MSA 27.5469
govern protective proceedings, petitioner has failed to address the limitations on the probate court’s
jurisdiction of those proceedings. MCL 700.462(c); MSA 27.5462(c) provides that the provide court
has concurrent jurisdiction “to determine the validity of claims” against the protected person and his title
to any property or claim. In the present case, petitioner has not asked the probate court to examine the
validity of claims brought in circuit court, but rather, has asked the probate court to intervene in the
scheduling of those matters. Accordingly, because the probate court lacked jurisdiction of the
requested relief contained in the petition, it lacked the authority to order a special master to intervene in
the scheduling of the various circuit court matters.
Even if we could conclude that the probate court had jurisdiction over the present matter,
petitioner has failed to establish that there would be waste or dissipation unless a special master was
appointed. MCL 700.461; MSA 27.5461. Petitioner is represented by counsel in the various legal
proceedings in circuit court to guard against any waste or dissipation.1
Affirmed.
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
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1
We also question whether petitioner has presented a justicable controversy. At the hearing regarding
the petition, the probate court inquired whether petitioner’s counsel had attempted to contact the
attorneys involved in the circuit court actions. Counsel for petitioner admitted that he had not. MCR
2.401(A) and MCR 2.401(B)(2)(c)(i) provides that the circuit court has discretion regarding scheduling
matters and a party may object to a scheduling order. There is no indication in the record that
petitioner’s counsel requested that the circuit court exercise its discretion in scheduling matters to
alleviate the effects of petitioner’s depression. Furthermore, we question whether the issue is moot
because we arguably can no longer fashion a remedy. Frericks v Highland Twp, 228 Mich App 575,
586; 579 NW2d 441 (1998). There was no request for a stay of proceedings, any such stay would not
have affected the circuit court actions, and it has been over a year since the claim of appeal was filed.
Arguably, the scheduling issues are moot due to the passage of time.
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