MARGARET HINMAN V UTICA COMMUNITY SCHOOLS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MARGARET HINMAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 11, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 211855
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 96-007999-CZ
UTICA COMMUNITY SCHOOLS,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Hood, P.J., and Smolenski and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from an order granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition
under MCR 2.116(C)(10), thereby dismissing plaintiff’s claims for age discrimination under the Civil
Rights Act, MCL 37.2202(1)(a); MSA 3.548(202)(1)(a). We affirm.
A trial court's grant or denial of summary disposition is reviewed de novo. Spiek v Dep’t of
Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998).
A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of the
complaint. In evaluating a motion for summary disposition brought under this
subsection, a trial court considers affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and
other evidence submitted by the parties, MCR 2.116(G)(5), in the light most favorable
to the party opposing the motion. Where the proffered evidence fails to establish a
genuine issue regarding any material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. MCR 2.116(C)(10), (G)(4). Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich
358; 547 NW2d 314 (1996). [Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 119-120; 597
NW2d 817 (1999).]
The party opposing the motion has the burden of showing by evidentiary materials that a genuine issue
of disputed fact exists. Skinner v Square D Co, 445 Mich 153, 160; 516 NW2d 475 (1994).
To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she suffered an adverse employment
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action [failure to hire]; (3) she was qualified for the position; and (4) she was not hired under
circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. Lytle v Malady (On Rehearing),
458 Mich 153, 172-173, 177; 579 NW2d 906 (1998), citing McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green,
411 US 792; 93 S Ct 1817; 36 L Ed2d 668 (1973); see also Town v Michigan Bell, 455 Mich 688,
697; 568 NW2d 64 (1997). Once plaintiff has established a prima facie case, a presumption of
discrimination arises, and the burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate a "legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason" for plaintiff's adverse employment action to dispel this presumption. Lytle,
supra at 176. “[I]n the context of summary disposition, a plaintiff must prove discrimination with
admissible evidence, either direct or circumstantial, sufficient to permit a reasonable trier of fact to
conclude that discrimination was a motivating factor for the adverse action taken by the employer
toward the plaintiff.” Id.
In this case, plaintiff filed a two-count complaint, alleging intentional and disparate impact age
discrimination based on defendant’s refusal to hire her as an elementary school teacher. On appeal,
plaintiff does not challenge the dismissal of her disparate impact claim, but only contends that the trial
court erred in dismissing her claim of intentional age discrimination. We disagree.
Assuming that plaintiff established a prima facie case of age discrimination, defendant
established a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for not hiring plaintiff, setting forth evidence that
plaintiff was not hired because she was not as qualified as other applicants. Defendant presented
evidence that plaintiff did not do well on her interview, scoring four out of a possible ten points, and that
her “perceiver interview” score was thirty-three, whereas individuals under the age of forty received an
average score of thirty-seven. In his deposition, defendant’s current personnel director, Glenn
Patterson, testified that an applicant was not likely to be hired if he or she had a low interview score, but
would be “considered as one of many, many candidates.” Patterson averred in his affidavit that plaintiff
was not hired because her interview score was low, she was not recommended by a school principal or
administrator, and her immediate supervisor had given only a neutral recommendation about her
qualifications. Moreover, plaintiff had not taught as an elementary school teacher for eighteen years,
and her more recent teaching experience was as an adult education teacher with class sizes ranging from
five to seventeen students, whereas she would be required to teach twenty-five to thirty-five children in
an elementary school classroom. Based on this evidence, defendant rebutted any presumption of age
discrimination, clearly articulating legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for not hiring plaintiff.
In opposition to defendant’s motion, plaintiff presented the affidavit of Joan Uhrick, an adult
education teacher who sought a position in the K-12 program during the 1980s, when she was in her
forties. Uhrick’s affidavit indicated that Mr. Michael Murphy, the former personnel director, told her
that “if he had a twenty-three year old competing against a fifty year old for employment, he would hire
the twenty-three year old every time because she was younger.” Plaintiff also presented the affidavit of
Nora Lee Jobe, an adult education teacher over forty years old, who, although hired for a full-time
position, claimed that “it was extremely difficult for an adult education teacher to obtain a position” and
that it was easier for “recent college graduates, which [sic] are the primary applicants hired for teaching
positions in this school district.” Plaintiff also presented the affidavit of Linda Visnaw, who was
associated with adult education in Utica for twenty-three years and was the supervisor of adult
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education until April 1995. Visnaw stated that defendant’s personnel office did not consider adult
education teachers for full-time positions in the day program, primarily because they were teachers in
their forties.
Notwithstanding this documentary support, we do not believe that plaintiff thereby raised a
triable issue that age was “a motivating factor” underlying defendant’s decision not to hire her as a full
time teacher in the K-8 program. As the trial court observed, defendant presented evidence showing
that it had hired certified K-12 teachers from the protected class. Hiring records from 1992 indicated
that five of sixteen people hired for K-6 teaching positions were over the age of forty, and records from
1996 indicated that four of the thirty-three teachers hired were over the age of forty. Although plaintiff
claimed that defendant did not hire teachers from the adult education program to teach in the K-12
program, the trial court correctly observed that adult education teachers are not members of a protected
class. Even so, evidence was presented that defendant had hired nine teachers from the adult education
program in recent years, including six teachers who were over the age of forty.
As the trial court indicated, “[t]he fact that Defendant hired more younger people as teachers
than older people, by itself, will not support a claim of age discrimination. Eliel v Sears, Roebuck &
Co, 150 Mich App 137, 141; 387 NW2d 842 (1985).” Moreover, as defendant notes, simply casting
suspicion upon its legitimate reasons for its action does not raise a genuine issue of material fact showing
that age was “a motivating factor” underlying its decision not to hire plaintiff, see Irvin v Airco
Carbide, 837 F2d 724, 726 (CA 6, 1987), nor does the mere fact that it used subjective tests, such as
a screening interviews, standing alone, raise a triable issue of age discrimination. See also Grano v The
Dept of Development of the City of Columbus, 699 F2d 836, 837 (CA 6, 1983) (“[t]he ultimate
issue . . . is whether the subjective criteria were used to disguise discriminatory action”). Accordingly,
we conclude that summary disposition was properly granted.
Affirmed.
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
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